

Letter of 12 May 2023 from the Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation to the President of the House of Representatives on the government's policy on strategic dependencies

We – the Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation – are writing to the House, in close consultation with other relevant ministries, to present the government's approach to the issue of strategic dependencies, in line with the undertaking given on 23 November 2022.¹

In accordance with that undertaking, this letter deals with the specific aims and activities of the Task Force on Strategic Dependencies ('the Task Force'). The House was informed about the establishment of the Task Force in the letter on Open Strategic Autonomy (OSA) of 8 November 2022.² The House was informed about the initial plans for the Task Force in the report of 31 January 2023 on the Foreign Affairs Council.³ The present letter also implements the motion submitted by MP Tunahan Kuzu, of the DENK Party.⁴

Core points

The government is well aware of the need to reinforce the geopolitical and geo-economic position of the EU and the Netherlands in the world, in order to be able to continue safeguarding national and European public interests. Reducing high-risk strategic dependencies is a part of this process, and the EU is the main platform for action. Reliable value chains are crucial for maintaining both our earning capacity and our national security.

A clear example of a high-risk strategic dependency – and a procedure to phase it out – arose last year: on 22 April 2022 the government wrote that it intended to end the Netherlands' dependence on Russian fossil fuels by the end of 2022, and on 10 February 2023 the government indicated that the Netherlands was importing almost no more Russian energy.⁵ Companies themselves bear primary responsibility for mitigating risks in their own value chains. However, in situations where far-reaching action is called for in order to mitigate the risks of strategic dependencies, the government is prepared to take these steps. This was the case when phasing out the Netherlands' dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Yet, as this example shows, drastic and/or acute state intervention entails high costs, not only in the form of higher private and public expenditure, but also in terms of the direct and indirect impact on the business and investment climate. It is therefore important to always make a careful assessment of whether state intervention is truly needed, and if so, to what degree. The government's preference is for early action, with as little market distortion as possible, and the decision-making process should always take account of the private sector's own responsibility for mitigating strategic dependencies. This requires regular meetings and consultation with the business community. In addition, the mitigation of high-risk strategic dependencies in complex value chains is often accompanied by more uncertainty than the example of Russian fossil fuels. The sheer number of indirect political and economic repercussions complicates the cost-benefit analysis.

Strategic dependencies can be found in many different value chains and sectors, and as a result they touch on the policy areas of multiple ministries. As noted in the Security Strategy for the Kingdom of

¹ Proceedings of the House of Representatives 2022/23, no. 26, item 10.

² Parliamentary Paper 35 982, no. 9.

³ Parliamentary Paper 21 501-02, no. 2602.

⁴ Parliamentary Paper 36 200 V, no. 50.

⁵ [Netherlands no longer dependent on Russian energy | News item | government.nl](#)

the Netherlands, which was shared with the House on 3 April, there are four areas that require additional attention: i) critical raw materials and energy (including fossil fuels); ii) digital and high-value technological applications; iii) medical products; and iv) food security.⁶ Identifying high-risk strategic dependencies is a complex and time-consuming process. Many studies that have been initiated are not yet complete. This letter examines the provisional assessment of the strategic dependencies identified in the Geo-Economic Monitor, including mitigating measures that are being taken. It should be noted in this connection that on account of strategic and national security considerations, we must be careful about how openly we communicate about vulnerabilities in the Dutch and European economies.

The House is regularly updated by the ministries responsible on how strategic dependencies are being dealt with.⁷ The government is already taking various steps to reduce the Netherlands' high-risk strategic dependencies. This is being done at both national and European level.⁸ Recent tangible examples of this include the National Raw Materials Strategy and the upcoming National Technology Strategy.

Given the interministerial dimension of this issue, a government-wide approach is necessary. In presenting this approach and the role of the Task Force within it, this letter discusses i) the definition and identification of high-risk strategic dependencies; ii) the principles governing the mitigation of these dependencies; iii) the core duties of the Task Force, complementary to the responsibilities of the individual ministries and iv) a timeline for the Task Force's activities.

1. Defining and identifying high-risk strategic dependencies

1.1 The definition of high-risk strategic dependencies

The government-wide approach seeks to address high-risk strategic dependencies between countries. **Dependencies** are not by definition problematic: mutual dependencies are the cornerstone of the global trade system. This creates the conditions for specialisation, encourages innovation, keeps products accessible, enables the circulation of scientific knowledge and increases purchasing power. We use the term 'dependency' for the Netherlands if (i) we import a large amount of a product, service or technology (relative to domestic production) and (ii) that product, service or technology is imported from a limited number of non-EU countries. Both direct and indirect dependencies (trade flows via other countries) are relevant in this regard. Dependencies can also arise in relation to whether companies are under Dutch control and the Netherlands' knowledge/innovation/investment position. A dependency is **strategic** when the product, service or technology is crucial for safeguarding the public interests of the Netherlands and/or the EU, or when the dependency poses a risk to the continuity of critical processes or affords third parties access to sensitive information. In order to determine whether a particular strategic dependency should be characterised as **high-risk**, it is necessary to assess the likelihood of disruption to the supply chain. This depends on a variety of factors, including the level of market concentration and the scope for

⁶ Parliamentary Paper 30 821, no. 178. The Security Strategy also identifies 'knowledge' as a priority issue.

⁷ A non-exhaustive list: Letter to parliament on supply security of medical products and policy actions for 2023 (Parliamentary Papers 29 477 and 32 805, no. 794); letter to parliament on dependencies and human rights (Parliamentary Papers 32 735 and 35 207, no. 339), letter to parliament outlining a step-by-step plan on global food security (Parliamentary Paper 33 625, no. 341), letter to parliament on strategic dependencies in the energy sector (Parliamentary Paper 21 501-33, no. 845).

⁸ See, for example, the appendix on national and European initiatives to strengthen the OSA agenda, enclosed with the letter to parliament on Open Strategic Autonomy of 8 November 2022.

substitution, the nature of relations with the country on which we are dependent, and the degree of mutual dependence. If there is a **high risk**, the strategic dependency is characterised as such.

1.2 Identifying high-risk strategic dependencies

In order to mitigate high-risk strategic dependencies, it is first necessary to identify them with due care. Over the past few years multiple parties have attempted to identify strategic dependencies in quantitative terms, not only in the Netherlands, but also internationally and within the EU. It is in the Netherlands' interest to align with European efforts to this end and benefit from them as far as possible. A **national example** is the Geo-Economic Monitor,⁹ which the government has previously shared with the House.¹⁰ The Geo-Economic Monitor has identified 21 product groups in which the Netherlands has a strategic dependency on a non-EU country, and 11 product groups in which a *possible* strategic dependency exists. A **European example** is the methodological paper published by **DG GROW** on 18 April 2023, which presents a bottom-up, data-driven methodology for identifying strategic dependencies in the EU.¹¹ The study identified 204 products in sensitive industrial ecosystems for which the EU is dependent to a significant degree on foreign suppliers. The government is also continuing to work with and share knowledge with **international** partners outside the EU. In this connection the government will consider how lessons learned by these partners can be applied to the national or European context.

Quantitative studies of strategic dependencies, such as the Geo-Economic Monitor, are generally based on trade data gathered by Customs and thus offer a general overview of dependencies that could pose a problem to the Netherlands and the EU. However, these studies entail certain limitations with regard to the methodology and data they use. The first limitation relates to the data's level of detail. The available data is of such a high level of aggregation that these quantitative studies offer an insufficient basis to formulate concrete policy on *specific* high-risk strategic dependencies. A second limitation is that value chains are globalised to such a degree that it is extremely difficult to identify indirect dependencies on the basis of trade data (which is typically bilateral). A third limitation is that quantitative analysis offers only a limited sense of the relationship between a given dependency and a public interest, the possibility of substituting a similar product in a timely manner, and the scope for diversifying supply lines or setting up domestic production capacity within a short time span.

The limitations associated with quantitative analyses call for additional *qualitative* analysis and assessment. Ministries have already started to conduct further studies of the strategic dependencies in their policy domains that emerged from the Geo-Economic Monitor. For example, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport is examining Europe's dependence on China and other countries for active pharmaceutical ingredients in generic medicines (inset 1); the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality is looking into the dependency related to phosphorous pentoxide, a key ingredient in fertiliser (inset 2); and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy is researching dependencies related to solar panels (inset 3). Furthermore, the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) is conducting an in-depth study of the methodology used to identify strategic dependencies. By supplementing quantitative indications of strategic dependencies with qualitative analysis, the government can formulate policy with a greater degree of precision.

⁹ [Geo-Economic Monitor 2023; Updated in-depth review of Europe's strategic dependencies, 23 February 2022](#); letter to parliament on vulnerabilities within the Dutch private sector due to disruptions to global value chains (Parliamentary Paper 34 952, no. 126); [Strategic Raw Materials for Defence, HCSS 2023](#).

¹⁰ Parliamentary Paper 36 180, no. 31.

¹¹ DG GROW, [An enhanced methodology to monitor the EU's strategic dependencies and vulnerabilities](#)

There are various questions and considerations that ministries and the Task Force can incorporate into their qualitative analysis, as described above in section 1.1 on the definition of high-risk strategic dependencies. These questions are already being used by the ministries to analyse dependencies, but in a constantly evolving landscape it is advisable to periodically update and refine them. The Task Force can play a role in these efforts. See also section 3.

Inset 1 Generic medicines

The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) acknowledges the dependence on China and other countries for the production of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) for certain categories of antibiotics, as noted in the Geo-Economic Monitor. We have observed a major direct and indirect dependence on Asia (particularly China and India) for the production of APIs, especially when it comes to generic medicines (including important antibiotics). Given the obvious public interest in ensuring the availability of generic medicines, including antibiotics, this would appear to constitute a strategic dependency.

In order to gain more insight into the APIs for which the most high-risk strategic dependencies exist for Europe in terms of the availability of generic and other medicines, the European Commission, with the help of the European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and other bodies, is currently conducting a more detailed analysis. The Ministry is also taking stock of which medicines are essential for the Netherlands and which are vulnerable, so that this issue can be tackled at EU level.

As explained in the government's letter to parliament on the supply security of medical products (Parliamentary Papers 29 477 and 32 805, no. 794), the Netherlands is urging the European Commission to phase out the most high-risk strategic dependencies in a targeted way. The EU member states need to work in concert, because production chains are complex and intertwined at a global level, and EU legislation plays a key role in bringing production back to the EU. Against this backdrop of global dependencies, we are already working at national level to formulate measures to counteract sudden medicine shortages caused by supply chain disruptions. Such measures include maintaining emergency stocks and procedures for reporting and taking action on shortages (or impending shortages) (Parliamentary Papers 29 477 and 32 805, no. 806).

Inset 2 Phosphorus pentoxide

The Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality has conducted an initial assessment of a strategic dependency concerning phosphorus pentoxide, which was highlighted in the Geo-Economic Monitor. Fifty-nine per cent of the Netherlands' total imports of this substance is from China. Phosphorus pentoxide is a raw material used in the production of phosphate fertiliser, and it therefore affects the public interest of food security.

Further study by the ministry revealed that the true dependence on China for the availability of fertiliser is less clear-cut than the Monitor would suggest. That report does not take account of the fact that other variants of phosphoric acid can be used as an input in the production of fertiliser, and thus that in the event of supply issues with China substitution options exist. Analysis shows that raw materials for phosphate fertiliser production mainly come from Israel (77%) and Morocco (11.7%).

Only 1.6% of imports of phosphate fertiliser products are from China. Furthermore, in practice, more and more alternative raw materials are becoming available through recycling processes. Examples of alternative sources of phosphate include incineration ash from sewage sludge, manure and bone meal, and the recovery of struvite from at least 10 sewage purification plants. Since mid-2022 it has been possible, under the EU Fertilising Products Regulation, to use such products as raw materials for EU fertilising products.

The same analysis concerning phosphorus pentoxide shows that the quantitative findings of the Geo-Economic Monitor are not always sufficient for identifying strategic dependencies. The ministry is currently devising further research into high-risk strategic dependencies within the agricultural sector that could have implications for the food supply.

Inset 3 Solar panels

The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy has performed an initial assessment of the findings of the Geo-Economic Monitor and concluded that it is possible that not all existing strategic dependencies are mentioned in the report. Specifically, the ministry noted that, notwithstanding the Monitor's findings, there is in fact a dependency related to solar energy. Solar energy, generated with photovoltaic panels, is an essential part of the energy transition. In order to achieve the relevant goal (42.5% renewable energy by 2030, in line with the Renewable Energy Directive), a fourfold increase in solar panel capacity is needed in the years ahead. The Netherlands is highly dependent on China in this regard: the entire solar panel value chain, from raw materials to final product, is strongly concentrated in China. In the past year, China's share in, for example, polysilicon production has grown to 88%.

At both national and European level, various steps have been taken to galvanise the European and national solar panel manufacturing industry, such as the establishment of the national consortium SolarNL, the proposal for a National Growth Fund devoted to circular solar panel manufacturing, and various European initiatives (e.g. IPCEI Solar, the EU Solar Photovoltaic Industry Alliance and European Solar Manufacturing Council and the broader Net Zero Industry Act). Nevertheless, further analyses of the dependencies in this chain in the light of the relevant goals are needed before a determination can be made about whether the public interest in question is so strategic that additional state intervention is appropriate at this time.

2. Mitigating high-risk strategic dependencies

If a dependency is identified as a high-risk strategic dependency on the basis of the considerations outlined above, it is important to determine how the risks can be mitigated, in a proportionate and cost-effective way. Given the interwoven nature of the single-market economies and the EU's clout, most high-risk strategic dependencies can best be addressed at EU level.¹² This thinking is based on the principle that there are no high-risk strategic dependencies involving products, services or technologies that are fully produced within the single market, given the free movement of goods and services within the EU.

When high-risk strategic dependencies do arise, various policy options can be used to address them. These include (but are not limited to) setting up and maintaining storage or production facilities, substituting something else for the dependency in question, facilitating diversification through trade agreements, and encouraging innovation and transition processes with the help of existing funding instruments.¹³ The House was informed about this in the government's letter of 1 April 2022. In principle high-risk strategic dependencies are addressed by the market parties themselves, with the government playing a facilitating role. Existing private-sector consultation forums and the stakeholder consultation used by the Task Force can play a role in this.

A more far-reaching form of state intervention may be advisable if: i) there is a major risk that one or more public interests could be harmed; ii) the business community itself is not (yet) doing enough to mitigate the risks of the strategic dependency and the expectation is that this is unlikely to change in the short term; and/or iii) the expected benefits of state intervention are greater than the expected costs, or the costs are proportional to the public interest requiring protection. Ultimately, the decision on whether state intervention is necessary and if so, what form it should take and what resources should be used to that end, is a political one.

When it comes to mitigating high-risk strategic dependencies, there is generally a trade-off between speed and affordability. The preferred mitigation strategy will vary from case to case. In most cases, stockpiling can be done relatively quickly, but at the same time it can entail considerable costs. Mitigating a risk by facilitating diversification can be a protracted process without a guaranteed outcome. This can create attractive conditions for companies to broaden their supply channels at a relatively low cost. Reshoring, the practice of relocating production facilities to one's own country, is a long and expensive process. For example, Boston Consulting Group concluded that setting up a localised and fully self-sufficient chip industry would require an investment of at least one trillion dollars and would lead to annual incremental operating costs of \$45 to \$125 billion. This would increase the price of chips by 35-65%.¹⁴ Regardless of the solution that is ultimately pursued, phasing out high-risk strategic dependencies may be accompanied by a heightened risk that existing dependencies could be instrumentalised by state actors. It is therefore important for the members of the government to share their experiences and learn from each other when it comes to mitigating risks in different policy areas. The Task Force, which will be discussed in section 3, has an important role in this regard.

At national level, various policy measures are already in place or in development that help, either directly or indirectly, to mitigate the risks of strategic dependencies and are thus part of the government's approach. These include the National Raw Materials Strategy; the development of

¹² For a further explanation, see the letter to parliament on OSA (Parliamentary Paper 35 982, no. 9).

¹³ Letter to parliament in response to motions related to dependencies and human rights in China (Parliamentary Paper 32 735, no. 339).

¹⁴ Boston Consulting Group, [Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era | BCG](#)

knowledge-security policy further to the government's letter to parliament detailing the progress on the approach to knowledge security in higher education and science;¹⁵ and the introduction of the Security Assessment (Investments, Mergers and Acquisitions) Act (VIFO) to prevent undesirable investments, mergers and acquisitions. Export controls can also help prevent undesirable knowledge transfer. In order to encourage technological leadership in specific technologies, the government is working on the aforementioned National Technology Strategy, which is expected to be completed after the summer. The government also expects to be able to inform the House in the autumn about the specifics of its plans regarding digital open strategic autonomy (DOSA). This will be a detailed expansion of the government's OSA approach into the digital domain. Obtaining an overview of dependencies and possible cascade effects is also an important part of the approach to protecting critical infrastructure. The House will be informed later in the year about the government's enhanced approach to protecting critical infrastructure.

In addition, at EU level the Netherlands is actively working to solidify its own competitive position, foster a competitive manufacturing industry and reinforce strategic sectors.¹⁶ The risks of strategic dependencies can also be mitigated by strengthening the economic foundations of the EU, in line with the letter to parliament on OSA. This can be done through the EU Chips Act, the IPCEIs for semi-conductors, hydrogen, cloud infrastructure and medicines, and the pending IPCEI for medical technology, and by taking an active role in Commission proposals that fall under the EU Green Deal Industrial Plan, especially the Net-Zero Industry Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act. In a broad sense, active trade policy (in which trade agreements are an important instrument) helps facilitate diversification of trading partners. With regard to defence capabilities, the European Commission is currently looking into various bottlenecks that are hampering efforts to ramp up production capacity, with a view to proposing solutions. The EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence, which was published in March, underscores the strategic interest of free access to and use of space. The Netherlands is pleased with the political attention this issue is receiving and looks forward to the specific proposals that the Commission will soon present.

3. Task Force on Strategic Dependencies

In some cases additional efforts are required or existing initiatives need to be arranged coherently to ensure the success of the government's approach. This is where the interministerial Task Force on Strategic Dependencies comes in. The work of the Task Force is specifically designed to complement that of the ministries. It is co-chaired by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and any ministry may participate in it. The various ministries remain responsible for the government's approach to strategic dependencies within the sectors for which they bear responsibility. The aim of the Task Force is to promote interministerial cooperation when it comes to addressing high-risk strategic dependencies. It will also drive Dutch efforts to tackle such dependencies. The Task Force reports to the Senior Civil Service Committee on EU Affairs (HCEU). The Task Force has two core duties, which are explained below.

1. Identifying, prioritising and deepening insight into high-risk strategic dependencies

The Task Force fulfils this core duty in various ways, such as:

¹⁵ Parliamentary Paper 31 288, no. 948.

¹⁶ Letter to parliament on strategic and green industrial policy, Parliamentary Paper 29 826, no. 147.

- further developing and elaborating a quantitative and qualitative method for identifying dependencies; and
- defining areas requiring additional attention and prioritising high-risk strategic dependencies.

With regard to defining high-risk strategic dependencies, the Task Force has already come to a number of conclusions. Various strategies, studies and analyses, including those conducted in connection with the aforementioned Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, point to four specific areas that require additional attention, namely: i) critical raw materials and energy (including fossil fuels); ii) digital and high-value technological applications; iii) medical products; and iv) food security. The Task Force will focus on these areas first, in order to identify priority high-risk strategic dependencies within them. In order to offer tangible examples of how the government's approach and Task Force work in practice, the insets above explain how the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy and the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality are currently using this approach to reassess strategic dependencies in the antibiotics value chain, the solar energy value chain and the agricultural industry. However, in addition to the focus areas mentioned above, the Task Force also, in keeping with its first core duty, remains alert to high-risk strategic dependencies in other domains, such as those highlighted by the Geo-Economic Monitor, as well as potential future dependencies. For example, where necessary and supplementary to the role played by the ministries in this connection, the Task Force can help drive policy development by clarifying certain considerations and dilemmas, and by providing advice on choices that need to be made.

2. Driving the approach to specific high-risk strategic dependencies and the relevant economic, diplomatic, social and security interests

The Task Force fulfils this core duty in a variety of ways, including the following.

- Conducting geopolitical risk assessments and advising on the Netherlands' position on these issues in the EU and other relevant forums and on opportunities for working with like-minded countries, inside and outside the EU.
- Promoting policy coherence between the ministries.
- Sharing lessons learned and experiences, and discussing dilemmas related to mitigating risks associated with strategic dependencies. Ministries can provide case studies for this purpose.
- Offering advice about the point when state intervention becomes necessary, in order to supplement the action the private sector is responsible for taking.
- Involving the private sector in raising awareness about the approach to strategic dependencies, using instruments such as those offered by Invest-NL, Invest International, Atradius and the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO).

A good example of enhancing the Netherlands' ability to determine its position in the EU in this area is the government-wide effort to prepare for Spain's Presidency of the EU, in which OSA is a priority issue. The government supports this and is actively involved in the preparations. This includes the Netherlands' participation in a Spanish research project on how shared insights can be identified for a range of sectors (digital/technology, public health, food security and energy).¹⁷ All ministries are being involved in this process through the Task Force.

Stakeholder consultation

In order to gather knowledge and formulate recommendations, the Task Force will use external

¹⁷ [La Moncloa. 06/02/2023. Pedro Sánchez: 'Promoting open strategic autonomy will be one of the priorities of the Spanish Presidency of the European Union' \[President/News\]](#)

stakeholders, including think tanks and knowledge institutions. They will also consult with the private sector and engage with like-minded countries in order to identify best practices. The private sector has the information required for gaining insight into and knowledge about value chains that will make it easier to identify dependencies. In cases where strategic dependencies could be employed as leverage, it is not only countries but also companies involved in the value chain in question that may encounter negative repercussions. This is another reason the private sector's engagement is so vital. Consultations offer an opportunity to raise awareness within the private sector of the geopolitical risks to value chains. Primary responsibility for ensuring the economic resilience of these value chains rests with the private sector itself. At the same time the state and the private sector have a joint task to protect public interests. The consultations will encompass a dialogue with the broader business community, centring on whether they agree with the sectoral boundaries that have been set. Subsequently, in discussions with specific sectors, the Task Force will focus on concerns raised by the business community. The parties will then jointly consider suitable solutions. These discussions will also consider the role played by research and innovation in specific value chains. The Netherlands' missions abroad can play a role in providing international knowledge and consulting with stakeholders (e.g. in the form of the Innovation Attaché network, the Education and Science Attaché network and economic security officers). Consultations with the private sector have revealed that the business community is increasingly facing geopolitical risks and vulnerabilities in their value chains, but the degree to which this is being addressed varies.

4. Timeline for the Task Force's activities

Q2 2023

- Take stock of progress (on identification, prioritisation, instruments and options for action) within the following focus areas: i) critical raw materials and energy (including fossil fuels); ii) digital and high-value technological applications; iii) medical products; and iv) food security, in order to determine where the Task Force can bring added value.
- Further assess and analyse the findings of the Geo-Economic Monitor in order to identify high-risk strategic dependencies.
- Discuss methodological issues as they relate to quantitative analysis, with input from experts at the OECD and European Commission.
- Update the questions guiding the application of qualitative analysis.
- Engage in further consultations with the private sector, knowledge centres, EU member states, the European Commission, etc. with a view to **identifying** and **prioritising** dependencies within the focus areas.
- Organise internal knowledge sessions (on matters such as raw materials) in order to share lessons learned on identifying and mitigating risks.

Q3 2023

- When necessary, hold additional consultations, including at political level, with the private sector, knowledge centres, EU member states, the European Commission, etc. to discuss **instruments** and options for **action** within the identified areas.
- Organise internal knowledge sessions to share lessons learned with regard to risk mitigation and to assess the approach to specific high-risk strategic dependencies, with the help of simulations.

- Advise the interministerial steering group on OSA and the HCEU on how identifying and mitigating high-risk strategic dependencies should be suggested to the European Commission as a focal point for the 2024-2029 period.
- Use lessons from the stock-taking exercise to flesh out the quantitative and qualitative methodology for identifying dependencies.

Q4 2023

- Send a progress report to the House on the Task Force's activities and the government's approach (including in respect of the responsible ministries).