

# EVALUATION OF THE MINE ACTION AND CLUSTER MUNITIONS PROGRAMME OF THE NETHERLANDS 2016-2020



## FINAL REPORT

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## Glossary of abbreviations

APMBC	Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention, Ottawa Convention
AP	Anti-personnel
AT	Anti-tank
BAC	Battle Area Clearance
CHA	Confirmed Hazardous Area
CL	Community Liaison
DCA	Danish Church Aid /DanChurch Aid
DEC	Development Evaluation Criteria
DFID	Department for International Development (of the United Kingdom)
EO	Explosive Ordnance
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HALO	The HALO Trust
HMA	Humanitarian Mine Action
HQ	Headquarters
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
LMAC	Lebanese Mine Action Centre
Logframe	Logical Framework
MACM	The Mine Action and Cluster Munition programme of the Netherlands
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MAG	The Mines Advisory Group
MASG	Mine Action Support Group
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MRE	Mine Risk Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
NMAC	National Mine Action Centre
NRCDD	National Rehabilitation Centre for Development

NTS	Non-Technical Survey
NTSG	National Technical Guidelines and Standards
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCIA	Post Clearance Impact Assessment
RCD	Results Chain Diagram
RE	Risk Education
RFP	Request for Proposals
SAA	Small Arms and Ammunition
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SES	State Emergency Services
SHA	Suspected Hazardous Area
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNMAS	UN Mine Action Service
UNODC	UN Office for Drugs and Crime

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The Netherlands is one of the largest donors in Mine Action worldwide. The Mine Action and Cluster Munition (MACM) programme principally consists of a 45-million-euro grant provided over a four-year period (2016-2020) to three Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). These three organisations conduct activities in 14 countries/territories. The government of the Netherlands is currently formulating a new policy framework for Humanitarian Mine Action, including a tender for new grants. The evaluation of the 2016-2020 MACM programme will feed into the formulation of the new framework, including:

- Project planning cycles
- The relationship between funding UNMAS and NGOs
- Policy principles
- Geographical focus
- The future of the emergency response funding

To support the development of the new framework, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has commissioned this evaluation. The evaluation team was informed that the MFA required a thorough, in-depth evaluation of the MACM programme, including constructive criticism as appropriate.

The evaluation team was provided a set of specific evaluation questions by the MFA. These were supported by an additional question set, designed by the evaluation team and based on the Development Evaluation Criteria of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development. Standardized questions were used for all interviews to allow comparison of responses. The evaluation team has conducted an in-depth qualitative evaluation with triangulation of sources, methods and analysis. 85 meetings, discussions, and interviews were conducted with agency representatives, organisations, and beneficiaries, either by phone, by email, or face-to-face. The evaluation team also reviewed more than 130 documents and carried out two field missions to observe the work of the three implementing partner NGOs and conduct face-to-face interviews.

The findings of the evaluation are generally positive. The aims of the MACM programme aligned with the overall strategy of the MFA (human security, socio-economic development and capacity development) and a great deal of good work has been done. At large, the implementing partners have met the targets agreed in their grants. No complaints about the technical quality of their work were reported from Embassies, national mine action authorities (NMAA), the various country offices of the United Nations or beneficiaries. Nor was there any suggestion that the money allocated to the three implementing NGOs has been spent other than as specified.

However, some conceptual gaps in the design and execution of the MACM programme at a policy level were identified. These are set out in detail in the report. A number of observations and recommendations are included in this report, which the evaluation team hopes will be seen as constructive criticism with the intent of 'making a good project even better'. Key recommendations are:

- The multi-year funding structure should be maintained;
- A more detailed policy document for mine action should be developed;
- A more country-specific project design approach should be adopted.

## PART ONE: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

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### INTRODUCTION

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The Netherlands is one of the largest donors in Mine Action worldwide. The Mine Action and Cluster Munition (MACM) programme consists mainly of a 45-million-euro grant provided over a four-year period (2016-2020) to three NGOs: The Mines Advisory Group (MAG), The HALO Trust (HALO) and Danish Church Aid (DCA). Under the Dutch grant, these three organizations conduct activities in 14 countries/territories: Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Palestinian Territories, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

The government of the Netherlands is currently formulating a new policy framework for Humanitarian Mine Action, including a tender for new grants. The evaluation of the 2016-2020 MACM programme will feed into the formulation of the new policy framework, mainly into decisions on the following points:

- The planning cycles of the projects under the grant
- The relationship between funding NGOs and UNMAS
- The policy principles for the policy framework
- The geographical focus of the policy framework
- The continuation of the emergency response funding

In order to make decisions on these issues, this evaluation must answer a series of questions which are described in more detail in part two of this report.

### AIM

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The aim of this report is to set out the findings of the evaluation team and make recommendations to the MFA on the possible optimisation of future MACM funding.

### METHODOLOGY

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#### OVERVIEW AND STRUCTURE

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The evaluation uses qualitative methodology with triangulation of sources, methods and analysis. The methods used include:

- Document review
- Interviews and focus group discussions
- Direct observation (in Ukraine and Lebanon)

The range of the work undertaken during this evaluation is presented in Figure 1 and Table 1 below, showing the various interviews and field visits, as well as in the annexes. The list of documents reviewed in Annex A, and the list of persons interviewed in Annex B. An outline project work-plan for the evaluation is set out in

Figure 2 below.






FIGURE 1. INTERVIEW LOCATIONS.

Table 1. Interviewees by country and agency

Ser	Country	NLD Embassy		DCA		HALO		MAG		NMAA		UNMAS/UNDP		Remarks
		Represent	Interview	Represent	Interview	Represent	Interview	Represent	Interview	Represent	Interview	Represent	Interview	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)
1	Afghanistan	X	X			X	X			X	X	X	X	
2	Colombia	X	X			X	X					X	X	
3	DR Congo	X						X		X		X		
4	Iraq	X	X	X				X	X	X		X	X	
5	Kosovo	X	X			X	X							
6	Lebanon	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	
7	Libya	X	X	X	X	X				X		X	X	
8	Mali	X	X	X	X							X		
9	Palestine	X	X			X	X			X		X		
10	Somalia	X				X	X					X	X	
11	South Sudan	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	
12	Syria	X	X			X		X						
13	Ukraine	X	X			X	X			X	X	X	X	
14	Yemen	X	X			X						X		

Green = 100% coverage achieved; orange = potential respondents reached for interview but unavailable or indicated to have no information (8)




FIGURE 2. THE EVALUATION PROJECT WORKS PLAN.

All interviews were conducted under the ‘Chatham House Rule’<sup>1</sup>, i.e.:

*“When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed”.*

## TRIANGULATION

The evaluation team used three triangulation methods. These are described in Table 2 below<sup>2</sup>.

Table 2. Triangulation methods			
Ser	Method	Description	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Methods triangulation	Methods triangulation involves checking the consistency of findings generated by different data collection methods. Such as including qualitative and quantitative data in a study.	In this evaluation the different methods used were document review, key informant interview and direct observation.
2	Triangulation of sources	Triangulating sources involves- examining the consistency of different data sources from within the same method.	In this evaluation source triangulation was done by interviewing different organisations separately.
3	Analyst Triangulation	Analyst triangulation involves using multiple analyst to review findings or using multiple observers and analysts. This can provide a check on selective perception and illuminate blind spots in an interpretive analysis.	In this evaluation the team have continually exchanged notes and come to a consensus.

Furthermore, the evaluation team have also examined the answers to the original questions posed in the ToR in the light of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Evaluation Criteria (DEC). It was felt that, by only focusing on the set questions, there was a risk of missing nuances relevant to the five key questions set out in the introduction above. The OECD criteria, with a brief explanation, are set out in Table 3 below. These criteria were also used to build the ‘Conclusions’ section set out below.

<sup>1</sup> See <https://www.chathamhouse.org/chatham-house-rule>

<sup>2</sup> See: [https://www.researchgate.net/post/What\\_is\\_triangulation\\_of\\_data\\_in\\_qualitative\\_research\\_Is\\_it\\_a\\_method\\_of\\_validating\\_the\\_information\\_collected\\_through\\_various\\_methods](https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_is_triangulation_of_data_in_qualitative_research_Is_it_a_method_of_validating_the_information_collected_through_various_methods)

**Table 3. OECD Development Evaluation Criteria<sup>3</sup>**

Ser	Criterion	Definition	Elaboration	Rule of Thumb
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1	<b>Relevance</b>	The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor	Problems and needs	Does it fit development and/or poverty reduction plans?
2	<b>Impact</b>	The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. This involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environmental and other development indicators.	Achievement of wider effects	Does it have a positive effect on the intended beneficiaries?
3	<b>Effectiveness</b>	A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.	Achievement of purpose	Does it meet its targets?
4	<b>Efficiency</b>	Efficiency measures the outputs -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible to achieve the desired results. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see if the most efficient process has been adopted.	Sound management and value for money	Does it meet its targets in a cost-effective manner?
6	<b>Sustainability</b>	Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.	Likely continuation of achieved results	Will the government take on funding of sustainable capacities? Note, in mine action it is not always necessary for the clearance to be sustainable: sustainable outcomes can be achieved by the clearance of land so that the land is then available for subsequent use.

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

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## CONTENT OF THE REPORT

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As discussed in an initial inception report, the evaluation team has structured this report to respond to the questions posed by the MFA.

The team has also included 'reportage' of its findings from the interviews and from direct observation during the two field visits. The findings are incorporated in a set of answers to the questions set in the ToR, and set out in **Annex C**. The two detailed visit reports for the two field visits (Ukraine and Lebanon) are set out in **Annex D** and **Annex E** respectively.

The team was also asked by the MFA to pay particular attention to the question of 'capacity development'. The team has therefore included some detailed notes in **Annex F**.

Finally, the team also included some additional areas of analysis which have been identified by the team as of interest to the MFA. This includes discussion of the following themes:

- Theories of change
- The introduction of the 'POIRE' concept (prioritisation, outcomes, indicators, responsiveness and evaluation)
- Possible alternative management systems

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## SCOPE OF THE REPORT

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As per the ToR, the MACM evaluation team conducted a total of 85 meetings, discussions and interviews with agency representatives and beneficiaries). These include meetings at the MFA, and at the head offices of two of the three main partners (HALO and MAG) and 31 beneficiary interviews.

- Four face-to-face meetings with implementing partners and MFA
- 17 face-to-face meetings with field agencies and in-country organisations
- 33 voice calls to NMAAs, embassies and mine-action organisations
- 31 face-to-face beneficiary interviews

Eight additional interviews have been requested but received no response. One potential interviewee declined the interview due to a lack of substantive information about the MACM.

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## LIMITATIONS

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Firstly, there is, a structural issue because the MACM programme has not been evaluated previously. With this evaluation happening towards the end of the programme, only little time remains for corrective action. While the focus of the implementing partners is already on submitting their proposals for the next round of funding. It was also difficult to conduct more field visits to the high-risk areas which are currently the focus of the MFA, because of security limitations (particularly because of limitations of access to beneficiaries). The evaluation team believes that field visits are indispensable in achieving the 'granularity' needed to put the documents and interviews in context. A suggested redesign of the evaluation process is discussed in more detail below and included in the recommendations section.

The evaluation team achieved a 69% 'census' of all possible respondents (92% of embassies; 56% of agencies; 57% of NMAA; 67% of UNMAS/UNDP). For some organisations the team could not obtain valid contact details. Some respondents did not reply, despite reminders by the team and their own headquarters. Similarly, not all the requested documents were received, despite a reminder, or were received too late to be taken into account. Nevertheless, the team was able to review more than 130 documents as part of this evaluation. Further, the evaluation team perceives that a sufficient number of people were reached to receive a representative picture.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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The evaluation team would like to thank all people who gave their time to assist in this evaluation, either by receiving voice calls, responding to email requests, answering questionnaires or hosting visits to their head offices. It is acknowledged that this takes time out of already busy schedules. In particular, the efforts made by all three of the implementing partners to host the two field visits were invaluable in making this evaluation work. It would have been impossible without the levels of cooperation that were experienced.



FIGURE 3. A SIGN MARKING GROUND CLEARED IN UKRAINE BY HALO. ALL THREE PARTNERS WERE CAREFUL TO GIVE DUE VISIBILITY TO THE NETHERLANDS' FUNDING THAT MADE THE CLEARANCE POSSIBLE.

(PHOTO: RUSSELL GASSER)

## PART TWO: MAIN FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION

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As set out in the methodology above, this part of the report is focused on answering the key questions posed by the MFA. These findings are presented to comply with the stated aim of the MFA to welcome constructive criticism of the MACM programme, which the evaluation team would see as ‘making a good project even better’.

### Q1. THE PLANNING CYCLES OF THE PROJECTS UNDER THE GRANT

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In general, the planning cycle process has worked well. At an operational level, most targets have been met or exceeded, with some exceptions, which have usually been explained to the MFA and new targets agreed. There are two significant exceptions. The first, even though strictly speaking outside of the scope of MACM but part of the overall mine action funding of the MFA, is a component to the UNMAS project by the MACM programme in Afghanistan. Secondly, issues were found with the capacity development projects funded via DCA in Lebanon. These are discussed in more detail below.

There is widespread agreement on the efficiency gains achieved by the multi-year funding, in that less management overheads are required (compared with annual proposal writing) and that there is less disruption at a program level where otherwise teams would need to be stood down and then re-recruited due to funding fluctuations, with attendant risks and costs. Three Embassies commented on the lack of flexibility of four-year pledged funding in light of the volatile security and political contexts of some of the project countries. To be clear, they did not object to the concept of multi-year funding, just that they would like more flexibility in its employment.

There are, however, some disadvantages to the current funding mechanism as observed by the evaluation team. These problems concern the current implementation rather than the idea of multi-year funding .

The main planning effort by the partners is taken up in proposal writing at the beginning of the grant. Their main focus is on winning the grant. At this point a gap is apparent between the overall strategic goals of the MFA (i.e. ‘human security, economic development and capacity development’) and the largely operational-level proposal submissions by the partners. This is most evident in the discussions on outcomes (and beneficiaries) included below. There is a sense to the evaluation team that this becomes an effort by the implementing partners to define what they already do (i.e. their core business) in terms of the MFA’s strategic goals rather than develop a specific design of their submissions to address the MFA’s targets. Indeed, one respondent commented:

*“It’s really difficult to fit what we do into the MFA requirements.”*

The team does not see this as a deliberate act of malfeasance, but rather a problem associated with what economists would describe as the twin problems of ‘asymmetric information<sup>4</sup>’ and ‘agency cost<sup>5</sup>’.

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<sup>4</sup> <http://oer2go.org/mods/en-boundless-static/www.boundless.com/economics/textbooks/boundless-economics-textbook/challenges-to-efficient-outcomes-15/sources-of-inefficiency-83/asymmetric-information-adverse-selection-and-moral-hazard-318-12415/index.html>

<sup>5</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency\\_cost#cite\\_note-Bebchuk-1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_cost#cite_note-Bebchuk-1)

Asymmetric information means that one party has more or better information than the other when making decisions and transactions. The imperfect information causes an imbalance of power.

BOX 2. DEFINITION OF 'ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION'.

*...when the principal chooses or hires an "agent" to act on its behalf. Because the two parties have different interests and the agent has more information, the principal cannot directly ensure that its agent is always acting in its (the principal's) best interests.*

BOX 1. DEFINITION OF 'AGENCY COST'.

The concept of 'asymmetric information' is relevant because specialist mine action agencies present in a country must always, by definition, know more about mine action, and most likely know more about the country context, than the individuals in the MFA responsible for allocating resources. Under the current program structure, the MFA are effectively passive recipients of proposals. The MFA could provide more strategic direction, using their own expertise, if their RFPs were formatted in such a way that they sought responses that addressed more thematic or country-specific requirements, such as capacity development.

An exacerbating factor is that the associated Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) framework is not adapted to the multi-year structure of the funding, which increases the level of information asymmetry. This evaluation was extensive (as illustrated in the methodology above) but scheduled quite late in the project cycle without a prior mid-term evaluation. Thus, there is a potential *risk* of 'sunk costs'<sup>6</sup> if the same MEL process is adopted in the next round of funding, in that there is very little time in the current project cycle after the evaluation to fix any significant problems. There was an example of a sunk cost seen in Lebanon, as discussed in **Annex E**.

A sunk cost (also known as retrospective cost) is a cost that has already been incurred and cannot be recovered. Sunk costs are contrasted with prospective costs, which are future costs that may be avoided if action is taken. In other words, a sunk cost is a sum paid in the past that is no longer relevant to decisions about the future.

BOX 3. DEFINITION OF 'SUNK COSTS'.

Humanitarian mine action is a centrally funded thematic area for the MFA; embassies cannot be expected to have specific expertise on the topic which is often a very small part of their overall portfolio. The link between policy and programmes is also part of the The Hague's responsibilities, and the established MFA protocols were followed in the MACM programme. Mine action is specifically included in the multi-annual country strategies of many of the embassies involved who also have access to the reporting by implementing partners.

However, some dissatisfaction was expressed by some embassy staff about how distant they felt from the overall planning and implementation cycle. Factors that influence this include the long planning cycle and the regular turnover of staff in embassies which is unlikely to align with the planning and implementation cycle. Local knowledge of the MACM portfolio is easily lost when staff transfers part-way through a project.

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<sup>6</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk\\_cost](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost)



As a result, an embassy's involvement can depend on two things: the interest in mine action of the individuals working at the embassy at the time, and whether or not the agencies in-country actively reach out to the embassy. Some embassy staff are very interested in mine action and welcome the opportunity to become more involved. Implementing partners who do not already make regular contact with the embassy could be encouraged to do so. Several embassies indicated they would appreciate more substantive guidance from the MFA that might enable them to monitor the projects more effectively; this appears to be a relevant concern given that the specific focus on mine action is concentrated in The Hague. However, a number of embassies have been involved in the decisions to disburse emergency funding, and this was reported to the Evaluation Team in positive terms.

## Q2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FUNDING NGOS AND UNMAS

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UNMAS was considered in two different contexts within the MACM programme.

### *UNMAS as intermediary in a funding model*

The first was a project funding model as an alternative to working directly with implementing partners: the evaluation team was asked to look at Afghanistan, where the MFA provides both grant funding to NGOs through the MACM programme, and three million Euros to the UNMAS Voluntary Trust Fund, earmarked for a country-specific proposal. This earmarked funding is in addition to a further three million Euros unallocated funding granted to UNMAS headquarters by the MFA. The unallocated funding was not part of this evaluation.

The first comments on this earmarked allocation to Afghanistan relate to the UNMAS project funding structure. UNMAS (in Afghanistan at least) does not adopt a specific single-project funding structure and reporting, but instead runs a form of country-level 'trust fund' from which it finances a range of activities. Thus, while the form of funding in the proposal (and in UNMAS reporting) implied that MFA was funding a specific project with documented logframe outputs and outcomes, in practice the funding was processed as part of a general fund which financed a range of activities that were usually delivered by the four national implementing partners. Using a country-specific trust fund in this way incurs some disadvantages in terms of accountability as it obscures the audit trail between MFA inputs (funding) and the specific outputs and outcomes identified in the logframe. This is a contrast to the bilateral project-level funding of the other implementers in the MACM programme where the MFA was more able to identify causal links between inputs, outputs and outcomes directly at a project level, and monitor this aspect of the implementation.

The second comment concerns the costs and overheads of the UNMAS project funding. UNMAS charge a management fee of 8% which accrues to UNMAS New York. The UNMAS country office then charges a second set of overheads to cover the in-country project management. While this is understandable (and indeed not uncommon) the project management structure of UNMAS country offices means that they have an interest in increasing the volume of their work to maximise their overall income to pay for staff and other costs, and this makes them a direct competitor to any other implementing partners as it creates a dual role for UNMAS as both implementer and coordinator - with an attendant risk of conflict of interest. While the structure of an HQ and field offices, each with their own management, is common in the sector, the dual role as implementer and fund coordinator is not. A further result is the reversal of the calculation for budget funding as described to the evaluation team which can be paraphrased as:

*“We start with the total amount of funding we think we have available, then we subtract the costs of the management team, and whatever is left is what we can spend on activities”.*

This reversed funding calculation can also be inferred from the original UNMAS proposal which forecasts ‘activity-based costing’ but then states future reporting on this basis would not be possible.

The result is that the UNMAS team in Afghanistan does not specify the cost of country-level coordination separately but includes it within the figures given for project implementation. In the opinion of the evaluation team, this approach is unfortunate as there is usually a clear and justified role for UNMAS in country-level coordination which must be financed. In the specific case of Afghanistan, the work that UNMAS is doing to support the NMAA is a valuable contribution, as is the work that UNMAS is doing to support the development of capacities to deal with the significant threat from improvised explosive devices (IED).

The final comments on UNMAS in the specific context of the UNMAS project in Afghanistan relate to project management.

A significant amount of money in the grant was earmarked for a major assessment of UNMAS’ impact in mine action in Afghanistan, to take place during 2019. Such a multi-year retrospective review of the benefits to beneficiaries of the funding would be of significant value to several donors to inform future funding decisions. Unfortunately, this element of the project has been delayed and the evaluation team was not able to learn from the results.

The logframe for the clearance element of the project was included in the project documentation and raised the following issue: the main outcome was identified as increased use of safe land, whilst noting that this assumes that the potential beneficiaries had access to the resources to make use of the land. In logframe design, the inverse of ‘assumption’ is ‘risk’, but the risk matrix included in the project proposal made no reference to monitoring, managing, or mitigating this risk. UNMAS confirmed that the risk matrix was a ‘standard’ one used for any country. This is particularly unfortunate because, as a UN agency, coordination with other UN agencies should be feasible (such as FAO, UNDP or UNODC in the Afghan context) to provide some assurances that the beneficiaries had access to such support. In the experience of the evaluation team this ‘silo’ approach to mine clearance is not unique to UNMAS Afghanistan; to a very large extent any UNMAS country office has to work with the legacy of a program structure they have inherited and the general business model of UNMAS. It is worth pointing out that this linkage of outputs to outcomes is not a problem unique to UNMAS, as is discussed in more detail below.

#### *UNMAS as mine action programme coordinator*

The second perspective on UNMAS was its wider role in the coordination of mine action interventions, both at an international and a country programme level.

The evaluation team noted that respondents were generally unified in recognition of UNMAS’ positive performance in supporting peacekeeping missions but made comments that UNMAS was less effective in providing country-level coordination (as above) or providing strategic support to, or capacity development of, national institutions. However, these were not overall comments and the opinion of UNMAS varied significantly between countries.

The evaluation team understood that the partners would prefer UNMAS not acting as an intermediary, and would rather receive funds directly, without the UN overheads. However, the evaluation team

believes that interviewees could accept a role for UNMAS as a coordinator, and, where necessary and appropriate, as a focus for capacity development of the national institutions. However, a further analysis of a future role of UNMAS is beyond the scope of this report.

### Q3. THE POLICY PRINCIPLES FOR THE POLICY FRAMEWORK

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(including cross-cutting issues and sustainability)

The strategic direction of the MACM programme is aligned with the overall policy focus of the MFA. However, there are a number of observations of the evaluation team in terms of further improving the MACM model.

First, in terms of cross-cutting issues. All the implementing partners understood the requirement to be gender-sensitive in their project design. This was particularly clear in the context of female recruitment and gender-sensitive human resource management. The partners also recognised the need to ensure that the voices of women and girls were heard in the context of community liaison activities. How these policy commitments could be translated into priority setting, and the disaggregation of casualty data in planning Mine Risk Education (MRE) and related activities was less clear. These issues are both discussed in more detail below.

However, while the gender-agenda is pushed forward by this programme, other issues that are commonly considered cross-cutting in humanitarianism are not explicitly covered by the MACM policy principles. Safeguarding as well as humanitarian protection principles could be included in the policy principles, ensuring that the programme is aligned with current insights into humanitarian aid and with international standards. In terms of identifying – and addressing - thematic issues either at a country-wide, or at a strategic level, the evaluation team found room for improvement. The current MACM process is largely passive. The project documentation, particularly the request for proposals (RFP), specified the target countries and the type of activity that could be funded, but it did not address particular thematic issues or identify strategic gaps at a country program level. Instead the RFP relied on the expertise of the potential implementing partners to propose projects which the MFA could then choose to fund.

For example, there are some conceptual gaps in the approach to MRE. The International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) for MRE is currently being re-written to encompass the challenges faced in dealing with Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), for example, and the evaluation team hopes that this revision will also address some of the other gaps in the existing IMAS in terms of addressing behaviour change. The current MACM program structure does not allow funds to be allocated to such global challenges, nor does the reactive nature of the MACM program allow country-specific issues to be identified unless these are identified in a proposal by the agency.

This reactive nature of proposal development became particularly apparent in terms of sustainability, as seen through the lens of capacity development. During early scoping discussions with the MFA, the evaluation team was asked to comment specifically on capacity development, and a specific annex (Annex F) on capacity development is included in this report. The evaluation team found that, with a few specific exceptions, the implementing partners considered capacity development largely at an operational level, based on technical training of their own personnel and *ad hoc* training sessions provided to the various NMAA (or similar organisations). The evaluation team feels that a re-design of the MACM programme could help focus capacity development on a more strategic level, including the ability to manage programmes in the longer term. The notes on capacity development included help

set out how capacity development should be more holistic than simply providing equipment and technical training.

Another limitation of the MACM programme design was the restricted range of the agencies who could apply. The MACM funds were only open to NGOs, which left no room for other specialist entities to apply, such as a NMAA national mine action authority (NMAA) or indeed a UN agency such as UNDP which has a focus on capacity development. While this may have been sufficient for general activities, it does limit the choices for other potential high-impact interventions. In Ukraine, for example, there is a significant problem caused by a major gap in access to casualty data. In Lebanon, there is work underway to build the capacity of the regional humanitarian demining training centre, especially in developing a regional humanitarian IED training facility. None of these capability gaps are likely to be addressed in proposals by partner NGOs.

The evaluation team considers that these issues are symptomatic of a ‘missing middle’ in the MFA policy on mine action. There is a clear strategic overview – as set out in the three priorities – but the next level of intervention is the series of activities conducted by the various partners. The RFP required the potential partners to present a theory of change (ToC) for their activities, a subject discussed in more detail in part three below; the evaluation team considers that a more proactive approach would be more appropriate, with the development of a more detailed mine action policy that establishes its own ToC for various types of interventions. Such an approach would allow the MFA to identify specific thematic interventions or allow for support of more country-specific activities identified by embassies, the NMAA, the UN or other relevant agencies.

The situation is likely to be more complicated should the Netherlands be selected to chair the Ottawa Convention process, in that taking on this role is likely to put additional pressure on the MFA personnel looking at mine action policies and overseeing the MACM process. This is discussed in more detail in the discussions on prioritisation in part three below.

#### Q4. THE GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS OF THE POLICY FRAMEWORK

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Firstly, the strategic direction of the programme, as stated above, is aligned with the overall policy focus of the MFA. However, this does, in some cases, result in a tension between supporting the countries with most needs (in terms of humanitarian priorities) and those countries which are of geo-political significance. The RFP stipulated that proposals must allocate at least 80% to countries on the MFA’s priority list, and that agencies were at liberty to propose up to 20% for projects in non-listed countries.<sup>7</sup> At least one agency reported to have struggled with this as the RFP did not give clear guidance on the strategic goals or priorities in non-listed countries. This is essentially a problem of prioritisation which is discussed in more detail in part three below. The situation is likely to be exacerbated by the Ottawa presidency as mentioned above, as there will then be a further tension between humanitarian targets and Ottawa compliance targets which have relatively less humanitarian impact.

Secondly, concentrating expenditure on fewer countries might increase effectiveness. €45 million is a significant and generous amount of funding, at just over €11 million per year, but distributed to over 14 countries that is an average of less than one million euro per country per year. Supporting larger scale project implementation in fewer countries could yield economies of scale (as it would allow the

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<sup>7</sup> MACM Policy Framework, p. 7 and p. 13

program’s fixed overheads (such as their country office costs) to be shared over more means of production, such as more demining teams or more mobile EOD teams. This could still allow room for some more focussed, high-impact interventions in other target countries, aimed at addressing some of the thematic issues facing the mine action sector, such as the issues surrounding MRE referred to *en passant* above (and raised again in Part Three below).

The possible adjustment of the MACM programme design referred to above could allow such a refocus. It is hard to put a firm number on this – as there are so many competing imperatives on the MFA funding – but funding substantive projects in five to seven countries, supported by high-value/low cost thematic activities that could have regional or global significance, and reserving a proportion for emergency response funding (see below), might be a useful way of allocating funds. The evaluation team have discussed a possible ratio of 50/30/20 on these three types of intervention.

## Q5. THE CONTINUATION OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUNDING

The final specific question raised in the ToR of the evaluation concerns the emergency response funding.

In general, the allocation of an emergency funding element was welcomed by the implementing partners, as it increased flexibility to deal with emerging problems. One significant positive example of this was how MACM funding helped HALO to become established and operational in Yemen. However, there was some lack of clarity about what could be considered an ‘emergency’, some discussion about the proportion of the overall fund that should be allocated to emergency funding, and comments that the emergency fund was not available to cover the final year of the programme. There was discussion on the question of how to fund emerging problems in countries where none of the chosen implementing partners were present. Suggestions to the evaluation team included the use of other ‘pre-qualified’ agencies, i.e. organisations that had previously met some – to be specified – minimum standards in the tendering process to be eligible for emergency funding under such circumstances. The team recognises that additional – especially ad hoc – MACM partners could possibly create additional pressure of work on the part of the MFA (as this would more contracts and more partners).

The evaluation team considers, taking into account all of the comments they received on this subject, that it might be better to consider this a ‘contingency’ rather than an ‘emergency’ fund. Thus, this funding could be used to support innovation or to address emerging issues, as a source for additional funding to expand an existing project, or even as a way to deal with funding shortfalls caused by unforeseen externalities such as an exchange rate fluctuation, A possible example of priorities for contingency funding could be as set out in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Possible priorities for contingency funds		
Ser	Possible priority	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)
1	Emerging problems in new countries	
2	Emerging problems in existing countries	
3	Innovations/emerging issues?	Where no Priority 1/2 requirements exist
4	Expanding current projects	E.g. due to new access to additional areas
5	Funding shortfalls (such as exchange rate issues)	Force majeure issues only

## PART THREE: ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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### ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS

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The evaluation team identified, throughout the evaluation process, a number of recurrent themes apparent from either the documentation or during the interviews with the various partner organisations. First, this section outlines the issues encountered by the team regarding the Theories of Change used in this round of the MACM. Secondly, a number of interrelated themes is discussed together in one subsection, for ease of reference grouped under the acronym 'POIRE'. Lastly, this section proposes various options for alternative management systems of the MACM.

#### A. THEORY OF CHANGE

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##### OVERVIEW

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The evaluation team found that the concept of a Theory of Change (ToC) was widely misunderstood amongst the stakeholders, with many confusing a 'Results Chain Diagram' (RCD) with the wider ToC, whereas the RCD is but a subsidiary part of a ToC. In order to explain the observations on the MACM ToC, it is therefore necessary to provide some background into how the Evaluation Team understand the ToC concept.

##### THE BACKGROUND

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There is no single definition of a ToC. Different interpretations were presented by different respondents. The MFA addressed this in part by working with the three implementing organisations to develop a largely standardised model after the start of the programme. The team have developed a summary *aide memoire* to explain how they understand the ToC concept, included as **Annex G**. Given the wide range of interpretations of the phrase 'theory of change' in the humanitarian and development sectors, it is suggested that clear specification of what is required at the RFP stage is required.

A ToC outlines the rationale for undertaking the work set out in the workplan, in order to achieve the desired impacts and outcomes. The workplan answers the question: "What do we need to do in order to achieve the outcomes?" and the ToC answers the related question of purpose: "Why do we think that these particular activities will lead to the outcomes?" and subsequently "Why do we think that the behaviour changes of the outcomes will lead to the impacts?"

Without a clear ToC that is agreed by all stakeholders, it is easy to lose the link that connects everyday project activities on the ground to the humanitarian goals of the programme. This connection is often called "line of sight". Once the line of sight is obscured then operational considerations can easily become the goal in themselves. A common effect of this in mine action is a focus on maximising clearance without due consideration for beneficiary needs, cost-effectiveness or prioritisation.

##### TOC IN THE MACM CONTEXT

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A ToC is thus not just a planning document but ensures that the implementation of a project or programme has common purpose and everyone working for the same goals. Funders in the mine action

sector tend to be focussed on humanitarian benefits, implementing partners on efficient clearance and effective MRE, and the NMAA on its own national priorities and capacity development the MACM programme would benefit from a commonly agreed ToC. The MFA, as the funder, should insist on the development and subsequent use of a ToC by all partners, based on a basic ToC model or outline set out in the RFP.

Setting out an outline ToC within an RFP gives guidance to potential bidders on the MACM and ensures that the detail version of the ToC in each bid follows a common pattern which is aligned with the strategic goals of the MFA. The proposed workplan and ToC should be separate documents, they are (as noted above) answering two different questions.

## B. PRIORITISATION, OUTCOMES, INDICATORS, RESPONSIVENESS AND EVALUATION (POIRE)

As mentioned above, there are a number of themes that were raised several times throughout the early stages of this evaluation by different respondents. The team has collated these into five main areas which can be grouped under the acronym 'POIRE'. These are briefly explained below.

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### PRIORITISATION

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There appears to be a significant gap, between stated outcomes and impacts in logframes, project documents and theories of change, and the actual mechanisms that are used to define and set priorities 'on the ground'. In ISO 9000 quality management terms, this would be considered a key part of 'process control'. While there was general understanding at a qualitative level of the need to prioritise, none of the implementing agencies had a formal policy on prioritisation, nor a mechanism to implement prioritisation. This absence has potential implications in terms of a management audit and a coherent strategy, both in-country and for the MACM programme, particularly in providing an 'audit trail' linking back the work done to the overall MFA priority to assist 'vulnerable groups'. Deferring prioritisation to national authorities moves the problem away from the implementing partners, but there was still no clear evidence of suitable policies or mechanisms in place at a national level.

It was evident that there is a tension in terms of 'which piece of land is to be cleared next'. In short, this can be described as a tension between *efficiency* and *impact*. It was more *efficient* to clear the adjacent piece of land to an existing clearance site, but this did not always ensure that *impact* was optimised. To some extent, this may be caused by the partner NGO being dependent on direction from the relevant NMAA, although the team also heard (from various NMAA) that they are ' beholden ' to the wishes of the donors. There appears to be a need to resolve this issue if the MFA is to further improve the effect of its investment in mine action. A possible prioritisation matrix is included at **Annex H**.

The issue of 'prioritisation' also came up at a strategic level. The evaluation team heard from at least two UNMAS representatives that the remaining landmine clearance work in their countries was largely now residual clearance to comply with Article Five of the 1997 Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention (APMBC), otherwise known as the 'Ottawa Convention', as, in both countries discussed, the annual number of casualties now being caused by conventional AP mines were in single figures.

Whilst this is not a problem at the country level, it is an issue for any donor supporting mine action activities in more than one country, especially where a country (such as the Netherlands) is also a

signatory to the Ottawa Convention, with an (admittedly caveated) obligation under Article Six of the APMBC.

There could be an argument that once a country achieves an ‘impact free’ status (see Ser 5 in in Table 4 above) that they should not be a priority for future funding, compared to a country that has not achieved such a status. This however raises the question of obligations under Article Six. Furthermore, there are more activities in mine action than just clearance, and these are defined as the ‘five pillars’ of mine action<sup>8</sup>. These are summarised as follows:

- Clearance of landmines and explosive remnants of war (“demining”), which includes surveying land to determine areas that are mine-affected as well as marking or fencing off contaminated areas.
- Mine risk education [MRE], which helps people to understand and avoid the risks they face in mine-affected areas.
- Victim assistance, which comprises of medical assistance, rehabilitation and reintegration services to victims, including job-skills training.
- Advocacy in support of mine action and international treaties.
- Destruction of countries’ landmine stockpiles.

There has been some criticism of these pillars because they do not specifically include actions to deal with ‘spot’ tasks by mobile Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams, make no reference to the requirement to deal with non-landmine explosive ordnance (EO) stockpiles or the emerging threat from improvised explosive devices (IED). Nevertheless, the pillars help make the point that donors need to consider how to divide their resources (prioritise) between different types of interventions.

Thus, a donor to mine action interventions finds that they are pulled in several directions at once, namely:

- How to ensure that the work they support is optimised to maximise impact
- How to reconcile the support of clearance with other mine action interventions
- How to allocate resources between countries suffering severe impact and those which need help to meet their Ottawa (and Oslo) convention obligations.
- Additionally, in the specific case of the Netherlands (and the MACM programme), there is an additional obligation to align funding of mine action activities with overall foreign policy objectives.

Whilst the last two of these are clearly a matter for the MFA to handle internally, the first two, under the current MACM programme structure, tend to be left to the partners to propose. This means that there is not really much of an audit trail between the overall strategic goals of the MACM and what is actually done on the ground.

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## OUTCOMES

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There is a general feeling amongst respondents that the current program’s approach to the issue of outcome definition remains inadequate, and all three of the partners would welcome an opportunity to discuss and develop common outcomes. In some cases – as seen in the documentation provided to the evaluation team - there appears to be a disconnect between the definition of outcomes and the agency’s risk management process. For example, one logframe seen by the evaluation team stated that the outcome of the project was ‘land used by beneficiaries’ and had an assumption that the

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<sup>8</sup> <http://ask.un.org/faq/14495>



beneficiaries had access to the resources needed to make use of the land. The same agency's risk management matrix for the same project did not include how this risk would be managed, and, on questioning, the agency saw no need to consider this issue. A general definition of outcomes, outputs and indicators is included in **Annex G** below. The key point is that an outcome is:

*"...a change in behaviour by people outside the project that is plausibly attributable (at least in part) to the project"*

Some of the outcomes used by the partners are, at best, merely outputs. For example, the increase of knowledge that beneficiaries obtain through mine risk education projects is often labelled as outcome, while it is actually an output (this is discussed in more detail below). Similarly, where an outcome depends on an exogenous activity (such as the example below), the partners should take account of that in their risk management strategy or lower the priority of that activity (see Ser 3 in table 3 above). For example, one Embassy reported that an agency or the NMAA used returnee figures as outcome of mine action, yet it is clear that, whilst mine action may be an enabling factor, the return of refugees or internally displaced persons cannot only be attributed to mine action.

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## INDICATORS

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The current programme appears to have focused on establishing common outcome-indicators; whilst the team recognises the need to do this, the outcome indicators should follow, and not precede, the outcome definitions. A limited set of standard outcome indicators has obvious advantages, but only if they are sufficiently specific and attributable whenever and wherever they are used. For example, the number of casualties is listed simultaneously as an indicator for both MRE and clearance in more than one MACM project. Separating the influence of each contribution is difficult at best, and in the end the reduction in casualties may also be due to other factors external to the intervention. Defining standard indicators before considering each specific outcome in its context risks plausible but false results. A 20% reduction in casualties should not be reported as both a 20% reduction due to MRE and also a 20% reduction due to clearance.

The evaluation team also has some observations and suggestions on calculating beneficiaries as done by UNMAS and the three partners. These are described below.

Although there have been some attempts to return to a site to undertake a post-clearance impact assessment (PCIA), these have not always been systematic; for example there does not seem to have been an attempt to compare the estimated number of beneficiaries with the actual number of beneficiaries encountered (or a reasonable *ex post* estimate of beneficiaries from a site visit). Indeed, in the two field trips it became evident that none of the agencies seemed to have a very established mechanism for recording (and following up with) beneficiaries.

As with outcomes, the MFA has worked with the implementing partners to develop common methods for calculating beneficiaries. However, the results currently achieved are not always plausible and further work is required on their methodology. For example, in many cases the quoted number of beneficiaries for a single hectare of agricultural land measures in the hundreds, even though the total number of people in the households of the land owners/users are often in single figures. The method used to estimate the beneficiaries can be seen, but there appears that no logic check has been done to see if the numbers are feasible. While the implementing partners have made significant progress in developing a common approach, further work is required to ensure that beneficiary data is not only

collected consistently, but accurately reflects the real number of beneficiaries. Links to methods by other humanitarian sectors need to be further explored in order to avoid mine action beneficiary calculations being at odds with the wider sector. The situation is somewhat more complex than is often presented, and the evaluation team have seen (and heard) that there are two axes of benefit that need to be taken into account.

### Removing blockages

The first axis of benefit is the removal of a ‘blockage’ to agricultural land. The concept of ‘blockage’ has been widely understood in humanitarian mine action since – at least – the start of ‘Landmine Impact Surveys’ (LIS) (the precursor to the non-technical survey (NTS) paradigm). This concept assumes that the positive effect of *area* clearance (be that landmine clearance or battle area clearance (BAC)) is that it removes the presence of a (potential) hazard that stops people from using that land. The evaluation team would suggest that this is more true of landmine contamination than contamination by other forms of EO, in that beneficiaries tend to under-value the hazard posed by other EO contamination, or the likelihood of its presence. Secondly, as stated above, it is more realistic to relate potential economic benefits of cleared land more directly to the owners or users of that land.

### Reducing risk

The second axis of benefit from removing EO contamination is that it reduces risk, by removing hazard. The evaluation team use the definition of ‘hazard’ found in International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)<sup>9</sup>, namely Something that is:

*“a potential cause of harm”*

It is axiomatic that removing explosive hazards must be a good thing, but in the context of measuring effect (and hence developing indicators) there are two concepts that need to be considered. The first of these is the range of the potential explosive effect at the moment of detonation, and in some cases this has been found to be exaggerated (one partner claimed some 5,000 beneficiaries from the removal of a single anti-tank (AT) mine). Secondly, in measuring *risk*, The evaluation team also uses the definition of ‘risk’ in IMAS, namely a:

*“combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm”*

Whereas the severity of EO injuries is clearly understood, the *probability* of those injuries occurring is less commonly taken into account in the mine action sector. In the example quoted above, the AT mine in question had been in place for more than a decade and had been locally marked. It was being avoided. Furthermore, from photographs provided by the implementing partner, it appears that the mine is at some distance from comparatively low-density accommodation, and thus the probability of 5,000 people being at an unsafe distance from the mine if it exploded were very small. Risk management professionals use ‘exposure hours’ to help quantify risk and a greater use of the ‘exposure hours’ concept in the mine action sector (and indeed the MACM programme) would be useful in terms of better estimating beneficiaries and identifying indicators.

Reflection on these two axes of benefit suggests they are, to some extent, mutually exclusive. If local populations are very aware of the risks, their tendency to interact with EO (and be exposed to risk) may

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<sup>9</sup> See IMAS 04.10 at:  
[https://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/20190201\\_IMAS\\_04\\_10\\_Glossary\\_on\\_mine\\_action\\_terms\\_definitions\\_and\\_abbreviations\\_Am\\_10RB.pdf](https://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/user_upload/20190201_IMAS_04_10_Glossary_on_mine_action_terms_definitions_and_abbreviations_Am_10RB.pdf)

be reduced. On the other hand, if they are unaware (or otherwise willing to accept risk) then the degree of economic blockage will be reduced, as they will be more willing to use the land.

The role of mine risk education (MRE) in this regard is potentially very important but the evaluation team finds that, in general, this is not well evidenced in the MRE undertaken under the MACM project. MRE tends to be understood at an activity level (how many people received MRE), and at best, at an output level (how much knowledge was provided), and not much effort was spent in measuring the outcome (modified behaviour) or the impact (a reduction in casualties). To be fair to the implementing partners, this is a widespread problem in the mine action sector.

There are several significant issues in the current reporting of beneficiaries of MRE in the MACM programme, which taken together tend to invalidate some of the claims made.

The MRE reporting presented in the MACM programme has generally assumed that the outcome of MRE is an increase of knowledge, and tends to conflate this with a change in behaviour. However the evaluation team would contend that there is substantial evidence that this is a false assumption<sup>10</sup> in that there is a significant difference between knowing that a behaviour is unsafe and then modifying one's behaviour. This speaks to the limitations of using surveys to measure behaviour change and highlights the need for better collection and interpretation of casualty data. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the partners tend to use survey questionnaires to see if MRE recipients will, or have, changed their behaviour.

One can look to the definitions of 'stated' and 'revealed' preference to help explain this, See Box 6<sup>11</sup> and Box 7<sup>12</sup> below:

*Stated preference approaches to nonmarket valuation rely on answers to carefully worded survey questions. Those answers—in the form of monetary amounts, choices, ratings, or other indications of preference—are scaled following an appropriate model of preference to yield a measure of value.*

*Box 4. Definition of 'stated preference'*

*Revealed preference is an economic theory regarding an individual's consumption patterns, which asserts that the best way to measure consumer preferences is to observe their purchasing behavior.*

*Box 5. Definition of 'revealed preference'*

In the context of MRE, and particularly in many of the cultures in which projects funded by the MACM program, the reliance on 'stated preference' methods (surveying people on what they say they will do) rather than revealed preference (using epidemiological methods such as 'case control studies) risks a problem with people 'saying the right thing'.

A general definition of outcomes, outputs and indicators is included in **Annex G**. Based on these principles, the evaluation team suggests the following matrix of outcomes, outputs and indicators for

<sup>10</sup> See, for example "Theories and techniques of behaviour change: Developing a cumulative science of behaviour change" Michie and Johnston; <https://doi.org/10.1080/17437199.2012.654964>

<sup>11</sup> [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-007-0826-6\\_4](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-007-0826-6_4)

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/revealed-preference.asp>

mine action, as set out in Table 5 below. These were discussed in the Outcomes Workshop held as part of this evaluation on 2 October 2019.

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## RESPONSIVENESS TO CHANGE

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There were a number of comments and suggestions about how the emergency response element of the MACM programme funding might be developed in the next phase of funding. The emergency response funding was discussed above.

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## EVALUATION AND LEARNING

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All three partners expressed a desire to increase cross-programming evaluation, especially earlier in the project cycle. Additionally, all partners voiced their interest in using the MACM programme for building closer relationships between the different implementing agencies as well as between donors. The current evaluation structure does not really provide a chance to modify the course of the MACM programme as a single evaluation point towards the end of the project cycle (and thus the expenditure is largely a 'sunk cost'). It is not uncommon to reserve up to 5% of project expenditure on monitoring, evaluation and learning, and it may be possible to establish a mechanism to provide a monitoring and evaluation (M+E) framework throughout the course of the programme.

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## REPORTING

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The issue of reporting was raised specifically in the questions set out in **Annex C**, and also in discussions with a number of stakeholders. It is understood by the partners that reporting is a transaction cost, but there is a general sense in the mine action sector that a lot of time is spent reporting more or less the same thing to different donors in slightly different formats required by different donors. The ability to influence this problem directly is beyond the scope of this evaluation but it may be possible that the MFA could influence other donors to accept a more standardised approach to reporting, perhaps via the Mine Action Support Group (MASG). It is also understood that an effort is under way to reform the steering committee for IMAS and this may be another potential venue for such discussions. However, whilst standardisation of reporting will benefit the implementing partners, it *may* make it harder for the MFA to reconcile and match the content of these reports with the wider foreign policy goals of the MFA; however, a more developed MEL framework *may* resolve this problem.

The reporting provided by the implementing partners throughout the programme was extensive and reflected the organisations' focus on operations and outputs. Considerable effort was expended in producing detailed reports on activities and outputs (including a 269 page annual report) without a similar attention consistently given to how the outcomes and impacts were being achieved, risks managed and lessons learned. There is ample evidence that the MFA can have full confidence in the implementing partners' commitment to deliver outputs, and a change in focus of the reporting would potentially benefit both the funders and implementers. Providing more information relating to strategic goals and beneficiaries, more detailed discussion about: risks and risk management, problems arising and solutions, and especially lessons learned and their benefits, could add value for everyone. Limiting the amount of information - or otherwise simplifying the process - included in routine reporting at an activity and output level (not the frequency of reports) might be a first step to reducing the effort to leave resources available for the more strategic issues. Discussion of risks and lessons learned requires a cooperative problem-solving relationship between the funder and implementers. The

Evaluation Team found the MFA and the three partners evidenced this approach. Three Embassies indicated that more substantive reporting along those lines would enable them to monitor the programme better and provide support related to conflict sensitive issues and political shifts. The Evaluation Team would therefore suggest that there is an opportunity to be seized.

The transaction costs surrounding reporting are exacerbated by the use of the IATI process. All of the implementing partners (and indeed the Evaluation Team) recognise the need for transparency in reporting and in accounting for expenditure, and it is also understood that the decision to adopt IATI is a decision taken at a high level of the Netherlands government. Nevertheless, it is apparent that IATI is not yet very user-friendly. It may be that it is possible that some work to standardise reporting at an activity level may help with minimising the workload, but it appears unlikely that IATI – at least in its current format – will ever be suitable to reflect progress at an outcomes or output level. In line with the suggestion in the previous paragraph, if an improved user-interface can be developed for IATI then a large part of activity and output reporting could be transferred to the system instead of being presented in written reports. The cost-benefit of contracting a modern user-friendly app for easy data entry would appear to be beyond dispute given the estimates of hours spent by partners entering data using the current interface. One senior staff member of one of the implementing partners said that he had to spend at least three full days on this process for each quarterly report

### C. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

There are a number of alternative programme management systems that might be considered by the MFA, instead of the current arrangement. One of these would be greater use of UNMAS, indeed the relationship with UNMAS was a specific question raised in the ToR and is discussed above. It can be compared with the current mechanism. There is a third possible mechanism, which is to adopt a more in depth bilateral programme management system, similar to that currently used by the British Department for International Development (DFID). This enhanced bilateral model is based on the use of a consultancy team to undertake some of the detailed tasks in the project cycle, including:

- Appraisal of potential projects for funding
- Monitoring of projects as they take place, from very early in the project cycle
- Evaluation of the programme and recommendations for future interventions

This model can also easily incorporate the various project management issues raised in this report.

There is also a fourth model, which would be to allocate a proportion of the MACM budget to a creditable humanitarian response/development NGO that is also an existing partner to the MFA. They could then use that funding to pay for mine clearance by competent and accredited agencies in areas where they (the NGO) would like to work but where they are blocked by the existence (or reasonable suspicion) of contamination. This would significantly help address the *relevance* and *impact* of the mine action funding via MACM and help more closely align mine action outputs with the wider human security and development goals of the MFA. In commercial terms the mine action agencies engaged would essentially act as sub-contractors to an overall ‘prime’ contractor. By delegating detailed project management work to the ‘prime’ the MFA would then be able to concentrate on other issues, such as support to thematic interventions, emergency response or indeed wider policy issues such as support to the goals of the Ottawa (and Oslo) Conventions. It is recognised however that such an NGO would in the short term at least need some assistance to deal with working with mine action agencies, not least to avoid potential asymmetric information agency cost issues as described above.

The relative advantages and disadvantages of each of these mechanisms is considered below.

The selection of any external support arrangements (as suggested under Option 3 in table 6 above) will require confirmation that the consultancy service has a track record of actually delivering such services, a perspective that matches the overall strategic focus of the MFA (beneficiaries, outcomes and impacts) (especially given a propensity to focus on activities and outputs throughout the sector), and that offers value for money.

Table 5. Suggested inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts of typical mine action activities								
Ser	Activity	Output	Output Indicators	Outcome	Outcome Indicators	Impact	Assumptions	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
1	Area clearance	Cleared land	Area cleared <sup>1</sup>	Increased <i>use of</i> , safe, useful land	People using the land as expected	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased wealth</li> <li>Increased welfare</li> </ul>	People have sustainable access to the land and the resources necessary to use it	'Increased welfare' may need specific attention in the ToC
2	MRE	People with more knowledge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of recipients<sup>2</sup></li> <li>Pre/post tests showing increased knowledge</li> </ul>	Behaviour change to safer behaviour	Reduction in casualties <sup>3</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased health</li> </ul>	No other influences are adversely affecting the situation	Requires use of epidemiological tools (case/control studies)
3	EOD (spot tasks)	Hazard removed	Items cleared <sup>4</sup> Number of tasks	Reduction in hazard	Reduction in potential casualties <sup>5</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased health</li> <li>Increased welfare</li> </ul>	Assumes items are in a location and a condition where they could cause harm	Not all items of reported EO are unsafe
4	Survey	Knowledge of extent and impact of contamination	Scope, quality and availability of survey report	Survey data used to start or improve mine action tasks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Selection of most urgent tasks first</li> <li>Consistent, transparent prioritization at national and local levels.</li> </ul> 1.	Results of clearance achieved more quickly and efficiently	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Survey process is adequate</li> <li>Prioritization scheme is fit for purpose</li> <li>Personal interests do not over-ride objective prioritization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Measurements are highly context specific</li> <li>Only has impact IF the survey findings are used</li> </ul>

Notes:

1. All data to be disaggregated by such factors as age, sex, and ethnicity, and identities to be protected through confidentiality and anonymity as required.
2. Clearance standards to be defined by specifications in national technical standards and guidelines (NTSG) (or IMAS where NTSG do not exist).
3. Controlled for relevance to affected population.
4. Other factors (such as existing knowledge or economic pressure) can also affect the results. The attribution of outcomes must be carefully assessed.
5. Conventionally, small arms ammunition (SAA) is considered as anything of a calibre under 20mm, and is measured in kilograms rather than counted individually.
6. This can be assessed by monitoring the mean number of casualties per EO incident, and multiplying this by the number of *unsafe* items cleared.

Table 6. Possible alternative programme management systems for MACM				
Ser	Option	Advantages	Disadvantages	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1	Continue with current arrangements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cheapest</li> <li>Easiest understood</li> <li>Less disruption</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Does not easily permit thematic interventions</li> <li>Does not easily capture requirements not presented by partners in their proposals</li> </ul>	This is the 'minimal change' option
2	Using UNMAS as project manager	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Delegated responsibility</li> <li>Support of international organisations</li> <li>Global overview of mine action by UNMAS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Likely to be most costly</li> <li>Agency cost problems</li> <li>Difficulty with attribution of effects</li> <li>Very limited outcome, impact and beneficiary focus in current UNMAS' strategy</li> </ul>	May need interim funding to give time to change funding modality
3	Enhanced bilateral project management by consultancy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most detailed control</li> <li>Most optimised outcomes</li> <li>Ability to incorporate lessons learned</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>More expensive than Option 1</li> <li>How to select consultancy team?</li> </ul>	May need interim funding to give time to change funding modality
4	Provide element of MACM budget to an NGO 'Prime'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Focused intervention</li> <li>More closer alignment of HMA outputs with wider human security or development goals</li> <li>Less detailed project management by MFA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Some increased transaction costs</li> <li>Short term requirement for Prime to be provided with technical support</li> </ul>	Short term technical support could be considered as a variation to Option 3



FIGURE 4. DEMOLITION OF CLUSTER MUNITION BY LAMINDA (SUPPORTED BY DCA), LEBANON (PHOTO: WELMOET WELS)



## CONCLUSIONS

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The MFA seek continuous improvement and ever greater value from the expenditure of their taxpayers' funds, therefore it is important to seek ways in which a good programme can be made even better. The following conclusions are therefore made with this requirement in mind.

The findings of the Evaluation Team are, in general, positive. A great deal of good work has been done, and the Evaluation Team heard no complaints at a technical level about any of the activities undertaken by any of the implementing partners. Furthermore, there was no suggestion that money is not being spent honestly and as agreed.

The implementers have generally completed the tasks and targets set out in their proposals, or are on course to do so, subject to a few force majeure constraints. There are a few observations about the effectiveness of some interventions (see comments on Afghanistan and Lebanon), but these can be considered 'outliers' from the trend.

Although the management of activities and generation of outputs was good, there was less clarity on the identification of outcomes and measurement of beneficiaries, which is a problem that had already been recognised by the MFA.

The Evaluation Team also found that there is a gap in the MFA policy framework for MACM, a 'missing middle' between the strategic goals of the MFA and the 'on-the-ground' activities of the implementing partners.

The detailed conclusions of the Evaluation Team are set out in Table 7 below using the OECD development evaluation criteria described in Table 3 above.




FIGURE 5. MAG, IN THE PRESENCE OF LMAC, BRIEFS THE EVALUATION TEAM ON CLEARANCE DONE IN AN URBAN SETTING. TOUL, LEBANON. (PHOTO: WELMOET WELS)

**Table 7. Evaluation conclusions using OECD development evaluation criteria**

Ser	Criteria	Conclusions	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	<b>Relevance</b>	The Evaluation Team finds that the MACM programme was relevant in terms of its relation to the MFA's overall strategy, and the activities funded were relevant in that they generally followed three of the five mine action pillars. However, in the opinion of the Evaluation Team, there are areas for improvement in terms of project selection and, at an operational level, in the way that individual tasks are prioritised and linked to the wider humanitarian goals. The Evaluation Team would also like to highlight the positive attempts by all implementing partners (including UNMAS in Afghanistan) to address the IED issue. The cross-cutting issue of gender is addressed by all partners and resonates well in their AORs, leading to more acceptance of women in the workforce. However, safeguarding and protection should be added to the cross-cutting principles to ensure the safety of the population during and after operations and to align better with current humanitarian standards.	One exception was the victim assistance project in Lebanon described in Annex E below.
2	<b>Impact</b>	The Evaluation Team found that mine action continued to have impact on beneficiaries, both in terms of human security (by removing hazard) and economic development (by clearing contaminated land). However, there are also challenges in efficiency, discussed in Ser 4 below. Furthermore, the Evaluation team finds that there is room for improvement in attributing impact, particularly in assessing the number of beneficiaries reached by the various activities. The Evaluation Team also believes that more can be done in terms of identifying victims and in the use of established social science techniques in mine risk education (MRE).	
3	<b>Effectiveness</b>	In general, the Evaluation Team found that the implementing partners were effective in terms of reaching their targets. Where there were issues, then, in general, the implementing partners were good at communicating issues and agreeing new targets or other changes in their programs.	One exception was the impact study in Afghanistan which was supposed to have been carried out in 2019.
4	<b>Efficiency</b>	The Evaluation Team did not conduct financial audits of the implementing partners, but note that the reporting processes would allow measures of efficiency at an output level to be calculated. The implementers would have been able to estimate clearance costs per square metre, for example. The IATI system provided a means to track inputs and outputs, though the Evaluation Team note that the IATI system is not user-friendly and there is scope to further optimise its use in reporting outputs in the mine action sector. The Evaluation Team would also like to highlight the positive steps being taken by HALO in Ukraine and MAG in Lebanon to improve output efficiency by the introduction of new technology (new low-cost brush cutters in Ukraine, new data-logging metal detectors in Lebanon). Finally, it should be recognised that there is a challenge in efficiency in mine action, in that in some cases the benefit gained from clearance is exceeded by the cost of that clearance. This is a challenge at the operational level, in terms of task prioritisation and selection, and at a strategic level, in terms of Ottawa and Oslo compliance.	The Evaluation Team did note that there is room to improve on the way that overheads are calculated, in that there is a general need to understand costs in the form of activity-based budgeting.
5	<b>Sustainability</b>	Sustainability, in effect, is the third strategic goal of the MFA, namely 'capacity development'. The Evaluation Team found that all implementing partners put great emphasis on technical training of national staff, and also offered ad hoc training to personnel in the various NMAA, but there was little systematic capacity development as understood by the Evaluation Team. One notable exception was the work to partner LAMINDA carried out by DCA in Lebanon.	See Annex F.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

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The recommendations of the Evaluation Team are set out below in bullet point format for ease of reference:

- The MFA should consider the development of a more detailed policy document for mine action as part of their policy framework.
- The MFA should maintain gender as a cross-cutting policy principle, and expand the principles to include safeguarding and protection.
- The Evaluation Team recommends that the MFA adopt a more country-specific project design, with more liaison with embassies and NMAA, via an increased project appraisal process at the beginning of the project cycle.
- Prioritisation issues should be resolved through discussions with NMAA prior to project commencement. Agreement on prioritisation should be an *ex ante* requirement.
- Implementing partners should be requested to develop a formal prioritisation matrix.
- More work needs to be done to better define outcomes, ideally within a 'theory of change' owned by the MFA and included in the mine action policy framework as recommended above.
- Further work should be done on how to accurately estimate beneficiary numbers, and attention should be given to framing benefit in terms of economic value and recognised health economic methods.
- The Evaluation Team consider that MRE is potentially an effective (and cost effective) method of reducing casualties, but also consider that more work needs to be done on the ToC of MRE and on the use of epidemiological tools to measure (and improve) effectiveness.
- The MFA should consider funding in a thematic manner to address specific gaps, both globally and on a country-specific basis.
- Capacity development is a key strategic goal of the MFA, and the Evaluation Team recommends that an element of MFA funds be directed specifically at capacity development, and that this development be based on goals of 'impact free' and treaty compliance as set out in this report.
- The Evaluation Team recognises the increasing prevalence of IED and encourage the funding of interventions that deal with 'legacy' IED (including, but not limited to, improvised landmines).
- Multi-year funding has shown benefit and should be continued.
- The emergency funding element should be considered (and more clearly defined) as a 'contingency' fund at approximately the same proportion of funding, with more clear and pre-defined priority settings in its allocation.
- The embassies in project countries should be more involved in the project cycle and information flow to and from embassies should be enhanced, including handover of the MACM portfolio between outgoing and incoming staff.
- UNMAS (and indeed other UN agencies) do not work in the same way as NGO implementing partners and should not be considered in competition for individual project funds with the NGO. There are appropriate roles for other UN intervention, either as a potential fund manager, as a source of capacity development, or in a coordination role, that do not compete for the same funding.

- Action should be taken to address the implementing partners reports to include more scope for a 'lessons learned' process during the project cycle. Earlier, or more regular, evaluation could form part of this.
- The Evaluation Team recognise that a change to a more thematic/country specific project structure may require changes to the program management system, as set out in the options outlined in the report. The Team also recognise that such a change will need to be introduced after sufficient time to avoid disruption.

## ANNEXES:

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- A. List of documents provided
- B. List of people interviewed
- C. Responses to set questions
- D. Trip report: Ukraine
- E. Trip report: Lebanon
- F. Notes on capacity development in mine action
- G. An understanding of the concept of 'Theory of Change'
- H. Example of a possible prioritisation matrix

## ENCLOSURES:

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- 1. Terms of Reference (ToR)

## ANNEX A. LIST OF DOCUMENTS PROVIDED

Table 8. List of documents provided						
Ser	Title	Author	Provider	Date	Type	Pages
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	GICHD internal report – Not for distribution. Informal discussions with MAG and the HALO Trust held on 23-24 August 2016 in United Kingdom and DCA (9 September), Geneva.	GICHD	GICHD	not shown	Guidelines	5
2	MAG Post-Clearance Impact Assessment: Tindilo Town Centre (“Peri”) and Surrounding Area, South Sudan	MAG	MAG	May 2018	Impact Assessment	17
3	MAG Community Liaison SOP for Lebanon	MAG	MAG	Nov 18	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	18
4	MAG Community Liaison SOP for South Sudan	MAG	MAG	29.03.2019	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	21
5	MAG Conflict Analysis Lebanon	MAG	MAG	not shown	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	5
6	MAG Conflict Analysis South Sudan	MAG	MAG	not shown	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	5
7	MAG Conflict sensitivity gender and diversity baseline assessment [sic] (country by country) extract from longer document	MAG	MAG	not shown	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	21
8	MAG Conflict sensitivity, gender, disability and inclusion GMAP proposal, extract from longer document	MAG	MAG	not shown	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	2
9	MAG Dignity at Work Policy	MAG	MAG	10.04.2018	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	6
10	MAG Equal Opportunities Policy	MAG	MAG	03.06.2016	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	3
11	MAG Gender Statement	MAG	MAG	04.04.2019	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	3
12	MAG Guidance for Programmes: Integrating Housing, Land, and Property Rights in Mine Action	MAG	MAG	01.04.2019	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	6
13	MAG Guidance on collecting information on Post Clearance Impact Assessment (PCIA)	MAG	MAG	April 2019	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	10
14	MAG Guidance on collecting information on Risk Education Impact Assessment Forms (RE Pre Post)	MAG	MAG	10.04.2019	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	5
15	MAG Model REPP (Spreadsheet for standardized reporting of RE)	MAG	MAG	April 2019	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	5
16	MAG Modern Slavery Statement	MAG	MAG	31.07.2018	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	4
17	MAG PCIA Form 1 PCIA Baseline Group Interview V1.01	MAG	MAG	June 2019	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	6

18	MAG PCIA Form 2 PCIA Baseline Household Survey	MAG	MAG	June 2019	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	6
19	MAG PCIA Form 3 Task Outcome Evaluation template (spreadsheet) V1.03	MAG	MAG	June 2019	Organization's Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	1
20	MAG PCIA Form 4 PCIA Post Clearance Group Interview V1.01	MAG	MAG		Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	7
21	MAG PCIA Form 5 Post Clearance Household Survey	MAG	MAG		Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	5
22	MAG PCIA Task Outcome Evaluation Template V1.03 spreadsheet	MAG	MAG	June 2019	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	1
23	MAG Policy on Integrating Housing, Land, and Property Rights in Mine Action	MAG	MAG	01.04.2019	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	2
24	MAG Policy on Personal Conduct	MAG	MAG	22.02.2018	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	3
25	MAG Policy on Protection of Children and Vulnerable Adults	MAG	MAG	22.02.2018	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	5
26	MAG Reporting Malpractice & Raising Concerns ('Whistleblowing') Policy and Procedure	MAG	MAG	10.05.2018	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	7
27	MAG Safeguarding Framework	MAG	MAG	22.02.2018	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	4
28	MAG Safeguarding Strategy	MAG	MAG	08.02.2019	Policy, Analysis, Guidelines	6
29	DCA Annual Narrative Progress Report I 1 September 2016 - 31 December 2016	DCA	MFA	not shown	Annual Report	119
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
30	DCA Annual Narrative Progress Report II 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018	DCA	MFA	03.06.2019	Annual Report	269
31	HALO Concept Note: Mine Action Support in Yemen	HALO	MFA	not shown	Annual Report	10
32	HALO Final Report Colombia 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018	HALO	MFA	03.06.2019	Annual Report	24
33	HALO Final Report West Bank	HALO	MFA	03.06.2019	Annual Report	20
34	HALO Progress Report, 2018, Afghanistan 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018	HALO	MFA	03.06.2019	Annual Report	27
35	HALO Progress Report, 2018, Kosovo 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018	HALO	MFA	03.06.2019	Annual Report	26
36	HALO Progress Report, 2018, Somalia 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018	HALO	MFA	03.06.2019	Annual Report	20
37	HALO Progress Report, 2018, Syria 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018	HALO	MFA	03.06.2019	Annual Report	24
38	HALO Progress Report, 2018, Ukraine 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2018	HALO	MFA	03.06.2019	Annual Report	26
39	[REDACTED]	MAG	MFA	01.05.2018	Annual Report	19

40		MAG	MFA	01.05.2019	Annual Report	12
41	MAG Year 1 Annual Analytical Report September 2016 – December 2017	MAG	MFA	01.05.2018	Annual Report	43
42	MAG Year 2 Annual Analytical Report January 2018 – December 2018	MAG	MFA	01.06.2019	Annual Report	40
43	UNMAS Annual Report 2017	UNMAS	MFA	not shown	Annual Report	25
44	UNMAS in Peace Operations 2017	UNMAS	MFA	not shown	Annual Report	8
45	NL MFA Application Form and Threshold Check Form	NL MFA	MFA	not shown	Application form	9
46	UNMAS Five year plan and NL contribution letter.	UNMAS	MFA	not shown	Background documents	23
47	UNMAS The Strategy of The United Nations on Mine Action 2013-2018	UNMAS	MFA	not shown	Background documents	28
48	DCA Emergency Response for Derna, Libya Annex B Project Budget	DCA	MFA	20.08.2018	Budget document	3
49	HALO Revised country budgets 2016-2020	HALO	MFA	not shown	Budget document	8
50	HALO Emergency response, South Syria budget	HALO	MFA	not shown	Budget document	1
51	MAG Iraq Proposed Budgets for Mosul (separate documents)	MAG	MFA	not shown	Budget document	1
52	MAG Programme Revised Budget - all countries, 3rd party contracts and support	MAG	MFA	08.08.2016	Budget document	13
53	MAG Proposed Programme Budget 2016 - 2020	MAG	MFA	not shown	Budget document	14
54	MAG Revised Y2 Expenses and Y3 Budget	MAG	MFA	25.10.2018	Budget document	2
55		MAG	MFA	28.02.2017	Budget document	2
56	MAG Clearance of IED/UXO in MOSUL areas liberated from IS proposal budget	MAG	MFA	not shown	Budget document	4
57	DCA Humanitarian Mine Action Budget 01.09.2016 - 31.08.2020 spreadsheet	DCA	MFA		Budget spreadsheet	6
58		MAG	MFA	not shown	Budget spreadsheet	1
59	DCA Final Narrative Report 1 September 2016 – 31 March 2018	DCA	MFA	28.06.2018	Final Report	20
60	HALO Mine Action in southern Syria (Dar'a and Quneitra) 01 May 2017 - 31 March 2018	HALO	MFA	03.06.2019	Final Report	19
61	NL MFA HALO Grant Decision	NL MFA	MFA	25.08.2016	Funding Agreement	7
62	DCA Theory of Change and outcome indicator overview	DCA	MFA	19.09.2016	Guidelines	30



63	GICHD Report: Informal discussions with MAG and the HALO Trust (23-24 August 2016), United Kingdom, and DCA (9 September), Geneva.	GICHD	MFA	not shown	Guidelines	3
64	GICHD/MFA Agenda Mine Action Workshop RBM	GICHD/MFA	MFA	21.09.2016	Guidelines	1
65	Workshop Mine action (RBM) Powerpoint slides	GICHD/MFA	MFA	21.09.2016	Guidelines	20
66	HALO ANNEX 20 Beneficiary Definitions and Guidelines	HALO	MFA	not shown	Guidelines	8
67	MAG Outcome table	MAG	MFA	not shown	Guidelines	1

a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
68	DCA Final Narrative Report 1 September 2016 – 31 March 2018	DCA	MFA	28.06.2018	Final Report	20
69	NL MFA or GICHD ??? Workshop Mine Action – RBM – Follow up actions based on the discussion	MFA or GICHD ?	MFA	not shown	Guidelines	2
70	HALO Afghanistan - ARTIS Abandoned Improvised Mine Exrternal [sic] Review Final Report	ARTIS	MFA	02.01.2019	Independent Assessment	58
71	DCA Emergency Response for Derna, Libya Log Frame	DCA	MFA	19.08.18	Log Frame	3
72	MAG Iraq – Emergency Response Proposal Logframe	MAG	MFA	07.11.2016	Log Frame	2
73	[REDACTED]	MAG	MFA	28.02.2017	Log Frame	
74	HALO Project Proposal (all countries)	HALO	MFA	25.05.2016	Multi-country project proposal	3
75	NL MFA Policy Framework Mine Action and Cluster Munitions Programme 2016-2020 annex 1 List of priority countries	NL MFA	MFA	29.03.2016	Policy document	70
76	NL MFA Grant policy framework for the Mine Action and Cluster Munitions Programme 2016-2020 (NL and EN translation) and Annex	NL MFA	MFA	30.03.2016	Programme outline	1
77	DCA Programme Proposal: Safer Communities in South Sudan, Mali, Libya, and Lebanon, application form	DCA	MFA	not shown	Programme Proposal	24
78	MAG Programme Proposal application form	MAG	MFA	26.05.2016	Programme Proposal	66
79	DCA Annual Plan 2018 - Joint Outcome Indicators; Lebanon Log Frame; Libya Log Frame; Mali Log Frame; South Sudan Log Frame;	DCA	MFA	01.12.2017	Project Annual Plans	71
80	DCA Annual Plan 2019 - Joint Outcome Indicators; Lebanon Log Frame; Libya Log Frame; Mali Log Frame; South Sudan Log Frame;	DCA	MFA	01.11.2018	Project Annual Plans	16
81	HALO Monthly Progress Reports, Yemen: December 2017 to April 2019 (15 reports)	HALO	MFA	various	Project Monthly Reports	20
82	DCA Emergency Response for Derna, Libya	DCA	MFA	20.08.2018	Project Proposal	48
83	DCA Lebanon Humanitarian Mine Action Country Plan	DCA	MFA	25.05.2016	Project Proposal	18
84	DCA Libya Humanitarian Mine Action Country Plan	DCA	MFA	25.05.2016	Project Proposal	16
85	DCA Mali Humanitarian Mine Action Country Plan	DCA	MFA	25.05.2016	Project Proposal	16
86	DCA South Sudan Humanitarian Mine Action Country Plan	DCA	MFA	not shown	Project Proposal	12
87	GICHD Capacity Development and Upstream Mine Action Support 2018 to 2020	GICHD	MFA	28.03.2018	Project Proposal	16

88	GICHD Capacity Development and Upstream Mine Action Support 2018 to 2020 Annexes	GICHD	MFA	28.03.2018	Project Proposal	15
89	HALO Afghanistan Country Plan	HALO	MFA	not shown	Project Proposal	12
90	HALO Cluster Ammunition activities 2016-2020 Annual Planning 2019 Afghanistan, Kosovo, Somalia, Syria and Ukraine	HALO	MFA	03.06.2019	Project Proposal	13
91	HALO Colombia Country Plan	HALO	MFA	not shown	Project Proposal	33
92	HALO Kosovo Country Plan	HALO	MFA	not shown	Project Proposal	15
93	HALO Palestinian Territories (West Bank) Country Plan	HALO	MFA	not shown	Project Proposal	14
94	HALO Somalia Country Plan	HALO	MFA	not shown	Project Proposal	13
95	HALO Syria Country Plan	HALO	MFA	not shown	Project Proposal	15
96	HALO Ukraine Country Plan	HALO	MFA	not shown	Project Proposal	13
97	MAG Country Plan Democratic Republic of Congo	MAG	MFA	26.05.2016	Project Proposal	14
98	MAG Country Plan Iraq	MAG	MFA	not shown	Project Proposal	15
99	MAG Country Plan Lebanon	MAG	MFA	26.05.2016	Project Proposal	15
100	██████████	MAG	MFA	26.05.2016	Project Proposal	15

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
101	MAG Delivery of Mine Action Support for Populations Affected by Conflict in Mosul	MAG	MFA	07.11.2016	Project Proposal	10
102	MAG Lifesaving humanitarian mine action in response to the protection needs of conflict affected populations in Al Raqqa Governorate	MAG	MFA	28.02.2017	Project Proposal	13
103	MAG Multi Country Work Plans 2019 (Year 3)	MAG	MFA	07.11.2018	Project Proposal	10
104	████████████████████	MAG	MFA	not shown	Project Proposal	3
105	MAG Proposal for Emergency funding for Iraq	MAG	MFA	not shown	Project Proposal	4
106	UNMAS Afghanistan proposal and budget	UNMAS	MFA	26.10.2018	Project Proposal	16
107	GICHD Proposal for provision of services- NL MFA RBM workshop	GICHD	MFA	12.09.2016	Proposal	2
108	NL MFA Evaluation of MAG Irak emergency proposal (NL)	NL MFA	MFA	01.10.2016	Proposal Evaluation	13
109	GICHD Outlook report 2019	GICHD	MFA	15.01.2019	Report	72
110	MAG Gender in Mine action: Promoting women's employment across Mine Action in MAG Syria (public report)	MAG	MFA	31.10.2017	Report	4
111	DCA Budget annual plans and budgets 2018 document	DCA	MFA	01.11.2017	Report / Plan	13
112	DCA Budget annual plans and budgets 2019 document	DCA	MFA	01.11.2018	Report / Plan	13
113	??? Syria project outputs table (blank outline) spreadsheet	???	MFA	not shown	Results table	2
114	NL Metrics checker - spreadsheet	HALO?	MFA	not shown	Results table	1
115	Dutch MFA 2016-20 outputs table May 2019 year 2 results	MAG?	MFA	not shown	Results table	6
116	HALO Annual report 2017 MFA questions and HALO answers	HALO	MFA	not shown	Supplementary	5
117	HALO Theories of Change - all countries and global	HALO	MFA	not shown	Theory of Change	9
118	████████████████████	MAG	MFA	20.09.2016	Theory of Change	1
119	MAG Theory of Change - country not specified	MAG	MFA	not shown	Theory of Change	1
120	MAG Theory of Change DR Congo	MAG	MFA	19.09.2016	Theory of Change	1
121	MAG Theory of Change Iraq	MAG	MFA	19.09.2016	Theory of Change	1
122	MAG Theory of Change Lebanon	MAG	MFA	19.09.2016	Theory of Change	1

123	MAG Theory of Change South Sudan	MAG	MFA	19.09.2016	Theory of Change	1
124	NL MFA Annex 3B policy framework HMA Theory of Change	NL MFA	MFA	29.03.2016	Theory of Change	1
125	HALO email to MFA with video link 2'34" long <a href="https://vimeo.com/312971059">https://vimeo.com/312971059</a> Afghanistan	HALO	MFA	30.01.2019	Video link	1
126	DCA Article on Clearance of girl's school in Sirte email	DCA	MFA			
127	HALO Answers to questions from MFA on annual plans 2018 (email)	HALO	MFA			
128	NL MFA to HALO discontinuing South Syria email	NL MFA	MFA			
129	HALO MAG NPA Standardising Beneficiary Definitions	HAL/MAG/NPA	MFA, MAG	October 2016	Guidelines	214
130	DCA DanChurchAid International Strategy 2019 - 2022	DCA	DCA	24.10.2018	Background documents	68
131	DCA Strategy Safer Communities DR Congo 2015 - 2018	DCA		not shown	Background documents	3
132	DCA Strategy Safer Communities DR South Sudan 2015 - 2018	DCA		not shown	Background documents	2
133	Socio-economic benefits of mine clearance in Lebanon	UNDP	UNDP	01/2019	Funding case	108

ANNEX B. LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Table 9. List of interviewees			
1	██████████	DCA	HQ
2	██████████	HALO	HQ
3	██████████	HALO	HQ
4	██████████	HALO	HQ
5	██████████	MAG	HQ
6	██████████	UNMAS	HQ
7	██████████	UNMAS	HQ
8	██████████	MAG	HQ
9	██████████	MAG	HQ
10	██████████	Embassy	Afghanistan
11	██████████	HALO	Afghanistan
12	██████████	NMAA	Afghanistan
13	██████████	NMAA	Afghanistan
14	██████████	NMAA	Afghanistan
15	██████████	NMAA	Afghanistan
16	██████████	UNMAS	Afghanistan
17	██████████	Embassy	Colombia
18	██████████	UNMAS	Colombia
19	██████████	UNMAS	Colombia
20	██████████	HALO	Colombia
21	██████████	Embassy	Iraq
22	██████████	Embassy	Iraq
23	██████████	MAG	Iraq
24	██████████	UNMAS	Iraq
25	██████████	Embassy	Kosovo
26	██████████	Embassy	Kosovo
27	██████████	HALO	Kosovo
28	██████████	DCA	Lebanon
29	██████████	Embassy	Lebanon
30	██████████	LAMINDA	Lebanon
31	██████████	MAG	Lebanon
32	██████████	LMAC	Lebanon
33	██████████	LMAC	Lebanon
34	██████████	LMAC (RMAC)	Lebanon

35	██████	Regional School for Humanitarian Demining	Lebanon
36	██████████	Balamand University	Lebanon
37	██████████	Balamand University	Lebanon
38	██████████	UNDP	Lebanon
39	██████████	UNMAS (UNIFIL)	Lebanon
40	██████████	DCA	Libya
41	██████████	DCA	Libya
42	██████████	Embassy	Libya
43	██████████	UNMAS	Libya
44	██████████	DCA	Mali
45	██████████	Embassy	Mali
46	██████████	MFA	MFA
47	██████████	MFA	MFA
48	██████████	Embassy	Palestine
49	██████████	HALO	Palestine
50	██████████	HALO	Somalia
51	██████████	UNMAS	Somalia
52	██████████	DCA	South Sudan
53	██████████	Embassy	South Sudan
54	██████████	MAG	South Sudan
55	██████████	NMAA	South Sudan
56	██████████	UNMAS	South Sudan
57	██████████	Embassy	Syria
58	██████████	Embassy	Ukraine
59	██████████	HALO	Ukraine
60		SES	Ukraine
61		SES	Ukraine
62	██████████	UNDP	Ukraine
63	██████████	MOD	Ukraine
64	██████████	MOD	Ukraine
65	██████████	Civilian Protection	Ukraine
66	██████████	Regional Administration	Ukraine
67	██████████	Embassy	Yemen

## ANNEX C. RESPONSES TO SET QUESTIONS

Table 10. performance against typical evaluation criteria ( <i>answers in italics</i> )		
Ser	Q. No	Evaluation question
(a)	(b)	(c)
Impact and Policy Relevance		
1	1	To what extent has the program generated the results (outcomes, outputs, targets) as envisaged in the policy framework (and Theory of Change) and as described in the initial program proposals? Why or why not? <i>In general, based primarily on reported results, the implementers have met or exceeded the targets included in their proposals and the subsequent grants for outputs. Outcomes were, in general, poorly identified and measured. Where these have not been achieved, the reasons for doing so have been communicated to the MFA and alternative approaches (a change in target or a no-cost extension, for example) have been agreed.</i>
2	2	To what extent do these results contribute to a sustainable impact on human security and socio-economic development? <i>Mine action interventions in general have a positive impact on human security by removing explosive hazards, and assist in socio-economic developments by removing blockages from land. These benefits are, in general, sustainable in that, once removed, the hazards do not return.. Training risk education trainers has the potential of having a sustainable result if the overall principles of capacity development are followed and if the project is sustainable within the OECD definition of sustainability.</i>
3	3	To what extent has attention been paid to cross-cutting issues, particularly gender, conflict sensitivity and local capacity development? (See answers to 3a to 3c below)
4	3a	To what extent have programs contributed to strengthening the capacity of national/local actors and mine action operators? How has this influenced the effectiveness and sustainability of the programs, i.e. local actors are able to continue activities after the partner organization has left? How does this relate to the role of other actors working in this field? <i>In general, the partners regard 'capacity development' as technical training for their own employees. Whilst all of the partners understand the importance of 'nationalising' their own programs (not least to reduce costs), they (with the exception of DCA) are less systematic about providing capacity development support to national organisations. Where this support does exist, it tends to be ad hoc provision of training sessions or support to attend international meetings. The broader issues of capacity development beyond training are often not considered.</i>
5	3b	How do the implementing partners value their cooperation with national/local actors (e.g. national mine action agencies, UNMAS) and vice versa? What are the most important lessons learned? <i>In general, the partners have a better relationship with national mine action authorities than they do with UNMAS. UNMAS is, again in general, seen as a competitor for international funding. This view was borne out in discussions with some senior UNMAS personnel at a country office level who agreed that, whilst UNMAS is comparatively strong in its peace-support role (providing mine action support to UN peacekeeping missions) it is less good at dealing with humanitarian mine action programs. There is some nuance in this in that relations with some UNMAS country programmes is better than with others.</i>
6	3c	Have the implementing partners incorporated an (innovative) gender-based approach in their programs and how has this influenced program outcomes? <i>All of the partners recognise the requirement to take gender issues into account, and they all have a policy to actively recruit women. The inclusion of women in teams – particularly in MRE and community liaison (CL) activities, means there is a greater chance that the teams reach women and girls, and that the voices and opinions of female beneficiaries are heard. The positive role models of female deminers also supports a wider 'gender transformation' agenda. In addition, some NGOs actively worked on creating a woman- and mother-friendly work environment, e.g. by establishing breastfeeding policies. One project built the capacity of a women's NGO specifically with the objective of reaching out more to the woman-headed households in the community. This reversed process – starting from the gender-profile of the community and then building teams around that – is an inventive and beneficiaries-driven approach. Data disaggregation by sex is now well established in most programme. However, limitations with prioritisation processes as discussed in the main body of the report do not always take the results into account. Indeed the evaluation team find that there is a general lack of taking casualty data into account.</i>
7	4	What are the most important lessons learned, in terms of: programmatic approach and activity implementation? Relevance of assumptions and theories of change? Risk expectations and external factors? <i>The operational focus of all the implementing partners, and many of the other respondents, led to this question being understood as primarily concerned with efficiency of implementation even when asked in the context of impact. Impact and beneficiary-focussed lessons learned were notable by their absence. In the opinion of the Evaluation Team the ToC concept is not well understood, as discussed in the main body of the report..</i>
8	5	Does the current way of setting geographical priorities, including the 80/20 rule, allow for the largest impact, socioeconomically as well as politically? <i>There is a clear tension here, between socio-economic impact and political imperatives. This is discussed in more detail in the main body of the report.</i>



9	6	Joint outcome-indicators agreed with GICHD
		<i>The MFA guidelines document resulting from this workshop appears to be little known. It is understood by the Evaluation Team that joint outcome indicators were mainly based upon HALO/MAG suggestions, based in turn on existing DFID formulation, and which were then accepted by DCA during the original 2016 outcome workshop. However, as discussed in the main body of the report and in the Outcomes workshop of 26 Sep 2016, more work needs to be done on understanding both the outcomes of mine action and reasonable indicators of progress.</i>
10	6a	Are the partner organizations able to report on the requested indicators?
		<i>Yes, but at some degree of transaction cost when using IATI. See comments on reporting in main body of report. Calculated numbers for several beneficiary indicators are not always plausible. Whilst sample size has been discussed as a limitation, the Evaluation Team feels there are some more fundamental problems with the selection of both outcomes and indicators. These need to be resolved first. Sample size calculation is a comparatively routine epidemiological and statistical task once the correct ToC is in place, particularly for risk education.</i>
11	6b	Do the partner organizations apply and collect data for the indicators in the same way?
		<i>No. They have tried to interpret the indicators in ways that most suit their existing procedures. More work may need to be done on this to standardise methodologies. Brief indicator descriptions (title of indicator only) are not sufficient by themselves to support standardisation without supporting methodology.</i>
12	6c	Do the partner organizations and policy officers feel the indicators reported on reflect the true impact of work done?
		<i>To varying degrees. There was some recognition in the September workshop that these indicators, particularly those concerned with risk education, are not sufficient. Also the indicators do not readily reflect work done on capacity development.</i>
13	6d	Has the current program notably benefited from the addition of joint outcome-indicators?
		<i>In principle, yes. However in detail this is less clear – most benefit was realised by the two implementers who were able to use common indicators for MACM and another funder. See comments in the main body of the report.</i>
14	6e	Has reporting via IATI (International Aid Transparency Initiative) provided the envisaged level of insight in the impact of the MACM program?
		<i>The Evaluation Team recognise that there is a role for its use in recording outputs, not least in facilitating transparency and accountability. See comments on reporting in main body of report. IATI is not delivering the expected benefits at an outcome level.</i>

Efficiency		
15	1	What is the effect of multi-annual funding on planning cycles, outputs and outcomes and Monitoring & Evaluation of the NGOs? (see detailed answers in to questions 1a-1b below).
16	1a	Are implementing partners able to make and execute multi-annual plans, which allow for better/more efficient use of assets?
		<i>All of the partners report a positive effect on efficiency, in that they can plan more long term interventions, waste less resources standing teams up and down, and need expend less management effort than when working in an annual funding cycle.</i>
17	1b	Does the programme produce visible benefits as a result of multi-annual funding?
		<i>Yes, See Ser 16 above.</i>
18	2	To what extent has the multi-annual funding led to a more strategic donor-agency relationship, going beyond communication regarding the projects funded by the Netherlands, and led to more strategic policy input into the global mine action policy debate, both by the Netherlands and the implementing partners?
		<i>The partners were positive about the multi-year funding. A few respondents provided examples. One partner reported that the embassy had organised networking meetings with other donors to assist them with their funding flow. An embassy reported that they used their diplomatic abilities to advocate for access for agencies and their equipment. Such issues require relationship-building and time and a multi-year programme is an important enabler in that regard.</i>
19	3	To what extent have the implementing partners contributed to a coordinated Mine Action approach, both in the field and globally? Have the implementing partners actively sought synergy with other initiatives at country-level or within the international community to increase the effectiveness of their programmes?
		<i>There are a number of drivers towards coordination. Firstly, the partners tend to work in a similar manner in each of their programmes, and increasingly the role of national mine action authorities (NMAA) offers the chance for coordination at a national level, supported in some cases by interested and engaged embassies. Finally there is some coordination as a result of international fora such as the National Director's meeting facilitated by UNMAS and the Government of Switzerland.</i>

20	4	Did the partner organizations implement innovations, and how did this contribute to programme efficiency and effectiveness?
		<i>Yes. The Evaluation Team were able to visit examples of innovations during their two field missions. The innovations tend to contribute to efficiency, such as a more effective way of dealing with overgrown vegetation. See the Ukraine trip report at Annex D to this report for an example.</i>
21	5	How is the tender process viewed by the different stakeholders involved? Does the way the tender is designed have any effect on the programme and efficiency itself?
		<i>In general, the partners were very positive about the tender process, particularly in terms of the multi-year funding. There were some suggestions raised about the countries selected (see Ser 8 above) and on the emergency response funding (see below).</i>

Emergency response funding		
22	1	Do the results achieved with emergency response funding contribute to the envisaged policy objectives?
		<i>Yes. Stakeholders have used the emergency response funding to respond to emerging problems in the Middle East, and also to establish a new programme in Yemen.</i>
23	2	How has the emergency funding been dispersed among the three partners and how has this influenced the programme?
24	2a	a. Has the emergency response funding been demand driven (i.e. ministry requesting proposals) or supply driven (i.e. partners submitting proposals)?
		<i>It has generally been supply-driven (using the above definitions) in that it has always been as a result of a request from one of the implementing partners.</i>
25	2b	What percentage of the emergency funding did each partner receive and how does this relate to the produced outcomes?
		<i>MAG received 5.9 million; HALO received 3 million; DCA 2.5 million. Total: 11.4 million. The issue of outcome for the MACM program are discussed in more depth in the main body of this report.</i>
26	2c	Is the current procedure for requesting emergency response funding adequate and quick enough or is there room for improvement?
		<i>All of the stakeholders welcomed the existence of the emergency fund, but there was general consensus that there was a need to improve the clarity of the criteria under which a request could be made. There was also a general consensus that that the emergency fund allocation process was too slow for 'emergency' needs.</i>
27	3	Is the current ratio of emergency response funding to the total programme budget the most optimal?
		<i>See discussion on this in the main body of the report.</i>
28	4	What are the pros and cons of reserving the emergency response budget for multi-annual partners only, as opposed to also making funds available for organizations outside of the tender?
		<i>There was a general recognition that, in the event of an emergency in a country where none of the partners were accredited or established, that it made more sense for another, already pre-selected, partner who is present in that country to receive funding support.</i>

### OVERVIEW

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The field mission in Ukraine was undertaken in two parts. In the first week, the evaluation team had a number of meetings with agency representatives in Kiev, and then travelled over the weekend to the east of the country to view HALO activities and to meet beneficiaries and other key informants. An itinerary is included at Appendix 1 to this annex. The evaluation team was able to meet with<sup>13</sup>:

- HALO Trust staff in their office in Kiev, and at their operations base in Kramatorsk;
- Ministry of Defence representatives in Kiev;
- State Emergency Services (SES) representatives in Kiev;
- The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mine action project manager
- The UNDP person responsible for chairing the mine action sub-cluster in Kiev
- Joint Military Forces in Kramatorsk
- Donetsk Civilian Protection in Kramatorsk
- Beneficiaries in the Buffer Zone
- Farmers, agricultural managers, and an agricultural college in the Buffer Zone who wanted their land cleared
- Heads of Municipalities in the Buffer Zone.

### BACKGROUND

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Ukraine, with a population of approximately 40 million, is the largest land-area country fully inside Europe and is the second poorest (per capita) country in Europe<sup>14</sup>. Despite the evident wealth and modern buildings in the capital, Kiev, national median wealth is very low by global standards.<sup>15</sup> In early 2014 the national government was overthrown in a revolution. However, in April 2014 the two eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk were taken over by pro-Russian armed militias. The conflict front-line was highly mobile until a ceasefire agreement in February 2015 fixed the Contact Line and defined a 15km deep Buffer Zone on either side.

#### **The Explosive Remnants problem in Ukraine**

Ukraine has two distinct parts to its explosive remnants problem. These are:

- Items from the Second World War and subsequent ammunition storage incidents. Ukraine was very heavily bombed during the war. For over 70 years the national civil defence organization (SES) has been in charge of the response to unexploded ordnance, which has mainly been a response to individual items as they are reported.

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<sup>13</sup> A full list is in Annex B

<sup>14</sup> All data from Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine>


<sup>15</sup> Global Wealth Report 2018. Credit Suisse, cited in Wikipedia.

- Items from the recent (2014-2015) and ongoing (since 2015) conflict in the east of the country. Risk education, clearance and spot tasks are conducted by military deminers, SES, and International Humanitarian Demining Organizations. Both cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines have been used, including common use of grenades converted to victim-activated devices by attaching a wire or fishing-line to the pin. Low intensity artillery exchanges continue on nearly a daily basis. The rapid movement of the front lines in 2014 led to contaminated areas that are now well away from the fixed ceasefire Contact Line.



Political Map of Ukraine

FIGURE 6. THESE TWO MAPS SHOW THE AREAS OF CONTENTION IN UKRAINE.



## Victims

The Landmine Monitor reports 4,065 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties: 2,503 killed and 1,562 injured from 1945 to 2017. The Monitor recorded the majority of the mine casualties (725 killed and 1,353 injured) were between 2014 through 2017, reflecting the impact of the recent conflict where APMs have been used. However, according to HALO, these numbers are merely estimates. The difficulty of access to the rebel-held territories and the lack of information from these areas suggests that the figures for casualties since 2014 are probably a significant under-estimate.

## National Authority

The ongoing active conflict leads to an over-arching role for the national military, especially in the east of the country, and puts them in charge (directly or through coordinating committees) of task allocation for humanitarian demining. The stated priorities are infrastructure first and agriculture second.

Although Ukraine has passed legislation to establish a National Mine Action Authority and a National Mine Action Centre the implementation is currently still under discussion. Following recent elections and a new constitution the role of NMAA is contested: both the Ministry of Defence and the SES present themselves as strong candidates. A quick resolution of this issue appears to be unlikely. This lack of a national authority has caused some difficulties in certifying land that has been released; the first few clearance certificates issued in Ukraine were eventually handed over while the evaluation team was in Kiev.



FIGURE 7. FEMALE DEMINER DOING BAC AND TRIPWIRE DRILL, UKRAINE. (PHOTO: RUSSELL GASSER)

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## OBSERVATIONS

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There are a number of constraints on clearance close to the Contact Line, especially in areas where there is continued shelling.

The quality of clearance of HALO, and confidence that the land they had cleared was safe, were repeatedly emphasized. This is in direct comparison to several “off the record” remarks and anecdotes about the poor quality of clearance by both military and SES personnel. Part, but not all, of this can be traced to the difference between military and humanitarian demining standards, and the continued influence of institutions built up during the time of the Soviet Union.

The most striking interviews were with people in the agricultural sector. Some were desperate to get their land cleared, but it had not been prioritised. The long delays caused by the painstaking approach of humanitarian demining was a source of frustration to them. One farm manager (of a large farm which was - as is common in Ukraine - made up by renting a large number of individually-owned small parcels of land) had started to pay informal deminers to clear land so that he could farm it; he had to pay rent and land tax even while the land was unused. It was known that the clearance was inadequate and the tractor drivers had their wages increased very significantly as a result. Conversely, the one farmer who did not state that clearing the contaminated land would make a significant difference to his income had been prioritised. However, it is recognised that this was a small sample of beneficiaries.

Throughout all the meetings in Ukraine there was little evidence that prioritisation, as it may be discussed in humanitarian demining, is seen as an important concept. Requests for clearance generally pass through a local administration to the SES or to a military coordinating committee. The Evaluation Team was told that the priorities given are that infrastructure is the top priority, then agriculture, but the team was also told tasks were allocated on a ‘first come, first served’ basis. For spot tasks, away from the conflict in the east, the SES stated that they responded to all reports to suspect items.



FIGURE 8. THIS 80-YEAR-OLD BENEFICIARY IN UKRAINE STOPPED CUTTING HAY FOR HER GOATS IN A SHA AFTER RECEIVING MRE. (PHOTO: RUSSELL GASSER)

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## ANALYSIS

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### Relevance

There is a significant disconnect between the stated aims of the MACM programme and the work that is funded in Ukraine. The in-country planning has few mechanisms to include the needs of potential beneficiaries. As a result, prioritisation is notably weak. This is unlikely to change; in the east because of the ongoing active conflict which prioritises military objectives, and nationally due to the absence of an NMAA/NMAC committed to humanitarian objectives. HALO in Kramatorsk had a focus on outputs and the organisation's detailed record keeping and databases did not include beneficiary information.

### Impact

Funding for HALO has increased the profile of humanitarian demining in Ukraine, as has the sector coordination work led by UNDP who chair the coordination meetings. The socio-economic impact of the work done is increased by widespread confidence in HALO's quality and honesty, but the slow pace of clearance leads to frustration and the search for faster, more dangerous solutions.

### Effectiveness

In terms of output effectiveness the program was excellent. HALO have met the targets set in their grant documents or have re-negotiated them with the MFA, where circumstances have prevented them meeting targets.

## Efficiency



FIGURE 9. THIS REMOTE-CONTROLLED BRUSH CUTTER, USED BY HALO IN UKRAINE, REDUCES VEGETATION CUTTING TIME WHILE ITS OPERATORS CAN REMAIN AT A SAFE DISTANCE.

(PHOTO: RUSSELL GASSER)

Ukraine is a country where the high level of education, good infrastructure and low wages all contribute to a high-efficiency environment. Conversely, the heavy layers of old-fashioned bureaucracy and an ongoing armed conflict work against efficiency, as does the ongoing political dispute about national leadership of mine action. The MACM partner showed flexibility, innovation, and determination to deliver an efficient solution. For example, HALO have adopted a low-cost remote brush-cutting solution which promises to significantly reduce the amount of effort spent on vegetation clearance, and this should in turn increase their productivity and reduce clearance costs per square metre. The costs of clearance remain relatively high, however, and are not within the means of individual beneficiaries. The Evaluation Team heard that this has led to the growth of an ‘informal demining’ sector offering cheap clearance, albeit at a low standard of quality.

## Sustainability

At first sight there appears to be a significant opportunity to contribute to sustainability in Ukraine through capacity development. However, this is not a country with a ‘blank slate’ in EOD where a standard approach to capacity development can make a difference. For example, building on the 70+ years of EOD experience within the SES to assist in developing a more modern approach to humanitarian demining will require care and respect, and requires a systematic approach (as detailed in Annex F). The SES themselves have stated that they would appreciate support (in both training and equipment) to help them deal with modern weapons, but it will be more effective if the institutional arrangements in Ukraine (particularly in forming an NMAA and making a definitive agreement of the division of responsibility) are first resolved.



### **Recommendations for potential future funding**

The evaluation team believes that HALO have done a good job with the resources they have, but, all other things being equal, in the short term they would improve efficiency if they could field more teams and thus benefit from improved economies of scale.

The evaluation team also believes that the mine action sector in Ukraine would benefit from better access to victim data, in the form of primary and secondary data collection.

There is also a need for increased support of SES, once the institutional framework issues are resolved. It may be possible for the Embassy to help coordinate a donor working group to express the requirements of this need for improved coordination to the relevant national bodies.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D. UKRAINE ITINERARY

Table 11. Ukraine itinerary			
Ser	Date	Meeting or activity	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	4 Aug 2019	Travel to Ukraine	
2	5 Aug 2019	Detailed project brief at HALO Kiev office	MACM implementing partner
3	6 Aug 2019	Meeting with Ukraine MoD	MoD are managing HALO, and other activities in the absence of an NMAA in Ukraine, including prioritization and task allocation
4	6 Aug 2019	Skype call with OSCE project support unit	OSCE are providing support to SES (see below)
5	7 Aug 2019	Meeting with Ukraine State Emergency Service (SES)	SES provide civil bomb disposal and mine clearance cover throughout Ukraine
6	7 Aug 2019	Meeting with UNDP	Chair of mine action sub-cluster
7	8 Aug 2019	Review of findings	
8	9 Aug 2019	Comparison with documents	
9	10 Aug 2019	Travel to Kramatorsk	One team member robbed at Kievrailway station
10	11 Aug 2019	Meeting/briefing HALO Kramatorsk, planning itinerary for visit. Meeting with HALO beneficiary in buffer zone	Need to be out of buffer zone before 5pm for security reasons.
11	12 Aug 2019	Three meetings with mine affected people (three locations in buffer zone)	Need to be out of buffer zone before 5pm for security reasons.
12	13 Aug 2019	Meeting with Head of Demining Group of Joint Military Forces, Kramatorsk. Meeting with Civilian Protection, Mobilization & Defense Work, Donetsk Regional Administration	
13	14 Aug 2019	Meetings with three affected agricultural organizations very close to contact line.	Need to be out of buffer zone before 5pm for security reasons.
14	15 Aug 2019	Travel to Kiev	
15	16 Aug 2019	Depart Ukraine	

## ANNEX E. TRIP REPORT: LEBANON

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### INTRODUCTION

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Lebanon was selected as one of the two country visit locations. Two of the three MACM partners are present and implement activities with MACM funding in various locations in Lebanon. In addition, the security situation in Lebanon allows for travel, site visits, and meetings with beneficiaries, providing an enabling environment for this evaluation. Members of the team spent two weeks in Lebanon. The first week included meetings with head office staff, the Embassy and national mine action authority LMAC with some field visits. The second week was largely dedicated to site visits in the South of the country. The itinerary is attached below at Appendix 1 to this annex for reference. The visit was executed as planned with one exception. The site visit to the border with Israel and the planned local meetings with beneficiaries of MRE had to be cancelled due to tensions in the border area the day prior to the planned trip. Apart from this, the team was able to meet with beneficiaries and staff of a victim assistance project, meet beneficiaries and staff in cleared areas, meet local population in a contaminated area, and witness ongoing clearing at an active site.

### BACKGROUND<sup>16</sup>

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The Republic of Lebanon has a contamination legacy of over 40 years. Israel used cluster munitions in Lebanon in 1978, 1982, and 2006. The United States dropped cluster bombs against Syrian air defence units near Beirut during an intervention in December 1983. In 2006, Hezbollah fired cluster munitions from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. At the end of 2017, the Republic of Lebanon had a little over 20 km<sup>2</sup> of confirmed mined area, including the Blue Line. In August 2017, the Lebanese Army launched a military operation to expel Islamic State militants from an area they occupied in the western Qalamoun Mountains, near Arsala, on Lebanon's border with Syria. The area occupied by IS was found to have extensive contamination from IED, particularly IS-laid improvised mines.

3,755 casualties of mines and ERW are reported in Lebanon between 1975 and 2017, of whom 913 were fatal. The annual number of casualties has been steadily declining since 2000, except for a peak in 2006 immediately following the conflict with Israel.

Lebanon ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 5 November 2010, becoming the first State Party from the Middle East. Lebanon has expressed its desire to amend existing legislation to enforce the convention's provisions. The Republic of Lebanon has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, but indicated in December 2009 that it intends to do so, saying that it "hopes to sign...in the future" and it "looks forward to joining the Mine Ban Treaty." Previously, in 2004, Lebanon had said that it was unable to join the Mine Ban Treaty due to the continuing conflict with Israel. Lebanon has stated that it has never used, produced, or stockpiled cluster munitions, nor produced or exported antipersonnel mines.

The Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAC), chaired by the Minister of Defence, has overall responsibility for the mine action programme, captured in the National Mine Action Strategy. The Lebanon Mine Action Centre, part of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and its regional RMAC in the South, prioritise, task, and oversee operations. The LAF also provide clearance assets and take responsibility for the clearance of 'spot' tasks by mobile EOD teams and understand that they will be

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<sup>16</sup> Landmine Monitor, Lebanon country profile (accessed 20 Sept 2019)

responsible for residual EO clearance even after the completion of their Oslo obligations and the completion of minefield clearance. LMAC reports that the Lebanese government already pay for around 35-40% of the mine action budget, mainly through support of the LMAC and the LAF teams.

The first priority for clearance work is infrastructure, facilities, and built-up areas; second is agricultural land, and third is 'other' land (including the clearance of cluster munitions for Oslo compliance). LMAC selects and assigns tasks for clearance to agencies, including by the Dutch-funded partners.

In September 2011 the LMAC adopted a strategic mine action plan for 2011-2020, aiming for cluster munition clearance by 2016 and mine clearance (Blue Line excepted) by 2020. Progress has fallen behind due to underfunding and the identification of additional contamination.

LMAC has established a humanitarian mine action training school and is creating a regional role for itself as an Arabic-speaking training facility for other EO-contaminated countries in the Middle East and North Africa. It has also undertaken training for Afghan deminers. LMAC now has the ambition to expand its training capacity to provided IED disposal training in a similar manner.



FIGURE 10. LAMINDA DEMINER IN LEBANON POINTING OUT ONGOING CLEARANCE IN THE HIGH BRUSH.  
(PHOTO: WELMOET WELS)

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## OBSERVATIONS

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The Evaluation Team were able to visit a number of task sites, and speak to a large number of beneficiaries. Work appears to be done to national standards and there were no complaints about the technical standards of the implementing partners. The Evaluation Team were also able to watch clearance work being undertaken by the national agency LAMINDA, who are a partner of DCA under the current grant arrangements. It appeared that the technical work being done by LAMINDA was of an acceptable standard.

Unfortunately, the victim assistance project of Balamand university has gone considerably off-track vis-à-vis the project goals and is providing assistance to disabled persons or their immediate relations, even if the disability is unrelated to the conflict or ERW. This observation was passed to the new DCA country manager – the Balamand project was started before her recent arrival in Lebanon and she has not had the opportunity to look at it in detail. The Evaluation Team believes that findings from this observation alone underscore the requirement for country visits as part of the MACM monitoring and evaluation process.



FIGURE 11. CLEARED OLIVE YARDS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. (PHOTO: WELMOET WELS)

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## ANALYSIS

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### Relevance

Prioritisation is not transparent and the local population has little to no influence. Also the agencies appear to have, at most, a minor say in their task allocation. The LMAC firmly holds the reins of the

mine action programme. All priorities are set by LMAC. In one example, the Evaluation Team noticed that private, unused land (albeit with building potential and private gardens) were cleared, while a densely populated urban area with known contamination (and a recent fatal incident) only had clearance done on a relatively minor portion of land. In another example, a large swathe of land with building potential appears to have been cleared in the guise of a project to clear safe access for the installation of a pipe leading from a water tower. This project apparently took four years to complete (and was therefore started under a previous management team in LMAC, a point which will be discussed below).

LMAC has a prioritisation system, where 'Priority One' tasks are tasks in built-up areas or in close proximity to infrastructure, Priority Two tasks are agricultural land, and Priority Three tasks are 'other' land. The Evaluation Team thinks these are reasonable categories (see the discussion on prioritisation in the main body of the report). However, the work does not always seem to follow these priorities in practice. While the death of a child in one of the contaminated villages had a significant impact on local society, the response carried less result. Only the blast site was cordoned off with plastic ribbon; no warning signs were put up or a spot task team deployed. In the opinion of the Evaluation Team, work in this community was of a higher priority than some of the other tasks seen.

Impact

A significant number of explosive hazards has been removed and in that sense the impact is high. MAG are also helping deal with the recent IED contamination in the north-east of the country. The ongoing clearance site the team visited rendered benefits to the local infrastructure as roads had been tarmacked and expanded since they were cleared, improving road access to the South. At other cleared sites building activity was going on and people could harvest their olives safely.

However, some of the released areas visited appear to have had virtually no impact on socio-economic activity. The cleared olive gardens were for private use and did not form part of substantial livelihood provision. Other pieces of land might in future be used for construction, but are as yet not in use.

Community influence on the project cycle is minimal. A submunition had been discovered in a private garden adjacent to a freshwater spring frequented by the local population. After demolition as a spot task, this site was not surveyed and only barely cordoned. This site was close to an active clearance site of largely private land. The garden's owner continues to use the plot, albeit he no longer moves soil and does not allow his children on it.

The partners reported various activities and new approaches to include women in their workforce and to create an enabling environment for female staff, including specific HR measures for childcare, breastfeeding, vacancy announcements appealing to women, etc. According to reports these measures have indeed enhanced the participation of women. The effects of their work on the women in the communities is less easily put in focus, not least because of the issues with prioritisation described above.

The impact of the MRE sessions is open to doubt. Of the clearance beneficiaries spoken to by the evaluation team, almost none reported attending an MRE session and there is little work done at an NMAA level to measure behaviour change or correlate the provision of RE with behaviour change or reduced casualties. The MRE material shown by one of the partners proved an interesting information vector, but the substance of the information it carried was insufficient to pass the message. Follow-up on MRE by verifying actual behaviour change is only minimally done, if done at all. Hence, a proper feedback loop that would improve the quality of the training tools is missing. There is a need to link data on

casualties with information on the success of MRE materials, using tools such as an epidemiological ‘case control’ study. The Evaluation Team would add that this is not a problem specific to Lebanon, and note that the IMAS for risk education is currently under review.

### Effectiveness

In general, the agencies certainly were effective in delivering the planned outputs. They closely track their teams in the field and the outputs they render. They responded well to the border tension that occurred during the team visit, demonstrating that staff safety is a priority.

The agencies reported having hosted a visit from the MFA and were appreciative of the opportunity to present their work and share their concerns.

### Efficiency

Lebanon is a developed country with an existing infrastructure, functioning government and good levels of education. However, because it is a developed country, salary expectations of a trained workforce are higher than in many other mine-affected countries. In many cases the contamination is in remote areas, where the value of a cash crop (for example. one beneficiary estimated that he could earn about \$7,000 per year from his two hectares of contaminated land) is far exceeded by the costs of clearance. Thus drives for efficiency are critical.

In this regard there is a lot of positive news in Lebanon. The LMAC has, in recent years (particularly since an earlier evaluation by the EU in 2014) relaxed a number of control measures that were observed to be having particularly negative effects on technical efficiency. The LMAC has also embraced the concept of ‘land release’ and it is now possible for mine action agencies to reduce or cancel work on areas previously thought to be potentially contaminated. This means that work can be concentrated on areas where there is an actual hazard.

There are other attempts to increase technical and programmatic efficiency. MAG is introducing the use of a new type of metal detector which should be able to work much faster on cluster munition sites, and thus reduce the number of deminer hours expended per square metre of clearance. As most mine action costs are ‘fixed’ costs, this should help reduce the cost per square metre of land cleared. In turn this should help close the gap between ‘impact free’ and the ‘cluster munition’ free targets of the Oslo Convention. For its part, DCA’s work with LAMINDA should help reduce costs as – all other things being equal – one might expect a local implementing partner to be more cost-effective than one bearing international overheads.

### Sustainability

The national authority is firmly established and embedded in a larger structure, as well as working according to a national strategy and national technical standards. In terms of stability of the institution and technical skill, the national structure for mine action is highly sustainable. There is among the population of the South support for the mine action agenda.

The work by DCA with Laminda is interesting because previous evaluation reports in Lebanon have highlighted the high unit costs of mine clearance in particular compared with the potential economic value of the land; these previous evaluations have recommended a greater reliance on national solutions as a potential means to increase efficiency through the reduction of costs. Understandably, DCA’s initial focus has been on the technical training of Laminda, but work remains to be done on the other elements of capacity development as set out in **Annex F**.

Opportunities – and necessity – for capacity development remain, however; mostly in terms of prioritisation and transparency. Lebanon is a country close to success and, with comparatively little additional help, can become ‘impact free’ within a short time frame (even potentially within the lifetime of the next round of MACM funding). Lebanon, via the LMAC and the work done by the Lebanese Armed Forces,

The example of Lebanon is important as it demonstrates ‘ownership’ of the contamination problem, particularly in the way that the LAF accepts the role to deal with residual contamination.

### **Recommendations for Potential Future Funding**

At a strategic level, Lebanon is a good example of a country accepting responsibility of its contamination and the Evaluation Team believes that this ‘ownership’ should be encouraged. This could be done by helping to develop strategic economic planning in the Lebanon mine action programme to identify the costs and benefits of various end state/end date options in meeting Oslo Convention goals and dealing with landmine and residual EO contamination. The Evaluation Team has given some thoughts to LMAC and UNDP in this regard. Such a scoping study could help LMAC establish a sound funding strategy to help it towards ‘impact free’ status and eventual treaty compliance. There is a strong donor community (with a high level of engagement by the Dutch Embassy) and it is likely that such an approach would have a ‘multiplier’ effect amongst other potential donors. Inter alia, the issues with prioritisation could also be addressed.

At a regional level, the potential role of the training facility should be supported, particularly in terms of developing an IED search and disposal capacity. This has the potential for having a significant regional impact, including many other countries identified by the MFA as being ‘priority’ countries.

At a national level, there is scope for funding an improved approach to MRE, more closely focused on an evidence-based approach to behaviour change. The initiatives by MAG and DCA to improve efficiency discussed above should also be supported.



APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E. LEBANON ITINERARY

Table 12. Lebanon itinerary			
Ser	Date	Meeting or activity	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	26 Aug 2019	Travel to Lebanon	Team Leader
2	27 Aug 2019	Initial meetings with LMAC and UNDP	LMAC = Lebanese Mine Action Centre
3	27 Aug 2019	Initial meetings with MAG, DCA, Balamand and LAMINDA	
4	27 Aug 2019	Meeting with Dutch Embassy	Defence Attaché
5	27 Aug 2019	Travel to Nabatieh	
6	28 Aug 2019	Visit MAG sites/beneficiaries	
7	28 Aug 2019	Travel to Tyre	
8	29 Aug 2019	Meet DCA and LAMINDA	DCA office
9	29 Aug 2019	Travel to Nabatieh	
10	30 Aug 2019	Briefings in MAG office	
11	30 Aug 2019	Travel to Beirut	
12	30 Aug 2019	Follow-up meeting with UNDP	
13	31 Aug 2019	Update discussions	Second team member arrived
14	1 Sep 2019	National Rehabilitation Centre for Development (NRDC)	Interviews with beneficiaries of the Balamand University victim assistance project
15	1 Sep 2019	Travel to Nabatieh	Border incident near MAG sites
16	2 Sep 2019	Meeting MAG office	Intended field visit cancelled due to border incident
17	3 Sep 2019	Visit MAG sites/beneficiaries	
18	3 Sep 2019	Travel to Tyre	
19	3 Sep 2019	Meet UNMAS representative in UNIFIL	
20	4 Sep 2019	Visit DCA sites/beneficiaries	
21	4 Sep 2019	Visit LAMINDA sites/beneficiaries	Ongoing task
22	4 Sep 2019	Travel to Beirut	
23	5 Sep 2019	Visit to LMAC training facility outside Beirut	
24	6 Sep 2019	Depart Lebanon	

### Overview

Reflecting the SDGs and the overall Dutch foreign policy goals for security and the rule of law, the HMA Policy Framework goals stipulate that 'activities must (...) contribute to (...) local capacity building in order to ensure they have lasting impact'.<sup>17</sup> The enhancement of the partners' and the target groups' institutional capacity is echoed in the current MACM's policy principles, and funding proposals are scored accordingly.<sup>18</sup> There is general consensus in academia, between policy-makers and amongst practitioners that capacity building is a key component of any type of development assistance, including mine action. However, on *what* it is exactly and *how* to achieve this, opinions vary. This section outlines some of the main approaches and how capacity development might be framed in a context of HMA and the MACM.

### 'Capacity Development' in international assistance

There are various interpretations and definitions in circulation of what capacity development means in the context of international development assistance. Academia often sees institutional capacity as part of a system of interdependent components, and defines capacity development thus: 'the evolving combination of attributes, capabilities, and relationships that enables a system to exist, adapt, and perform'.<sup>19</sup> This is built on the premises that the internal mechanisms of a system influence each other in various ways, that system outputs are a product of such interactions, and that continuous adaptation and self-organisation allow systems to persist and evolve over time.<sup>20</sup> The practitioner's translation thereof, particularly as presented by UNDP, defines capacity building as a process, a permanent state of ongoing change that must be achieved: 'the process through which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time', and underlines that capacity development seeks to initiate a *transformation* in its recipients – the ability to learn and develop itself from within.<sup>21</sup> The policy-makers' version is the focus on the outcomes, their relation to other policy goals, and the desired end-state of phasing out external support for institutions.

To operationalize capacity building, 'capacity' is disaggregated into *capabilities*. Theoreticians, policy-makers, and practitioners use different words, but in fact outline more or less the same five capabilities, referred to as the '5C approach' by some:

- *The capability to commit and engage*, mobilise resources, create space for action, decide;
- *The capability to carry out tasks*, and to do so at a good level of performance; to generate substantive outputs and outcomes, and sustain this over time;
- *The capability to attract support*, create partnerships, build credibility and legitimacy;
- *The capability to adapt*, be proactive, develop resiliency in changing contexts;
- *The capability to balance diversity and coherence*, develop short- and long-term vision and strategies, be consistent, cope with complex and multi-actor settings.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> HMA Policy Framework, p. 6.; SDG target 17.9 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

<sup>18</sup> HMA Policy Framework, policy criterion P.4.a, P.5.a

<sup>19</sup> Brinkerhoff and Morgan, p. 3

<sup>20</sup> Brinkerhoff and Morgan, p. 3

<sup>21</sup> UNDP Capacity Development: A Primer (2009), p. 5

<sup>22</sup> Brinkerhoff and Morgan, p. 3; UNDP Primer, p. 20 sqq; ECDPM, p. 9 sqq

The idea is in fact pretty straight-forward: enhance these capabilities, and capacity will grow. UNDP operationalises this with a classic cyclical approach: assess capacity → prepare a plan → review of plan by stakeholders → implement the plan → evaluate the results → assess capacity → etc. A solid project cycle in easy-to-follow steps. Or so it seems. A number of factors are critical for success. Most of these are pretty straight-forward: national ownership and buy-in, clarity of responsibilities, dedicated budget-lines, mainstreaming with other development plans and strategies, transparency and communication.

However, there is an additional layer of understanding required to make capacity development effective. In the first place, understanding of the capabilities that make up capacity and the awareness that these are interdependent. Successful outcomes are achieved only by combining them, by pairing the delivery of technical know-how and new skills with the creation of space for the implementation thereof. In other words, it is *behaviour change* that is required for successful capacity growth, not only in the institution itself, but also in the system surrounding it. Secondly, capacity development is a complex activity and requires pro-active planning and a strategy to be effective; yet over-planning can be counterproductive, as the interconnectedness of the capabilities invariably implies a dynamic system in which changes cannot be predicted in detail (i.e. there is so-called “emergent behavior”). And third, there is no one-size-fits-all strategy, as different contexts require different approaches for capacity building, especially in multi-actor complex conflict settings: adapted strategies and flexibility, often in an incremental try-this-try-that approach, are essential to success.<sup>23</sup> In short, the theory on capacity building seems simple, but its execution demands resourcefulness, adaptability, and a re-setting of classical benchmarking beacons from quantifiable results towards behaviour change as the desired achievement.

### **Evaluation of Capacity Development**

In order to be effective, and to enable an incremented approach, regular (if not continuous) monitoring and evaluation of capacity development is crucial. This is not an easy task. First off, a clear definition of ‘capacity’ is required to allow for measuring its growth, as are concrete descriptions of the targeted capabilities (the 5C). Some evaluations consider performance as a synonym for capacity; others see it as one of its indicators. Another important factor is the identification of the drivers of change. Are they endogenous (e.g. donors) or exogenous (e.g. an organisation’s own desire for transformation), or – as is often the case – both, and how does this influence accountability? Also the way an organization manages its programmes is relevant. Do they (solely) use a logframe or results-based management system to design and track their activities (often linked to exogenous motivators), or does it (also) lean on input through various self-assessment feedback loops (indicative of an internal drive for change)? One must take furthermore into account that evaluation of capacity development is not a neutral observer activity, but forms part of the cycle of change. The very fact of evaluation may in itself be a driver of change.

### **Capacity Development in Mine Action**

As in other fields of development, capacity building has found its way into the jargon of mine action and all main players in the field have incorporated it into their compendium. Capacity development in the mine action sector has come to mean: national governments sustaining their own capacity to deal with contamination themselves, both pre- and post-(Ottawa) Article 5 completion. The notion itself is widely supported. The current UN Mine Action Strategy highlights the need for ‘continued focus on

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<sup>23</sup> Problem-driven iterative adaptation, see Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, *Building State Capability: Evidence, Analysis, Action*, OUP 2017

targeted institutional capacity building including as a contribution to broader national governance reforms, institution strengthening and development planning’, in other words: the mainstreaming of capacity development in security sector reform and support to governance. The document further highlights the importance of sufficient financial resources to enable these efforts. Strategic Outcome no. 3 states that interventions must be context-specific and contain benchmarks for the phasing out of UN assistance. The Outcome focusses on policies and legal frameworks; institutional capacities; and operational capacities.<sup>24</sup>

However, despite general agreement on the importance of capacity building to achieve Article 5 compliance and to deal with residual ERW contaminations in the years following, few or no instructions or consensus exist in the sector on how to operationalize this. UNMAS has no programme or publications on the matter. The GICHD with UNDP conducted a study on mine action and the SDGs, affirming their linkage and the importance of operationalizing capacity building – without providing guidance on the latter. The GICHD did some case studies on national capacities and residual contamination but to date has not published general sector-specific analytical lessons learned from these case studies.<sup>25</sup> The GICHD did come close to resolving this with their ‘MORE’ study (the management of residual explosive contamination) but this was not fully operationalised.

One of the issues is that the concept of ‘residual’ contamination inevitably leads to discussions of Ottawa (and Oslo) targets (which demand a ‘mine free’ or ‘cluster munition free’ end state), when the experience of many countries (including the Netherlands) suggests that explosive ordnance (EO) contamination is likely to be found for decades after a conflict. It must be remembered that EO contamination is wider than the scope of both conventions.

### **MACM partners**

All partners address capacity development in their proposals as per the RFP requirements. They generally do this by listing their mine action activities and explaining how these contribute to growing skills and enhanced information. No distinction is made between different types of capabilities as per the above ‘5C’ or a similar breakdown demonstrating understanding of capacity development. Strategic approaches and planning of capacity development are not mentioned. Generally, the partners frame capacity building in their proposals as per the four classic levels of society that development work often focuses on: local communities, local staff, national implementing partners, national institutions. While it is useful to demonstrate understanding that capacity building should focus on all levels of society to be effective, it does not clarify strategic thinking and adaptive planning, nor provide a long-term vision on the sustainability of such growth.

The country-level proposals are more explicit. DCA has the development of national partner organisations more closely woven into its ‘DNA’ than the other partners, although the arrangements for supporting victim assistance in Lebanon have not been successful (as described in the Lebanon trip report above). MAG in its proposal introduced the GICHD as its international partner for the DRC to develop national strategies for article 5 compliance as well as management of residual contamination, although this foray into strategic discussions has been controversial in some quarters in Lebanon. Other than this, overall the country plans’ capacity building consists of more ad-hoc arrangements, including information sharing, conducting NTS, technical trainings, sharing of methodologies and guidelines. This

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<sup>24</sup> UN Mine Action Strategy 2019-2023, p. 7, 15-16, and 24

<sup>25</sup> e.g. *National Capacities and Residual Contamination, Albania*, GICHD November 2017, *Assessment of the Capacity Development Support to the National Mine Action Authority, South Sudan*, GICHD November 2012

addresses only part of the overall picture of capacity development set out in the 5C model.

### **Suggested reading**

*Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, UN GA Res A/Res/70/1, 25 Sept 2015

*The United Nations Mine Action Strategy 2019-2023*, Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action  
D.W. Brinkerhoff and P.J. Morgan, 'Capacity and Capacity Development: Coping with Complexity', in *Public Admi. Dev.* 30, 2-10 (2010)

European Centre for Development Policy Management, *Bringing the Invisible into Perspective: reference document for using the 5Cs framework to plan, monitor and evaluate capacity and the results of capacity development process*, Report 2011

R Keeley, *Are we setting the Wrong Target?* *Journal of Mine Action*, Vol 9.1 (2005)

## ANNEX G. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO OUTCOMES, INDICATORS AND THEORIES OF CHANGE

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### OUTPUTS, OUTCOMES, IMPACTS

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There is general agreement on the meaning of these three terms, but they also overlap with the use by some organizations of “results” (and in the OECD DAC evaluation criteria, tend to be lumped together under “impact”), so they need some explanation.

#### Outputs

An output in plain English is: "Anything the intervention can make, do, or buy". Outputs are under the control of the project and the risk of failure to achieve the planned outputs is an internal project management issue. In contractual terms, the output is the thing that the supplier is contractually obliged to supply. Thus, in a mine action context, a typical output is the number of hectares cleared to a specific standard. In general, mine action is reasonably clear about its outputs.

#### Outcomes

An outcome is a change in behaviour by people outside the project that is plausibly attributable to the project – i.e. we can reasonably claim that the project made a real contribution to starting the new behaviour. Behaviour in this sense is broadly defined, and includes attitudes, decision-making and ways of working. However, outcomes are external to the project management; the project will have influence but cannot guarantee outcomes, as these are linked to the behaviour of people who are **not** employed by the project. There may also be other external influences involved that are not under the project’s control. This is where the ‘risks and assumptions’ section in a logical framework comes into play and identifies the other influences that must be present if the project is to succeed.

Continuing with the example above:

A demining organization clears some land with the expectation that it will then be used productively by a village for agriculture. The **expected** behaviour change is that people will use the land once it is cleared. This assumes that there is a ‘demand’ for the land, that the people who want to use the land have access to it, and that they have the necessary skills and materials to make use of it. All of these are external to a mine clearance project and there is therefore a ‘risk’ at an outcome level if these assumptions are in fact not true, for example if the land title is disputed so no-one can use the land.

There are three areas in mine action that need specific consideration under this definition:

1. people knowing more about hazards *cannot* be considered an ‘outcome;’ the outcome is the actual change in behaviour around potential hazards. A single session of risk education can increase knowledge but may need several repeats to achieve lasting behaviour change.
2. ‘Clearance of ‘spot’ EO tasks by mobile explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams does not clear land. The benefit has to be thought of in terms of removal of a hazard (thus reducing potential casualties).
3. Survey processes contribute to the efficient and timely release of land, but do not have a direct benefit. Nobody in a community directly benefits from the production of a survey report; it is only when that report creates behaviour change that it has a direct outcome.

## Impacts

Impacts are the societal level changes that are the underlying motivation for mine action. Broadly, they fall into three categories: health (including avoiding injury or death); better economic conditions and opportunities (access to cleared land, or roads and bridges that can be safely used); and increased opportunities for education, recreation and social and cultural interaction. "Health, wealth, and welfare" in short. The *assumption* of the Ottawa (and Oslo) processes is that the complete clearance of contaminated countries contributes to these impacts.

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## INDICATORS

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Indicators are used to provide a way to measure the changes due to an intervention. Inputs, activities and outputs can usually be measured directly. However, it is often impossible to measure outcomes and impacts (as defined above) directly. The best way is usually to define an indicator that shows, indirectly, for example, the benefits of risk education, rather than attempting to observe the behavior of the target population during the course of a project and afterwards. Thus a reduction in casualties could be an indicator of behaviour change, although again a number of external factors can also have a bearing.

Many project proposal writers have difficulty in defining outcome indicators; this is very often due to the outcome being poorly defined, too general or not fully understood. Initial efforts on outcome indicator definition should be directed to ensuring that the outcome is itself clearly defined, well understood, and agreed by all stakeholders.

A table showing suggested inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts of typical mine action activities is included at Table 5 above.

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## THEORIES OF CHANGE

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Theories of Change (ToC) is still a disputed topic; in academia there are basically two groups of practitioners who do not accept each other's approach, though they both agree that ToCs are very useful. Two useful sources are included as references in footnotes<sup>26</sup> <sup>27</sup>. In humanitarian and development interventions, theories of change are often regarded as a planning and reporting burden with little or no benefit. This is a self-fulfilling prophecy as superficial theories of change done in a hurry do indeed have little value. Theories of change also suffer from numerous incomplete, and even false, definitions copied on popular websites.

The essence of a theory of change is that it answers the "why" question: *why* do we consider that our intervention will lead to the behaviour changes we seek (outcomes) and *why* will these changes in turn lead to the social improvements we desire (impacts)?

There is no single way to express a theory of change, often diagrams are used but these usually need to be supported by explanatory text to explain the underlying assumptions. In funding proposals, the results chain diagram (RCD) is frequently used to describe how the project will achieve results. The RCD is a series of boxes (inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, impacts) that are linked by arrows<sup>28</sup>. The

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<sup>26</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/dfid-research-review-of-the-use-of-theory-of-change-in-international-development>

<sup>27</sup> <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9835.pdf>

<sup>28</sup> <http://resultsbased.org/site/results-based-methods/introduction-to-results-chain/> and <http://resultsbased.org/site/results-based-methods/what-are-theories-of-change/>

RCD shows *how* the intervention will achieve the results, but by itself is not a theory of change. A ToC addresses not only *how*, but *why* we expect the intervention to succeed - in short it sets out *why* we think that our actions will lead other people to change their behaviour, and how to achieve this change. The ToC is not inside the boxes of the RCD but in the arrows linking the boxes, most importantly in the link from outputs (which we control) to outcomes (which we can only influence). The more specific the discussion of the assumptions, and the wider the agreement by everyone concerned about the assumptions, then the more robust the ToC is likely to be. The ToC should also be considered a “living” document, and be monitored and updated throughout the life of the project.

A good ToC will help manage the expectations of the client; defining and clarifying the assumptions and answering the “why” questions will help the client feel confident that they are receiving what they think they are paying for. Answering questions about why people are likely to change their behaviour requires active engagement and agreement by those involved.

In more complex programmes, the cause and effect from activities through to outcomes may be far more visible in retrospect, and evaluators often attempt to re-create a cause-and-effect theory of change using hindsight in order to understand the intervention. However, this “after the event” analysis is no substitute for programme designers developing a ToC at the project design stage and keeping it up-to-date.

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## ANNEX H. EXAMPLE OF A POSSIBLE PRIORITISATION MATRIX

At the task level, discussion around the following rules of thumb may be of use:

1. The impact of the potential contamination is of importance, as well as the contamination
2. Actions can be determined based on a matrix of these two attributes

These two rules of thumbs can be represented by the following rule sets as set out in Table 13 and Table 14 below.

Table 13. Holistic prioritization matrix – possible appropriate interventions		
Contamination	Impact of problem	
	Impacted	Not impacted
Contaminated	<p style="text-align: center;">Yes/Yes (impacted and contaminated)</p> <p>Minimise boundary by NTS/TS Full Clearance of CHA</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">No/Yes (contaminated but not impacted)</p> <p>Mark, fence and avoid until resources available</p>
Not Contaminated	<p style="text-align: center;">Yes/No (impacted but not contaminated)</p> <p>Use proving technique to reassure population</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">No/No (neither impacted or contaminated)</p> <p>Identified by land release. No further action required</p>
<p>NTS = Non-technical Survey</p> <p>TS = Technical Survey</p> <p>CHA = Confirmed Hazardous Areas</p>		

Table 14. Impact priorities for mine clearance and possible responses			
Ser	Priority	Definition	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Impact Priority One	Communities living in, or in close proximity to, areas that the community believes to be mined, and particularly where casualties have occurred	Targeted clearance, aimed at points that may be of particular impact (such as wells, bridges, routes)
2	Impact Priority Two	Areas that believed to be contaminated and are earmarked for local development, where funding for the development project exists.	Area clearance within development project boundaries
3	Impact Priority Three	Areas that are believed to be contaminated and are earmarked for local development, but where funding for the development project is not yet identified.	
4	Impact Priority Four	Areas that are believed to be contaminated, where ownership by members of the community can be confirmed, and where the land is of potential value for agriculture or other use.	Use Community Liaison Processes to limit work to land that is likely to be used.
5	Impact Priority Five	All other areas of potentially useful land (i.e. where the benefit of clearance is greater to the cost of clearance). The completion of Priority Five tasks will contribute to a country achieving 'impact free' status.	Only where there are no tasks in Priority 1-4 available
6	Impact Priority Six	All tasks in support of convention compliance where there is no other significant benefit	Only where there are no tasks in Priority 1-5 available

The 'Priority Six' tasks in Table 14 above highlight where the strategic goals of compliance with the Ottawa and Oslo convention can potentially conflict with the desire to maximise impact for beneficiaries on the ground, as discussed in the main body of the report.