

Mid Term Review

National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security 2016 - 2019

Brussels, February 2019

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Summary of findings and recommendations

The purpose of this Mid Term Review of the *National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security 2016-2019* (NAP-WPS-III) is to assess progress and to make recommendations for the final year of NAP-WPS-III and to feed into policy discussions. In this summary the main findings and recommendations are discussed.

Compared to its predecessors, NAP-WPS-III is innovative by incorporating a strong Theory of Change for sustainable peace and security for everyone that is supported by a broad range of stakeholders.

Unlike many other national action plans to implement UNSCR1325, the Dutch NAP-WPS-III is not a comprehensive plan of governmental action. The Dutch NAP focusses on fostering collaborative spaces and - action among public and private actors towards the plan's goals. In practice, NAP-WPS-III serves three roles. Almost all signatories view NAP-WPS-III as a community, a way to learn, share, exchange and coordinate (collaborative) action. Secondly, NAP-WPS-III served as the basis for a funding framework issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in 2016 to allocate resources for collaborative action to some of the members of the community. Thirdly, NAP-WPS-III serves as a collective, strategic umbrella for government action, because the Dutch Ministry of Defence used NAP-WPS-III as a reference to develop its own, public, institutional action a plan for implementing UNSCR1325.

The co-existence of different perceptions and roles have generated different expectations which are not always met. Also, the dynamics related to different roles and identities may collide. For example, as a funding framework NAP-WPS-III has generated at times (competitive) dynamics that interfered with the collaboration, learning and exchange taking place in the community.

While the absence of a monitoring and evaluation framework makes it complicated to properly assess progress in the implementation of NAP-WPS-III during the review period, important achievements can be highlighted.

NAP as a community, inspiring collaborative action: Many signatories praise NAP-WPS-III as a valuable network that allows one to access relevant gender expertise. Several examples show how such connections lead to effective action. Indeed, NAP-WPS-III has triggered effective collaborative action at the level of the UN and in focus countries. Numerical participation of NAP-WPS-III has increased in terms of signatories. While all signatory organisations are committed to the goals of UNSCR1325 and the overall objective of NAP-WPS-III, actual engagement may vary, not only among signatories but also within organisations at department and individual levels. Pledging to NAP does not seem to include a responsibility to report to co-signatories on relevant action undertaken by one's own organisation, alone or in collaboration with other signatories.

NAP as a funding framework: MoFA, WO=MEN and the NGO/CSO consortia have invested considerable time and (human) resources into operations in the eight NAP-WPS focus countries where a wide range of Dutch and local partners currently work on sensitive issues in a context of (post)conflict. Only few diaspora organisations participate in the large, focus-county consortia. The separate establishment of the Peace and Security for All (P&S4All) initiative acknowledges the value of the work of these (smaller diaspora) organisations. Further reflection on more nimble management of these P&S4All grants is required.

NAP as a collective, strategic umbrella: To date, only the Ministry of Defence has drawn on NAP-WPS-III to translate it in an organisational level action plan. MoFA, MoJS and MoECS who are all signatories, do not have their own organisational action plan to implement and put UNSCR1325 into practice. Implementation plans for UNSCR1325 in each ministry would not only strengthen the concrete organisational engagement of and the individual accountability within these signatories, but it would also make it easier for others, including civil society organisations, to forge collaborative relationships with them and/or hold them accountable for the implementation of UNSCR1325.

For MoECS and MoJ&V there is potential for more active engagement with NAP-WPS-III by translating the WPS agenda into goals and activities relevant to their mandates. Connections between the realities of (post)conflict countries in the south and The Netherlands provide scope for a much stronger links between UNSCR1325 and the WPS agenda and the mandates of MoJS and MoECS.

The overall conclusion of this Mid Term Review is that NAP-WPS-III as a framework for funding has worked well. As a community and collaborative space, NAP-WPS-III can further develop, particularly if the interference of the dynamics of a funding call with the dynamics of collaborative learning and -action is minimised. As a collective, strategic umbrella for governmental action plans, NAP-WPS-III is under-utilised.

Recommendations

Drawing on its findings this Mid Term Review makes recommendations to signatories in six areas. This summary highlights some suggestions in each category, however, for a complete overview please refer to Chapter V of the main document.

1. Extension of NAP-WPS-III until 2022 untangling and reinforcing its roles

Given the continued relevance of the ToC, it is recommended to extend NAP-WPS-III until 2022. The prolonged NAP-WPS-III can serve as a strategic umbrella for funding, collaborative action and – learning, and organization-level action planning. The current MoFA funding framework based on NAP-WPS-III expires at the end of 2019. For the current programs, continuity is important. A new call that allows activities to start early 2020 is recommended. The ToC of this extended NAP-WPS-III can serve as a basis for a new funding call as well as inspire individual, institutional plans and continued learning and collaboration.

2. Funding NAP-WPS

In consultation with the NGO/CSO community, MoFA should draw a new funding framework and issue a call for proposals for medium-sized programs in 2019 and another call for proposals in 2020 for small scale actions of Dutch diaspora women's organisations in the countries of origin. Drawing lessons of the experience with PS4All, reflection on more nimble management of that call is required. Based on experiences with NAP-WPS-III, it is recommended to fund these medium-sized programs for a period of five years, and to fund these small actions for a minimum of 2 years. Incentives to promote collaboration between large development organisations and smaller Dutch and southern partners should remain incorporated in the framework. Collective learning and collaboration in the WPS community will be less impacted if the resource allocation process is transparent and swift.

3. Collaboration, learning, and exchange

MoFA and WO=MEN as coordinators should continue to support the existing eight Country Groups. Consortia partners are to generously share information without dominating discussions in discussion groups. Pledging to NAP has to imply that signatories help the coordinators to plan relevant collaborative activities and inform other signatories about their actions. All signatories should annually submit to the coordinators a succinct report on relevant (collaborative) action they have developed and what learning they have participated in and wish to participate in in the future. MoFA and WO=MEN should investigate if there is interest in specific thematic groups. MoFA is recommended to continue to fund collaborative learning and exchange as well as documentation and dissemination of lessons learned through WO=MEN.

4. Implementing UNSCR1325

MoFA, MoD and larger NGO/CSO signatories that have a mission broader than WPS should develop their own organisational plan to implement UNSCR1325 using the ToC of NAP-WPS-III. Such plans should entail systematic mainstreaming of gender in conflict prevention, resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery (CPRPRR) in all work of departments involved. An organizational implementation plan can be a basis for accountability and collaboration in the context of NAP-WPS-III.

Additionally MoJS, MoECS, WO=MEN and relevant NGO/CSO should discuss connections between (post)conflict situations in the South and The Netherlands and analyse how the commitments of UNSCR1325 affect realities of women and girls in the Netherlands for example those with a refugee/migration background.

5. Monitoring, accountability and governance

Without systematic monitoring and information-based governance, NAP-WPS-III may become irrelevant, ineffective and inefficient. Based on information provided by signatories, coordinators should compile public annual reports on progress in the collaborative implementation of UNSCR1325 from 2019 onwards. Outcomes listed in NAP-WPS-III would be the reference. Signatories should also establish a High Level Steering Committee for the remainder of NAP-WPS-III and subsequent NAPs. This Committee should have, with an equal number of statutory public and civil society representatives and should meet at least twice per year. Drawing on systematic information provided by signatories, compiled by the coordinators, the mission of the Steering Committee is to:

- Consolidate learning, reflect and adapt the overall strategic framework and ToC for promoting WPS; and
- Govern NAP-WPS as a space for collaboration, learning and exchange, deciding on activity plans and budgets for this role.
- Establish as a common reference a set of sample indicators for the ten outcomes and the three goals of the NAP-WPS-III ToC.

6. Preparing for NAP-WPS- IV (2022-2027)

According to aforementioned timeline, diverse experiences will be gained in 2020 and 2021, such as two new funding frameworks, organizational implementation plans, and the development of a steering committee. These experiences can be used as the basis for the NAP-WPS-IV, which should be a collective, strategic framework. It would be innovative if – through ICTs or otherwise – southern actors particularly women's organisations could provide inputs towards the strategizing process.

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Introduction

Adopted in 2000, UN Security Council resolution 1325 (UNSCR1325) and subsequent resolutions set standards for governments regarding the inclusion of women in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, recovery and post-conflict reconstruction, and the prevention of gender-based violence in the context of armed conflicts. Over time, international fora have produced innumerable resolutions, pacts, statements, and declarations that remain unimplemented, but few cases have gained the notoriety of UNSCR1325. At this stage the call to implement the resolution is loud and clear. To quote the Dutch Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Joke Brandt when she addressed the UNSC on 25 October 2018: “We have ran out of excuses. We know, so we now need to act”¹

Since 2007, a large number of Dutch civil society organisations and knowledge institutions together with Dutch governmental institutions have worked to map out collaborative strategies and undertake activities to promote the inclusion of women and gender dimensions in their work related to conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, recovery and post-conflict reconstruction. Three consecutive National Action Plans on Women peace and Security (WPS) have captured this collaboration. The third Dutch NAP-WPS was developed and adopted in 2016 for the period 2016-2019. NAP-WPS-III is coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and WO=MEN. In total 79 institutions and organisations are signatory to NAP-WPS-III. A full list of signatories is included in Annex 1.

This document reports on the Mid-Term Review of the Third Dutch National Action Plan for Women Peace and Security (NAP-WPS-III). The review was conducted in October-December 2018.

Objectives and scope of the MTR

This Mid-Term Review (MTR) is the first formal reflection on progress and challenges in implementing NAP-WPS-III. The purpose of the review is to assess progress and make recommendations for the last year of NAP-WPS-III and feed into policy discussions for the future of WPS policies. The ToR for this MTR lists the following specific objectives.

1. Give a snapshot of what has been achieved so far by signatories of NAP-WPS-III, including an overview of best practices and challenges.
2. Assess the progress made by the eight consortia financed through NAP-WPS-III, paying attention to main challenges and obstacles found.
3. Review the added value of collaboration between government and nongovernment actors in a common action plan for enhanced mutual cooperation and on effectiveness of programs.

In three sessions, a reference group consisting of staff from MoFA, MoECS, WO=MEN and three signatories have provided the reviewer with feedback on findings and recommendations. This does not imply they endorse the findings of this review, which remain entirely the responsibility of the author of this report.

¹ Security Council Open Debate: Women, Peace and Security, Statement by H.E. Joke Brandt, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, New York, 25 October 2018

Monitoring mechanisms and indicators

NAP-WPS-III does not specify a monitoring mechanism for activities, progress indicators or review process. The ToR specified that measuring the actual impact of NAP-WPS-III in the focus countries, and the design of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework for the NAP-WPS-III were outside the scope of this research. While NAP-WPS-III itself does not have an M&E framework, the grants allocated under the MoFA funding framework derived from NAP-WPS-III, all have fully developed, programme specific M&E and reporting frameworks.

MTR process and data sources

This review draws on earlier evaluations and reviews of NAP-WPS, documentation related to the projects funded under NAP-III and an evaluation of small projects funded under NAP-WPS-II. As part of the review relevant – public – EU and UN documents and internal reports of the MoFA to the UNSG were looked at. A list of documents consulted can be found in Annex 2.

Among the 79 signatories of NAP-WPS-III a wide range of people were interviewed: staff from both the NAP-WPS-III coordinators (WO=MEN and MoFA TaskForce Womens Rights and Gender Equality), from four relevant directorates of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Ministry of Justice and Security (MoJS) and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (MoECS). Among the many signatories from civil society, interviews were conducted with organisations that received funding, organisations that had aspired to receive funding but did not, and organisations that signed NAP-WPS-III without aspiring to receive any funding. Four representatives of knowledge institutions were interviewed, although only one is currently a signatory. The ToR excluded field visits. Views of southern partners present at the October 2018 learning events have been recorded but these organisations have not been otherwise involved in this MTR. An e-survey was conducted and filled out by 29 respondents from civil society and 5 respondents from Ministries.

NAP-WPS-III specifies 3 goals, 10 outcomes and 45 activities. A list of these is included in Annex 3. An attempt to use the NAP-WPS-III listing of 10 outcomes and 45 actions in this MTR as a format to rapidly collect information, did not yield any significant response. “Snapshots” of activities and achievements had to be (re)constructed from very diverse data sources that were not always tailored to that purpose. Available time was limited so the resulting “snapshots” may not be comprehensive, yet, they give an impression of the state of affairs and could very well be a starting point for more comprehensive monitoring to be done by the coordinators in the remaining period.

As NAP-WPS-III does not specify indicators or baseline values for its objectives or outcomes assessing progress towards expected achievements is not possible. The eight NGO/CSO consortia that received funding under NAP-WPS-III do work with comprehensive M&E frameworks and conducted baseline studies for their programmes. These programmes effectively started in 2017. While too early to assess their progress, the Inception Reports and Annual Reports for 2017 give an impression of their take-off and helped identify some challenges and obstacles.

Despite limitations in terms of evaluability and available data, throughout this MTR, criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability have been an implicit reference for identifying achievements and findings.

Structure of this MTR Report

The report provides a snapshot of progress and makes recommendations for the last year of NAP-WPS-III and future NAPs.

Chapter 1 looks at some specific features of NAP-WPS-III and assesses key strengths and weaknesses of NAP-WPS-III.

Chapter 2 gives a snapshot overview and examples on how individual signatories collaborated around the goals of NAP-WPS-III, highlighting some achievements.

Chapter 3 briefly describes the programmes of eight consortia, including some of the challenges and obstacles they encountered.

Chapter 4 looks into the added value of collaborative action to further the agenda of Women, Peace and Security..

Chapter 5 summarises the conclusions from former chapters and presents several recommendations for the current and possible future NAPs.

Chapter 1 – General assessment of NAP-WPS-III

This chapter analyses some general features of NAP-WPS-III since its adoption. By looking at what NAP-WPS-III is understood to be and in identifying some general strengths, achievements and challenges, it incorporates the perspectives of the signatories interviewed and respondents of the survey.

What is NAP-WPS-III?

The first National Action Plan on UN Security Resolution 1325 (UNSCR1325) started in 2007 as an agreement between three Dutch Ministries and 40 Dutch NGO/CSO's and knowledge institutions, to cooperate on issues related to the resolution. The agreement is known as the 'Schokland akkoord'. A second iteration was agreed in 2011 and covered 2012-2015. Towards the end of the NAP-II in 2015, all stakeholders agreed the effort needed to be continued although there was not clear consensus on how. After lengthy consultations between the stakeholders the NAP-WPS-III document was signed under Dutch political leadership from the Minister of Trade and Development Cooperation and the Ministers of Defence, of Education, Culture and Science and of Justice and Security with the strong support from civil society organisations². MoFA and WO=MEN assumed the role of (co-) coordinators of NAP-WPS-III and MoFA backed its commitment with a contribution of at least €4 million annually towards implementation.

To date, 79 UN member states have UNSCR1325 Action Plans³. Normally these NAP1325s are action plans that govern the action of governments, and which map out how governments undertake implementation of UNSCR1325⁴. From its early days, the Dutch NAPs have had a somewhat different character.

NAP-WPS-III represents a pledge by different stakeholders from the public sector, civil society and knowledge institutions to work together and to use their complementary capacities and mandates to move implementation of UNSCR1325 and the WPS agenda ahead. As an interviewee from MoFA explicitly stipulated, NAP-WPS-III does not (intend to) cover all governmental action to implement UNSCR1325, but is only a plan for collaborative action between government entities, civil society, and knowledge institutions. Drawing on NAP-WPS-III as a strategic framework, the Dutch Ministry of Defence (MoD) has elaborated its own Defence Action Plan to guide implementation of the resolution at organisational level. MoFA, nor any of the other ministerial signatories have an WPS-plan at ministerial level.

The interviews and the survey reveal that different interviewees/respondents have different perspectives on what NAP-WPS-III primarily is. The NAP document itself says it is: "an expression of our ongoing partnership and a contribution to the full realisations of the ambition set out in UNSCR1325" (2016:4). On the same page it says "together we form a platform of cooperation" (ibid). On the issue of partnership the document says "starting from our different mandates and organisations we will jointly contribute towards attaining the goals of the National Action Plan" (2016:42).

²2016, Tweede Kamer, Kamerbrief over vrouwen, vrede en veiligheid 8 maart 2018

³ See <https://www.peacewomen.org/member-states>

⁴ Like in the Netherlands, currently several involve explicit collaboration with civil society. Examples are Canada, which funds NGO programmes, and Ireland that installed a steering committee to supervise implementation of their action that has an independent chair and 8 members from civil society (50%).

Few signatories interviewed primarily identify NAP-WPS-III with action planning. More often, it is referred to as a community, a shared strategy, a shared space for exchange, a partnership and many emphasize its role as a source of funding. Actual comments from interviewees on the nature of NAP varied from: “it is to fund these consortia, isn’t it?” to “NAP is a shared agenda to influence and make sure women are taken into account in everything related to peace and conflict” and “For me it is a platform, a community, if I need an expert in something related to women and conflict, NAP is where I find it”. The view that seems to be most broadly shared is that of NAP as a community. A community of gender, peace and development organisations who know each other and cooperate with each other with a shared interest to strengthen the position of women and girls in countries with armed conflict. They commonly share a strong belief that women, if sufficiently supported for participation, can play a special role in protection, handling conflict and preventing armed conflict.

A Theory of Change for sustainable peace and security for everyone

Compared to earlier versions, NAP-WPS-III has enhanced its analytical underpinning and clarity as a framework by presenting a comprehensive Theory of Change (ToC) to promote implementation of the norms embodied in UNSC resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions. The vision NAP-WPS-III defines is “sustainable peace for everyone” and the highest level objective is: “Together we contribute to an enabling environment for women’s participation and empowerment in conflict and post-conflict environments so they can meaningfully participate in conflict prevention, resolution, peacebuilding, protection and relief and recovery” (NAP-WPS-III, 2016:26).

NAP-WPS-III combines a norms-based approach with an instrumental approach to women’s rights in stating that: “Including women in peace and security efforts is not only the right thing to do; it also makes these efforts more effective and leads to sustainable solutions” (2016:4). The “right thing to do” represents the norm, the “effective ...sustainable solutions” represent the instrumental approach.⁵

In terms of goals and outcomes, the ToC puts “decreasing harmful gender norms” at the core, flanked by “enhanced protection” and “equal leverage in conflict prevention, resolution, peacebuilding, protection, relief and recovery”. Interviewees from a broad range of signatories feel the ToC captures core problems and drivers as protection and leverage/participation are both influenced by the gender norms but flag both can also shift such norms. “Equal leverage” seems to be a goal that relates most to the work of smaller signatories.

The ToC also identifies outcomes in each of these three pillars looking at Capacities and Resources, Attitudes and Beliefs and Laws and Policy. For example, for equal leverage in conflict prevention, resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery (CPRPRR) the envisaged outcomes are:

1. Women working as agents of change with increased capacities, skills, knowledge and resources for meaningful participation in CPRPRR;
2. Increased political will, awareness, knowledge and skills for inclusive CPRPRR;
3. Stronger local non-violent strategies for and approaches to CP&RPRR, which are

⁵ A downside from the instrumental approach is that it allows for reversal of the arguments: women’s rights should not be realised (or put on hold) because that would be more “effective”

incorporated into policies and legislation.

As mentioned earlier, while it has developed a ToC, NAP-WPS-III does not define indicators for goals or outcomes. The UN Secretary General developed a comprehensive indicator-set for UNSCR1325⁶ that was approved by the UN Security Council. European Union member states also work at EU level on indicators for work on WPS. In principle all this could be drawn on to decide on success indicators for NAP-WPS-III.

NAP-WPS-III as an action plan



NAP-WPS-III specifies 3 goals, 10 outcomes and 45 activities (see annex 3 for a detailed listing). The image to the left shows the nature of the activities of NAP-WPS-III, depicting the frequencies of the verbs used to describe the 45 activities. Clearly “exchange” is a central action to NAP-WPS-III. For each activity defined in NAP-

WPS-III one or more relevant signatories are listed. It is not entirely clear however, if being listed as signatory commits the organisation to collaborate with other signatories around these activities, or whether it (also) represents a commitment to take-up the topic and change the signatory’s own practice(s) and structures.

Indeed, interviewees consulted for this MTR shared different perspectives as to whether NAP-WPS-III was an overall policy agenda or a limited collaboration framework. Apparently there is room for interpretation. For example in the case of activity II.2.6 “Integrate a thorough analysis of gender equality, gender norms and masculinities into all programs” which was subscribed by all signatories. Is this commitment limited to collaborating to integrate such an analysis in the MoFA funded, CSO implemented programs? Or does it represent a broader commitment? And if it is a broader commitment, to whom? In a narrow interpretation, signatories simply pledged to a series of joint activities while at the same time the signatories also pursue the implementation of UNSCR1325 and the Women Peace and Security agenda individually, outside the scope of NAP-WPS-III. However, if interpreted in a broader sense, as a “partnership”, it could be expected for example, that signatories have dialogues as to how they both individually and collaboratively contribute together towards the goals formulated in NAP-WPS-III.

Under the aegis of NAP-WPS-III exchange and collaborative action has taken place. Chapter 2 details several collaborative actions and achievements. The NAP-WPS-III document does not specify a reporting mechanism for such activity. It states that the coordinating partners in the past were not able to track activities and the development of a common monitoring and evaluation

⁶ A concrete indicator formulated by the UNSG and the UNSC is for example that relates to equal leverage is: *representation of women in formal and informal decision-making bodies on peace and conflict; improve partnership and networking with local and international women’s rights groups and organizations; recruit and appoint women to senior positions in peacekeeping forces, UNSG Report to Security Council - 2010/173*

framework is postponed (2016:20-21). So NAP-WPS-III signatories made a pledge to collaborate (and work) toward certain goals, but there is no monitoring system that supports (mutual) accountability among signatories. With signatories having no responsibility to report on their (collaborative) action for WPS to the community of signatories⁷, it is de facto left to the coordinators to document collaboration, learning and exchange in the community.

Geographic focus

In the past, NAP-WPS-II combined collaboration in country groups and in regional groups (Middle East and North Africa MENA-region, for example). In practice differences between countries were often too large to be able to foster concrete collaboration. For NAP-WPS-III it was decided to focus on eight countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Libya, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen. For each country there would be a Country Group, a more or less open structure, where signatory organisations could participate and cooperate.

In conjunction with this geographic focus of NAP-WPS-III, MoFA limited the program funding it provides to these eight countries and supports one consortium to work in each country. In general the value of working around one country only, is acknowledged by interviewees as many issues are country specific and need country-specific interventions. Some flag there are important cross-cutting issues that warrant attention, like small arms trade for example.

Also, some interviewees expressed regret that the geographic focus was limited because they feel there are valuable connections between Dutch civil society actors and partners in other (post)conflict countries, sometimes with WPS components, that seem to remain outside the scope of NAP-WPS-III or at least do not get the attention they deserve. Named specifically in this respect are the gender dimensions of global peace and security issues as they affect Dutch society for example through migration and tensions in diaspora and refugee communities in The Netherlands. Several interviewees stress that these linkages to Dutch policies and realities merit more attention particularly as NAP-WPS-III is supposed to be a national action plan.

Funding: upsides and limitations

For the period 2016-2019, MoFA allocated 16 million euro through a funding framework⁸ based on NAP-WPS-III. It funds eight consortia to undertake collaborative action in focus countries. All the grants approved have a ToC and comprehensive M&E systems with specific indicators. Reports are submitted by consortia leads to MoFA, and in some cases the reports are shared by consortia leaders with other signatories in country groups. MoFA also makes resources available to smaller signatories through the Peace and Security for All (PS4All) funding scheme. WO=MEN receives funding from MoFA based on its multi-annual plan and allocates part of these resources to work related to NAP-WPS-III. Grant recipients and WO=MEN are accountable to MoFA for the use of resources they receive from MoFA. It is not documented what other resources are dedicated to implementing collaborative action planned in NAP-WPS-III. Consultations that

⁷ Not that the consortia of NGO/CSO's funded by MoFA do have responsibilities to report to the funder

⁸ Order of the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of 3 May 2016, no. MINBUZA-2016.242245, laying down administrative rules and a ceiling for grants awarded under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Grant Regulations 2006 (Women, Peace and Security 2016-2019).

WO=MEN is conducting with members of country groups show several signatories access other financial resources for work on WPS.

Signatories generally applaud that financial resources are made available by MoFA for activities defined in the NAP-WPS-III. The resources are considered to be an important in support of the work on WPF done by NGO/CSO signatories. It not only enables undertaking a variety of activities in focus countries but also illustrates the importance adhered to UNSCR1325 by the Dutch government. This is considered very helpful for both Dutch and local CSO's and NGO's as they engage with local actors. Support for Peace and Security for All (PS4ALL) is also seen as an acknowledgment of the importance of smaller women's and diaspora organisations.

Consortia draw on the NAP-WPS-III ToC to develop their own program specific ToC. Initial experiences from the programs being implemented by country group consortia of NGO's funded by MoFA suggest this ToC is in alignment with the realities of women in the context of conflict as victims as well as agents. Chapter 3 provides details on the consortium programs funded.

While signatories are generally appreciative, there are also some drawbacks to the way funding is structured that deserve some attention. Some signatories feel quite strongly about the potential negative effects of the distribution of resources being top-down in the NAP-WPS-III agreement, as one interviewee put it: "NAP is developed from a Dutch perspective with MoFA at the top, in collaboration with Dutch development organisations". Indeed the administrative requirements of the funder to qualify for the core NAP-WPS-III funding, seem to benefit larger, development organisations.

Imbalances in power relations may induce recipients of funding to self-censor and be less open to more political reflection and strategizing (particularly when they are highly dependent on MoFA for funding). MoFA does not only has the means and authority to allocate resources to consortia, but also to WO=MEN for tasks related to the coordination of the NAP agreement. Some interviewees see a risk that WO=MEN and funded NGO/CSO signatories becoming merely implementors of public policies decided at a higher level. Others suggest that the risk is (well-) managed: the multi-annual plan of WO=MEN that serves as the basis for its funding from MoFA specifically mentions that WO=MEN has a role as "watchdog" and in the context of NAP-WPS-III, WO=MEN has fulfilled that role for example when lobbying for the PS4All programme.

The MoFA funding framework⁹ required signatories to form consortia. For the larger programs, this was not perceived to be altogether negative, but several grantees of the PS4ALL program did refer to these mandatory collaborative arrangements as "forced marriages". They flag that while the arrangements may have generated efficiencies for the donor, there are no corresponding efficiencies nor synergies for the recipients (and their partners), to the contrary.

The multiple actors active in the context of NAP-WPS-III have their own accountability towards their constituencies/members who expect actions for a peaceful world, for support from the diaspora, or for development cooperation from a religious compassionate or secular human rights

⁹ Order of the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of 3 May 2016, no. MINBUZA-2016.242245, laying down administrative rules and a ceiling for grants awarded under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Grant Regulations 2006 (Women, Peace and Security 2016-2019).

perspective. Such accountabilities need to be squared with the accountability to the financing partner. The same holds for the internal coordination. As coordinator, WO=MEN is accountable to co-coordinator MoFA but also to their own constituency, consisting mainly of non-governmental organisations specialized in development cooperation in the Netherlands. As funder, MoFA more than any other signatory has an important role to play, acknowledging these dilemmas and enabling others to balance their accountabilities.

A related concern regards the competitive nature of the funding process and the possible collision between the dynamics of competition and the dynamics of learning and exchange among NAP-WPS-III signatories. Knowledge- and information sharing, together with collaboration are at the core of NAP-WPS-III. Trust is essential for such sharing. In times when financial resources are being allocated, signatories become funders and (potential) recipients of funding or third party. The nature of the funder-recipient relation and the competition among potential recipients may foster self-censoring and selective information sharing. These dynamics collide with the trust required for knowledge- and information sharing. After the decisions regarding resource allocation have been taken the overall trust levels may pick-up and learning and sharing usually thrives much better. In this context, it is also important to note that government funding for Dutch NGO's has been systematically declining over the past decade and the competition among NGO's for such funding has increased¹⁰.

To maximize NAP-WPS-III's potential for knowledge and -information sharing, timing is important. The allocation of programming resources in the context of NAP-WPS-III took place roughly from March 2015 (start of discussions about the new NAP) until November 2016 (resources allocated to eight programs, with an overflow into 2018 for the P&S4All resources). Several interviewees report that in 2016 and 2017 funding issues influenced the exchange in some Country Groups in a negative way. Some groups were less affected, others are reported to have picked-up traction again in the course of 2018. It is important to take these dynamics into account when taking policy decisions and timing funding. Current programs funded under NAP-WPS-III end December 2019. A new funding call may again affect the knowledge- and information exchange in the NAP-WPS-III community again from mid-2019 onwards until the end of that new allocation process.

Conclusions

The Netherlands has been ahead and inclusive in promoting implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 through a broad partnership of civil society organisations and the government and allocation of resources. The allocation of a substantial amount financial resources for WPS-programming enables signatories to develop programs in focus countries and illustrates that the Dutch commitment towards implementing UNSCR1325 goes well beyond words.

NAP-WPS-III is unlike other national action plan to implement UNSCR1325. Only the Ministry of Defence draws on NAP-WPS-III to translate it in an organisational level action plan. While MoFA has an important responsibility to implement UNSCR1325 it does not have a comprehensive, organisation-wide plan regarding women/gender peace and security, a tool that could foster

¹⁰ See for example Lau Schulpen, 2016, The NGO funding game: the case of the Netherlands

synergies and (internal) accountability. Similarly MoECS and MoJS could benefit from a 1325-action plan at organizational level.

Compared to its predecessors, NAP-WPS-III is innovative, incorporating a strong Theory of Change for sustainable peace and security for everyone, and a ToC that is supported by a broad range of stakeholders.

While NAP-WPS-III is broadly supported by signatories, it also has features that limit its effectiveness:

- Signatories pledge to a partnership and an action plan but the pledge does not seem to include a responsibility to report to co-signatories on relevant action undertaken by one's own organisation, alone or in collaboration with other signatories.
- It is unclear if NAP-WPS-III is meant to serve as a plan to mainstream the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in the work of all signatories, or a basis for a funding policy and framework, or a plan for mutual cooperation and knowledge exchange between a variety of actors around WPS or all of the above at the same time
- Although formally an action plan, several NGOs and many in MoFA see NAP-WPS-III primarily as a platform/community and/or a funding mechanism. Actions specified in the plan are many and not always very concrete. Collaborative action, information and knowledge exchange and learning are at times hampered by competition for funding and geographic focus areas. There is no monitoring system for activities planned and outcomes aspired (aside of the 8 funded programs) which limits the (mutual) accountability of signatories.

Chapter 2 – NAP-WPS-III achievements

This chapter reviews in more detail the activities realised and the achievements of NAP-WPS-III. It reports on how signatories use NAP-WPS-III, describes the main collaborative spaces and highlights some achievements. As mentioned, NAP-WPS-III has no overall progress indicators or reporting mechanism. Because there is no activity reporting mechanism, the picture of what has happened compared with what was planned, may be incomplete. Also, lack of outcome indicators makes it hard to assess to what extent activities and results were relevant and contributed to generating the expected outcomes. Yet, drawing on a variety of resources, what follows below is a reasonably accurate snapshot of the state of play and the main achievements in the reporting period.

Collaborative spaces and relationships in NAP-WPS-III

Signatory events. All signatories are invited to participate in so-called NAP-WPS-III signatory events that provide opportunities for networking and collaboration. No less than five of these signatory events have been organised by WO=MEN and MoFA in the period 2016-2018. Besides being a way to discuss relevant issues these events are appreciated for the networking opportunities they provide. Several interviewees said that the location of these events at MoFA gave “weight” to the events.

Virtual exchange. WO=MEN has published regular new-letters with information on (planned) activities and reports on signatory events and ad hoc events organised by WO=MEN and/or signatories. Some of this information is available on the joint MoFA/WO=MEN website on NAP-WPS-III: <https://www.nap1325.nl>

Collaboration around specific opportunities. One of the signatory events was dedicated to preparing for the Dutch membership of the UN Security Council during 2018. MoFA and several other NAP-WPS-III signatories collaborated systematically around this Dutch membership of the UNSC, of which The Netherlands was chair in March 2018 during International Women’s Day. With inputs from signatories, the Dutch government was able to influence a series of important decisions serving the interests of women and realised important results that put UNSCR1325 in practice.

Country groups. Another important space for collaboration are the Country Groups, established for all eight focus countries. In these Country Groups all signatories that work in or around that country are invited to participate. Besides consortium partners that are funded, most Country Groups include several NGO/CSO stakeholders that are not funded. In some cases they are attended by staff of ministries and knowledge institutions. Important information is shared in several country groups. Interviewees suggest value could be added to collaboration if work in country groups would be based on a shared influencing agenda or action plan.

Not all Country Groups meet regularly or with the same satisfaction. Some meet very regularly, others more on an ad hoc basis (if they meet). In 2018, WO=MEN took the initiative to consult with Country Group Chairs around best practices and obstacles for smooth functioning of the Country Groups. Several ideas emerged to enhance the work of these groups that could be considered by the coordinators.

- Clear terms of reference and/or a plan or roadmap for collaborative action of the group makes them more dynamic and effective

- Consortium leads would need to be able to budget in their overall programme budget, resources for the tasks involved in leading a country group with a clear terms of reference

It is also suggested by several interviewees that specific thematic groups (on arms trade f.e.) could be interesting for a broader group of signatories. From the interviews and the survey it also emerged that groups could be more strategic about influencing (political) decisions that affect women and girls in the focus countries but also in The Netherlands and Europe (the so-called "domestic" angle¹¹).

In these Country Groups the NGO/CSO-consortia, a combination of large and small organisations, were formed that applied in 2016 for funding by MoFA to implement a joint program in eight focus countries. While the only restriction was that lead applicants and Dutch co-applicants need to be signatory of NAP-WPS-III, the size of the grants and MoFA's administrative requirements, de facto excluded several signatories to be (lead)applicants. The development of the NAP-WPS-III document, the funding call and funding proposals (in 2016), as well as their review and the development of M&E systems (in 2017), have used up considerable staff capacity of MoFA, WO=MEN and selected NGO/CSOs. Interviewees remark that at times during 2017, the funding component seem to have consumed almost all (scarcely) available MoFA capacity for NAP-WPS-III. At the same time it did not always benefit the dynamics of exchange in the Country Group.

In addition to providing a space where Dutch signatories collaborate with each other, signatories, particularly programme consortia connect with a variety of local actors in focus countries. Through the Country Groups – at least in theory – all these local actors these would be linked with the Dutch signatories working in/around that country. The country group for Yemen is an example, connecting Dutch NGO's, local actors and MoFA's The Hague-based and embassy staff. Also the DRC and Libya groups have shown this dynamic.

Other country-specific spaces. Related to the programs as a space for collaboration, several interviewees report that in relevant focus countries NGOs and CSO's work with the military and civil experts that are fielded by MoFA in collaboration with MoD and MoJS and the Police. The intensity of those working-relationship varies on a case-by-case basis.

Government entities collaborating. MoFA and MoD coordinate – at high level – all issues related to UN, EU and NATO missions in focus countries and in other countries with security issues, including women/gender related issues. They also work together around training of personnel deployed to missions. MoFA works with MoD and MJ&V in the recruitment and placement of military and civil experts that are seconded to missions and on countering violent extremism. Gender is a dimension in all this and this coordination activity is relevant to the outcomes and activities of NAP-WPS-III as it may involve information and learning that in NAP-WPS-III was envisaged to be shared with a broad group of signatories. However those involved

¹¹ Most work under NAP seeks to influence policy decisions and actions taken by governmental and non-governmental actors operating in the conflict countries. The "domestic angle" refers to all policy decision (Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Aid, Trade, Defence, Security etc. etc) taken in The Netherlands and at European level that directly or indirectly affect the situation or actors in these conflict countries.

do not usually link the collaboration to NAP-WPS-III. This is also the case for collaboration around work in the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

Connections outside the community. Outside the framework of NAP-WPS-III, MoFA collaborates on issues relevant to women, peace and security with a number of international NGO's. Examples are Women for Women International, IBIS, WIDA, Panos, Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, IPPF, Global Centre for Cooperative Security. MoFA also works with Dutch organisations that are not NAP-WPS-III signatories such as International Development Law Organisation (IDLO). Some of these activities involve collaboration with MoD and MinJ&V/Police.¹² Individual NGO-signatories interact in a variety of (international) fora on women, peace and security and have been able to secure financial resources for work on it from sources that are not part of NAP-WPS-III. WO=MEN connects with members outside the UNSCR 1325 community through its overall Women peace and Security work;

Monitoring implementation of planned actions

Overall it is not easy to establish if all the 45 different activities listed in NAP-WPS-III gained equal traction, at least not as collaborative efforts of NAP-WPS-III signatories. As the list of activities was not used for any form of reporting by any of the signatories, in some cases lack of information and/or very general framing of the activity make it hard to judge whether or not progress has been achieved. In other cases concrete activities may not have been feasible, for example the establishment of a common database of Women, Peace and Security Experts¹³. At the end of this chapter, a number of (collaborative) highlights are listed illustrating they dynamism in the NAP-WPS community.

Given the disappointing attempts under earlier NAPs to assess how much resources signatories invest, no attempt was made to collect detailed data on this aspect. Apart from the funding to programs provided by MoFA. WO=MEN allocated on average 1,5fte for work on Women, Peace and Security, MoFA possibly less also considering the vacancies during 2017 and early 2018. At the time of this MTR, MoFA's team working on WPS encompasses 3,5 fte. Signatories report having invested considerable time preparing proposals and forging consortia. WO=MEN seem to have spread its capacity over all 1325-activities and achievements. A lot of dedicated capacity in the MoFA-TFVG was used for tasks related to the program funding process. Other MoFA departments contributed to other achievements.

Overall assessment of role and relevance of NAP-WPS-III for signatories

One of the key reflections regarding the success of NAP-WSP-III in terms of convening and supporting action has been in terms of the meaning of NAP.WSP-III to the different groups of individual signatories, and what roles have importance for the different stakeholders. The response to the e-survey conducted in the context of the MTR gives an indication. Survey respondents (N=34) were mainly from NGO/CSOs signatories, complemented with a few

¹² Information obtained from internal MoFA documents reporting on implementation of UNSCR1325 to the UNSG

¹³ An activity listed for output 1 under the third goal of NAP-WPS-III. Data protection issues make it complicated to develop and manage such a database. Simple solutions like a closed Linked-In group could be an alternative

respondents from ministries. Consequently, the outcomes speak to perceptions of only part of the signatories, and are likely to come from the most engaged stakeholders and may say less about those who do not actively engage with NAP-WPS-III.

Importance of NAP-WPS-III	Not important (scores 1 or 2)	Important (scores 3 and 4)	Rank (average)
NAP has allowed me to develop new contacts	26%	74%	1
We draw lessons from document and information about what other NAP signatories are doing	38%	62%	2
Because of NAP we have access to funding for our work on WPS	41%	59%	3
NAP influences the priorities of our organisation	41%	59%	4
NAP changed the way we do things	50%	50%	5
In the Country Group we developed a joint strategy to work on WPS	50%	50%	6
The country Group is a platform to raise issues with Dutch authorities	59%	41%	7
The country Group is a platform to raise issues with other NGOs and organisations in civil society	62%	38%	7

Most scores had normal distributions. Notably, the scores on “NAP as a source of funding” were most divided: 10 respondents indicated no importance at all (score 1), while 16 respondents indicated that NAP was very important in this aspect (score 4). This may be related to the perceived double identity of NAP as a source of funding and a space for exchange and collaboration.

On working in consortia, one respondent commented that working with big organisations creates room for small organisations to improve their capacities because they receive support from the big ones. Another comment suggested that NAP made them realise that the WPS agenda requires translation in the Netherlands in the work with refugees, asylum seekers and migrants.

The survey asked respondents to give a score for the usefulness of UNSC-Resolution 1325 and NAP-WPS-III for their work. Scores showed the following pattern:

Usefulness (score out of 10 from very useful to not useful)	9-10	7-8	<6
UNSCR1325	8	18	8
NAP	8	16	10

It is of importance that up to 10 signatories (nearly 30% of the respondents who answered the survey) do not find NAP very useful for their work. The same applies to the outcome that 8 respondents doubt the usefulness for their work of UNSCR1325. Respondents who obtained funding tend to find NAP-WPS-III more useful than others. Comments of respondents suggest that the less than satisfactory functioning of the Country Groups may be a factor influencing these outcomes. The low perception of usefulness could also reflect that – as respondents commented

– people find it difficult to link these to their day-to-day work or they already have connections or develop collaborative relationships outside the framework of NAP-WPS-III.

Achievements: some highlights

These are several (collaborative) highlights realised in the context of NAP-WPS-III in the period 2016-2018:

- Five signatory meetings were organised. The first was organised around the official presentation of NAP-WPS-III early 2016; the second event took place in the fall of 2016 and reviewed the evaluation of achievements of the Small Seeds for Big Baobabs program. At the third signatory event, organised in the second half of 2017, priorities regarding women, peace and security for the Dutch membership of the UNSC were discussed. The event organised in June 2018 reflected on the activities in and around the UNSC and presented the Peace4All program, the successor to Small Seeds for Big Baobabs. The most recent event was organised in October 2018¹⁴ with the participation of local partners of the consortia in The Hague. This event also included a poster presentation of the work done by the consortia in the eight focus country, providing staff from all signatories an opportunity to network, get acquainted with these programs, and receive feedback.
- Dutch NGOs's and MoFA (staff in The Hague and at the Permanent Representation in New York) collaborated in preparation for the Dutch membership of the UNSC. Examples are the reincorporation of gender language in the UNAMA mandate, the request to the contributing countries to assign more women to MINUSMA and discussions around the linking of GBV and UN sanctions, facilitated by The Netherlands. Also because of the efforts of MoFA, WO=MEN and other signatories of NAP-WPS-III in 2018 more women from civil society organisations than ever briefed the UNSC-members around issues of women, peace and security.
- MoFA has granted €16 million to programs pursuing the objectives of NAP-WPS-III in eight focus countries.¹⁵ These consortia programs in the eight focus countries only effectively started work in the course of 2017; in each case their conception and inception involved high levels of collaboration among various Dutch signatories and their local partners. In one consortium a knowledge institution is involved. More detailed information on the achievements of these consortium programs can be found in Chapter 3
- A learning event involving Dutch and local consortium partners from projects funded under NAP-WPS-III was organised in October 2018. Participants were very positive about this opportunity to present their programs and exchange experiences with others working on similar topics in different contexts. They established that different contexts lead to different interventions. For example, while in all programs men were being involved in combatting gender inequality the narratives and modalities differed widely. At the same time, participants also identified important shared concerns, for example the threats posed to women and girls by the ever growing number of small arms circulating in (post)conflict regions.

¹⁴ This event was combined with a two-day learning event involving consortia partners and some of their partners.

¹⁵ In the framework of this MTR, it has not been assessed if and how NAP III was useful in signatories' fundraising activities outside the MoFA funds

- MoFA, in consultation with WO=MEN, developed the Peace and Security for All (PS4All) program allocating €450,000 to smaller collaborative programs in other countries (Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Mali, Burundi and Congo) involving consortia of diaspora organisations. A co-creation workshop was organised to help the applicants formulate coherent projects in line with MoFA quality standards. Projects started in 2018. More details on PS4All are included in Chapter 3
- MoFA en MoD continue to collaborate in training for military staff (together with Spain) a Comprehensive Approach to Gender in Operations which is run on average 4 times per year. Some NGO/CSO signatories (Pax and VOND for example) are involved in this effort.
- WO=MEN was organising partner to MoD at the 2017 Future Force Conference. The conference included a session on inclusiveness and gender sensitive approaches¹⁶. An interviewee who participated in the session argues that sessions on gender as part of a larger events are more effective than isolated events because of the potential to reach out to different people.
- MoFA, PAX and HIVOS actively collaborate to increase women's engagement in the Syrian peace negotiations in Geneva¹⁷. MoFA also supports UNWomen in this.
- Together with WO=MEN, Cordaid organized a "special procedure" in the Dutch parliament with MP's Sadet Karabulut and Martijn van Helvert in February 2018 which included 4 Libyan women activists¹⁸. In October of the same year Cordaid, Human Security Collective and Libyan partners provided inputs to Dutch parliamentarians for their mission to Libya.
- HMA-Yemen, WO=MEN, Oxfam Novib, CARE and other consortium partners and NAP-WPS-III signatories used Oxfam Novib's video-conferencing facilities to connect with local Yemini women's organisations and get an update on the situation as well as insights in their needs, trying to ensure their participation in (possible) peace negotiations.
- Members of the Colombia Country Group – in which MoFA actively participates compared to other Country Groups – were able to provide inputs into briefings for PM Rutte's mission to Colombia and connect the mission with local consortium partners.
- The DRC Country Group developed a roadmap for collaborative and strategic work and while actual activities never took off, the group does meet regularly and members appreciate participating because meetings are a good source of information on the situation on the ground.
- HMA-Libya approached consortium partners to refer relevant Libyan CSO's as members of the UNFPA-led working group on Gender-based Violence (GBV). Two partners of the consortium have significantly influenced the agenda and planning for interventions related to GBV with one producing a baseline report.

¹⁶ Eindrapport Future Force Conference 2017, page 43

¹⁷ According to an informant it would be very important to evaluate this effort with relevant signatories to learn for future support to involving women in peace negotiations. The 2018 UNWOMEN report of the Expert Meeting on Meaningful Participation of Women in Peace Negotiations includes ample reflection on the different modalities.

¹⁸ https://www.tweedekamer.nl/debat_en_vergadering/commissievergaderingen/details?id=2018A00569

- While there is no separate NAP Country Group for Afghanistan, gender and progress on WPS is a standard agenda item for the Afghanistan group in which NGO's coordinate but NAP signatories flag it requires effort to ensure due attention is given.
- In several programs in focus countries explicit attention is paid to masculinities, an element that was introduced in NAP-WPS-III
- MoFA, MinJ&V and MoD continue to collaborate to recruit and field gender expertise through the Civil Mission Pool. In 2018 three (3) civilian gender experts are active in the field and one vacancy, which is similar to the 2012-2014 average. An example is the gender expert working in MONUSCO, the UN mission in Congo. Other experts fielded may not have a strict focus on gender but some have a gender component as part of their ToR. Information on how many experts have a gender component in their ToR is not available. An example is the rule of law expert is stationed at EEAS who is also charged to ensure that gender considerations and expertise are incorporated in an early stage in mission planning. In recruitment for other fields of expertise (rule of law, migration, border management) gender expertise is considered an advantage but not a requisite. All police staff fielded to international position are trained on gender, undertake WPS related activities where and when possible and include gender issues in their 3-monthly reports.

Conclusions

Numerous important achievements can be highlighted in the context of WPS-NAP-III. Clear conclusions on progress towards objectives cannot be drawn as there are no indicators and base line data agreed in the NAP-WPS-III and no consolidated reports.

Firstly, in terms of relevance, the country groups and consortia are diverse group of organisations that currently work together would probably not have done so without NAP. Also, many signatories praise NAP as a community, a valuable network that allows one to access relevant gender expertise. Several examples show how such connections lead to effective action. At the same time MoFA and other ministries develop also collaborative action on WPS outside the framework of NAP-WPS-III.

Secondly, in terms of effectiveness, NAP-WPS-III seems to have some capacity to generate activities and influence what stakeholders do, as a platform it generates access to expertise, and under its aegis important work is funded. Many activities involve collaboration between NGO/CSO signatories, their programme partners and MoFA. With the exception of some individuals, other ministries and knowledge institutions that are signatory, seem to be less involved in collaborative initiatives under NAP-WPS-III.

Thirdly, on efficiency, it is clear that with few staff resources a lot of activity has been undertaken, particularly by the coordinators but also by the participants in country groups. The development of NAP-WS-III, the tendering and allocation of funding to the eight consortia in 2016-2017 and in 2017-2018 under P&S4All, have absorbed considerable capacity in 2016 and 2017 from MoFA, WO=MEN and the NGO/CSO signatories of NAP, possibly at the cost of tracking and documenting overall progress and other aspects of the implementation of NAP-WPS-III.

Fourthly, working around focus countries works. At the same time, the learning event - much appreciated – illustrates that actors working in different countries can learn from each other and that there are common concerns. WO=MEN is currently supporting Country Groups to foster the dynamics of collaborative action, learning and exchange within these groups. This, as well as further investment in reporting and documenting the multiple collaborative and learning activities undertaken under NAP-WPS-III can strengthen its relevance and effectiveness.

Chapter 3 - Consortium programs

Selected through a call issued mid-2016, eight three-year consortia programs in NAP-WPS-III focus countries are funded under NAP-WPS-III. Most programs concluded their inception phase mid-2017. It is too early, and outside the scope of this MTR, to evaluate these programs for effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. Drawing on documentation and interviews, this chapter seeks to capture some similarities and differences in terms of approaches and identifies some shared and context specific challenges.

All observations in this chapter refer to the programs in the eight focus countries. In 2017 another call was launched for consortia to apply for small grants in (combinations of) different countries: Peace and Security for All (PS4All). Towards the end of this chapter, some brief remarks on PS4All will be made drawing on information that emerged from the interviews.

Program descriptions and design

All programs of the consortia are grounded in a thorough context analysis and a theory of change that is developed collaboratively between the consortia partners¹⁹ and their local partners. In some cases the NAP's country groups – which in theory includes all NAP-WPS-III signatories active in a country - extensively contributed to that analysis in others the analysis was done by consortium members and their partners, in other cases the programs were merely presented and in some no significant interaction happened at all.

All programs have a program specific ToC²⁰, based on the NAP-WPS-III ToC but adapted to the country context and the capabilities of partners involved. Comparing ToCs, it can be observed that most programs pursue all three goals of NAP-WPS-III. One focuses on equal leverage and decreasing gender norms (objectives 3 and 2) and two programs focus exclusively on the objective of enhanced protection. The table below captures the distribution of the different programs in terms of emphasis on NAP-WPS-III goals

<i>Enhanced Protection</i>	<i>Decrease of Harmful Gender Norms</i>	<i>Equal Leverage in Conflict Prevention, Resolution, Peacebuilding, Relief and Recovery.</i>
AFGHANISTAN IRAQ	YEMEN	
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC CONGO, COLOMBIA, SOUTH SUDAN, LIBYA, SYRIA		

¹⁹ Mostly NGO/CSO actors, only in one program a knowledge institute was involved

²⁰ There was no strict format for the program ToC. For the Syria and the Afghanistan program a narrative with a LogFrame represented the theory of change. Other programs linked for each goal detailed intermediate outcomes in terms of "if – then" connection chains, and many also presented visual representations.

Afghanistan – Implementing the Afghan NAP 1325 by Linking Inclusive Security and Justice

The Safhe Jaded program aims to contribute to increased security and justice for women and girls in Afghanistan. Expected outcomes are (a) increased thematic and operational capacity in both justice and security sectors at national and provincial levels; (b) a change in societal and sectoral norms in favour of inclusive security and justice; and (c) more political will and more provision of inclusive security and justice through the effective implementation of the Afghan NAP 1325 and other relevant laws and policies. The program focusses exclusively on the protection pillar of the NAP-WPS-III ToC. The program operates in Kabul and six provinces and activities include ToTs for CSO's and local government staff, gender and conflict analysis workshops at provincial level and training sessions for female police officers. The program also engages in public influencing on the need for inclusive security and justice and has developed a training manual for the justice sector on the linkages between formal and informal justice system.

Colombia - Women as Central Agents for Peacebuilding in Colombia

Due to active influencing of a vast number of women's organisations, the Final Agreement for the termination of the conflict between the Colombian government and the ex-guerrilla of the FARC contains 100 specific provision for women. Implementation of the Final Agreement is however not progressing as it should. The consortium program is a broad alliance of Dutch and Colombian organisations. It seeks to empower women, their organisations and communities as agents of change and peacebuilders. For some activities there is a focus on specific regions and localities . The program supports (1) Women and their organisations to participate in advocacy processes, have access to information on GBV and contribute to preventing it; (2) Women, their communities, and organisations to generate and have access to reliable information on the impact the implementation of the Peace Accord has had on women and work to increase broad commitment to the protection of women as part of the peace process; (3) Regional platforms and national alliances of women to reinforce and consolidate their role in the development of peace and monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Colombia.

DRC - Mwanamke, Amani na Usalama: Women Peace and Security

The program seeks to contribute towards the equality of rights and opportunities of men and women for women to be able to fully participate in the consolidation of peace and in reconstruction in North and South Kivu provinces in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Results are pursued in three domains: (a) protection of women and girls, (b) combatting harmful gender norms and (c) reinforcement of women's capacities and action so they can participate equally in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. This requires both structural and normative change as well as implementation of existing laws and regulations. The program is implemented through a network of local partner organisations in both provinces and a CSO based in Kinshasa. Strategies involves research, awareness raising and training but also targeted local, provincial and national influencing and lobby activities and campaigning.

Iraq - Engendering the Transition to Peace and Security in Iraq

The program aims to contribute to structural change of gender norms, laws and institutions in Iraq, promoting equal rights, capacities and opportunities for men and women. It specifically challenges the idea that Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) is a private issue by linking it clearly to conflict patterns and histories that are markedly political, leading to integrating gender-sensitive and active women's participation in security sector reform (SSR), justice and reconciliation processes in "after ISIS" Iraq. The program strategies involve academic research on SGBV in Iraq and its impunity, as well as informed influencing by civil society organisations and work with Iraqi police and judiciary. An important element is the facilitation of dialogue between women/CSO's and various actors in the Security Sector.

Libya – Women and Youth as Bridge Builders

The overall goal of the program is to contribute to an enabling environment for women's participation and empowerment in Libya allowing CSO's, activists, men and women to play their role as bridge builders to increase human security and to contribute to a culture of peace. The main goals of the program are 1) to enhance human security with a specific attention for women's safety, 2) to contribute to reduce harmful, underlying gender norms & values and practices in women and men's lives and 3) to provide opportunities for women and men to participate meaningfully and equally in various peace processes and in conflict resolution & prevention.

South Sudan – Women and Girls for Change

The programs seeks to contribute to creating an empowering and inclusive environment, where women and girls feel safe and are enabled to realize their rights and opportunities to play a significant role towards sustainable peace. Working along three pathways the program (a) provides support for women and girls to be more resilient and better protected, (b) trains boys and girls to be champions of change for gender equality, and (c) works with a variety of actors to ensure women and girls are meaningfully engaged in local decision-making related to conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery

Syria - Syrian Women's Participation in Peace and Security: The Way Forward

Building on earlier experiences and networks, the consortium will empower and train women, complementing and building their capacities with hands-on learning and support them to develop and implement their own local initiatives. The program will also create a virtual Knowledge Platform, a non-political space where women from all Tracks and sectors can get to know each other, share expertise and coordinate on practical- matters. As a result of program activities (a) more Syrian women will have become influential leaders in the peace process, in key sectors, and in decision-making at the local level - with increasing support from male leaders (b) first steps will have been taken in structural and sustainable changes of harmful gender norms, laws and institutions (c) there will be increased awareness amongst targeted female and male leaders on key protection issues faced by Syrian women and girls.

Yemen – Women Peace and Security in Yemen

The program aims to create conditions for women to influence structural decisions on their future by strengthening a local enabling environment on the one hand, and ensuring that women have a voice at local level on the other end, by bringing women and local decision makers together. The emphasis is on capacity development through ToTs. While local men and women and their CSO's will develop capacities to combat harmful gender norms that form obstacles for the meaningful participation of women in sustainable conflict transformation processes on community level, local decision makers will develop their sensitivity and responsiveness to the needs and interests of women and girls in Yemen in decision-making and peacebuilding processes. Besides ToTs, program activities include local (media) campaigns showcasing and role-modelling progressive gender norms. Through various platforms at different levels, the program will bring the voices of local, grassroots women to (inter)national fora where peace is being brokered.

None of the program consortia is led by a women's (rights) organisation. Dutch organisations that specifically focus on women/gender and conflict/development tend to be small, medium size at most. Out of eight, seven consortia are led by large Dutch development organisations, one is led by a peacebuilding organisation. Several programs build very much on earlier activities and partnerships developed under NAP-WPS-II or other funding schemes. This applies to programs in Afghanistan, Syria and Colombia for example. In other consortia new relationships and/or activities are being developed as is for example the case of Libya and South Sudan. This means that the program development process and the development of consortium dynamics varied. In some consortia (Afghanistan for example) the Dutch partners (Oxfam and Cordaid) had a long experience working together, while in the case of South Sudan the – quite diverse – consortium partners had no such collective experience. The Colombia consortium brought together Dutch partners that were somewhat familiar to each other but each brought in local partners that knew each other but had previously been working independently, in a parallel way.

The program ToCs illustrate that the objectives are interrelated without setting directions of causalities in those relations. It seems as if there is an overlap between "Attitudes and Beliefs" as a *pathway of change* to achieve Enhanced Protection or Equal Leverage, and "Decrease of Harmful Gender Norms" as an *objective*. For example in the Afghanistan and Iraq programs the attitudes-and-beliefs-pathway is very important to promote changes in the Justice Sector, yet the programs identify promoting Enhanced Protection as their single goal. The interlinkages show prominently in the programs that pursue all three goals.

All programs have adjusted their ToCs in the inception phase and conducted baselines for relevant indicators and important investment to enable learning as the programs are being implemented. Several interviewees expressed doubts as to whether the investment was proportionate to the size and duration of the programs, which for many would be 30 months between completing inception i.e. the actual start of activities and the end of the programs. While this may be true, the ToC-based monitoring will generate a wealth of information that can hopefully at some stage be generously shared with the broader NAP-WPS community to learn. Interviewees indicated that they felt it was very well possible to tailor the ToC to the realities and needs in their specific country context. Some observed that the methodology was rather complex and that there was a risk that the needs expressed by local, grassroots partners would get lost in the methodological intricacies presented by outcome chains.

Monitoring and evaluation

All programs identified their own indicators with guidance from MoFA. They conducted their baseline according to program specific methodologies and parameters and devised their own reporting systems and formats.

Overall it seems that most programs will be eventually evaluable. The methodologies for M&E used vary considerable although there are considerable similarities between the programs. An overall review of the portfolio in this aspect looking at relevance and quality of data, stakeholder involvement, costs and influence of monitoring on program implementation could be useful.

Tender requirements and consortia

All programs involved originally at least three partners. The lead applicant (and Dutch co-applicants) has to be NAP signatory; the consortium could also include NGO/CSO's from the

focus country or region. Tender-criteria²¹ included positive scores for effective involvement of local partners in consortia. Additionally the tender stipulated a financial ceiling per country. Influenced by these conditions eight consortia “emerged” from the NAP signatory community submitting applications.

The criteria limited the number of applications an organisation could be involved in to two, thus promoting diversity. The tender evaluation criteria positively rewarded influence from southern partner organisations on development, implementation and steering of the programme. Because of the administrative requirements involved, small Dutch organisations and diaspora women’s organisations cannot lead consortia. Larger organisations on their part had no incentive to involve small Dutch organisations. Both the DRC and South Sudan program do however include diaspora organisations based in The Netherlands that are NAP-WPS-III signatories. WO=MEN has been mentioned by interviewees as being very supportive in the period in which consortia were being formed, to help smaller Dutch organisations to “develop their case” to be included in consortia.²²

Linkages with other ongoing programs

Most programs establish in the baseline study clearly what other relevant actors are active in the country or regions. Sometimes the emphasis is on avoiding duplication (DRC) and sometimes the study primarily outlines how other actors potentially influence the work of the program of the NAP-consortium. In Afghanistan there are clear synergies between Oxfam’s WPS-funded activities and other MoFA funded Oxfam activities. It would be interesting to track if the NAP-programs influence other work consortium partners do in the same country, or have an influence on programs of conflict prevention, resolution, protection, relief and recovery from other actors. The former is reported in South Sudan for example, where interviewees suggest that certain successful approaches from the NAP-funded program are currently being replicated in PAX’s other work in the country.

Lessons learned from NAP-WPS-II: Gender analysis, men and masculinities

Incorporating a lesson learned from the past, NAP-WPS-III emphasised the importance of working with a country focus and on the basis of a thorough gender analysis, including perspectives on masculinities (2016:19). All program designs are based on an analysis of gender relations and gender roles and the underlying power relations is an important starting point for action. Documentation for the different programs illustrates how these relations may be context specific but not static, and how they may change during conflicts.

Several but not all programs link security, violence, protection of women’s rights and participation in peacebuilding with masculinities and how gendered norms influence male behaviour. Masculinities are explicitly addressed with both men and women in for example the DRC and Yemen programs but also feature in the work done South Sudan and Colombia. How to address masculinities in depth was a topic at the October 2018 joint learning event.

²¹ Order of the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of 3 May 2016, no. MINBUZA-2016.242245, laying down administrative rules and a ceiling for grants awarded under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Grant Regulations 2006 (Women, Peace and Security 2016-2019).

²² Later WO=MEN continued to advocate for the value of the contribution of these organisations to which MoFA responded launching the P&S4All tender.

While they focus on women peace and security, in all programs men are involved, in different ways. Sometimes men are included because it is inevitable. Such instrumental involvement as illustrated for example by the Yemen program that has chosen to work on community level with community leaders. In the starting phase it will be necessary to access the community leaders / authorities by men but should create conditions for grassroots women to develop initiatives. In other cases men are a target groups that can influence and advocate for the inclusion of women and gender equality. Male decision-makers are targets of advocacy and lobby activities but they are also being involved in all kinds of training and awareness raising activities. Most programs are deliberate in organising activities with mixed and women-only groups. Expected outcomes may range from raised awareness to men and boys actually working with women in partnership as promoters of gender equality. Some programs focussing on (male) elders & traditional leaders and others on youth.

Progress, obstacles & challenges

Annual narrative reports over 2017 indicate that other than delays caused by late starts, activities are generally progressing as planned. Women Peacemakers Program, member of two consortia, closed its doors end of 2017 declaring that the funding environment was exceedingly challenging for medium sized organisations²³ and that in their view this and other constraints in the political and operational environment did no longer allow them to pursue their mission.²⁴ The two consortia affected (Yemen and Libya) adjusted the implementation arrangements with the lead partner (CARE and Cordaid respectively) taking over the role of WPP.

Grant contracts were awarded only in November 2016 with their formal end-dates being December 2019 while many programs had been originally conceived for 48 months. All interviewees comment on the considerable time invested in inception and elaboration of detailed M&E frameworks. Combined with the complexities of starting programs in (post)conflict countries in particularly obtaining permits from authorities, recruiting capable staff etc. this meant many programs only started actual activities mid-2017, leaving 30 months to actually implement activities.

Interviewees confirm that collaboration in consortia and the close involvement of smaller Dutch and Southern CSO's has enhanced the quality of the proposal. They also point to concerns. Where consortia involve many partners (Colombia) or partners that had not worked together before (South Sudan) it takes quite some time for the partners to align their expectations and ways of working and for the collaborative chemistry to develop. Secondly, they note that standards and requirements of the funder do not correspond to the available time and professional capacities of the smaller (sometimes in part volunteer-based) organisations, so the larger organisations had to invest time and resources to support their consortium partners to comply with the standards and paperwork from the funder. While part of that process may have been productive for all involved, interviewees note that program budgets do not include resources for such intra-consortium technical support. Despite the value-added, comments made by several

²³ No medium size organisations (annual budget between 1,000.000 and 10,000.000 responded to the survey for this MTR among NAP-community members (survey N=34)

²⁴ For WPS' declaration go to: <https://www.wri-irg.org/en/story/2017/after-20-years-women-peacemakers-program-closes-its-doors>

interviewee suggest that without the incentives i.e. the criteria included in the funding call, smaller partners would probably have been left out.

HIVOS who leads the Syria consortium reports the NAP-Syria country group did not contribute to the gendered conflict analysis or baseline study at the basis of the program which was done by the consortium partners. The baseline for the Afghanistan program was done by a local partner of Oxfam.

Working on Women Peace and Security often involves working in high risk environments. Additionally working with grassroots organisations further complicates logistics. All projects report security issues, in several cases work had to be done outside the programme country, which comes with additional costs and restrictions regarding the participation of women.

Another concern often mentioned in the 2017 reports is maintaining connections between local and grassroots women leaders and national level decision-makers (male and female) including national bodies that work on WPS. This was identified as a strength of the work realised under NAP-WPS-II. Several examples show how links are forged, but equally often challenges are reported by consortia. In the Colombia consortium connecting the concerns of rural and urban women is an ongoing concern. The DRC consortium points at the value of a local coordinator with resources to travel in-country to build these linkages. As the value of this grassroots connection was reiterated in NAP-WPS-III (2016:20), it may be important to review this aspect across the portfolio at a later stage.

Peace and Security for All

Funding for small signatories was provided by MoFA under NAP-WPS-II via Cordaid. The program, entitled Small Seeds for Big Baobabs was positively evaluated and the “small seeds” flourished in many ways. Notably some of the partners is the current, large consortia (STAD for example) originally started as a “small seed”. In 2016 MoFA hesitated to launch a follow-up to the programme because it was not convinced of the potential impact of these small projects. Cordaid, who had implemented Small Seeds regranting the funds to smaller signatories, had felt that the administrative burden was (too) high and finally the mixing of funding- and collaborative relationships was not perceived to be a positive experience by all involved.

WO=MEN and many NGO/CSO signatories insisted however that also under NAP-WPS-III funding would be provided to small, diaspora women’s organisations and MoFA decided in 2017 to launch Peace and Security for All. It was decided grants would be issued directly by MoFA to a limited number of small consortia in specific countries²⁵. To reduce risks and facilitate management of projects from their side, MoFA required for PS4All that actors joined-up in three consortia with a lead organisations with a certain track record. WO=MEN played an important role advocating for the PS4All funding scheme and accompanying the applicants.

The development and approval process of the PS4All programs took quite some time and they have only started very recently so it is even difficult to assess whether they are off to a good start.

²⁵Besluit van de Minister voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking van 14 augustus 2017, nr. MINBUZA-2017 4000000581, tot vaststelling van beleidsregels en een subsidieplafond voor subsidiëring op grond van de Subsidiereregeling Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2006 (Peace and Security 4 All)

Contrary to the large consortia, most of the organisations involved in PS4All are women's organisations. For this MTR no extensive desk review has been done on relevant documentation but in a number of interviews the PS4All program was referred to. Very positive comments were made by interviewees about the (belated) decision to continue to fund on a small scale activities in the global south of diaspora women's organisations. Several of these organisations are very active in NAP-WPS-III. While MoFA is not the only funder in this field, but is considered to be an important one and the funding adds value to the work of the recipient organisations.

The requirement for PS4All applicants to form consortia was referred to on several occasions as "forced marriages". Besides lumping different approaches and contexts together, two consortia have to manage different currencies and time zones. In one consortium there seems to be potential for synergies to be realised, however the others show less potential. The efficiency gains the mandatory consortia generate for MoFA will be probably more than offset by the extra time the grant recipients invest coordinating and consolidating accounts and reports. Interviewees also feel that the size and duration of the grants do not really correspond with the complicated formats and extensive reporting- and other requirements, which they feel are more suited to large scale operations.

Conclusions

NAP-WPS-III has added value triggering and funding collaborative programming that is relevant, draws on lessons learned in the past, potentially adds value and promises to yield interesting results and important knowledge around women, peace and security.

Both MoFA and NGO/CSO consortia have invested considerable time and (human)resources into an effective start-up of operations, working on sensitive issues like SGBV, gender in a context of (post)conflict.

Working in consortia has a cost but seems to add value. Small Dutch grassroots and volunteer-based organisations are included in only two of the NAP program consortia. Yet they seem to complement and challenge the work on the WPS agenda of large development NGO's and public actors and connect it with diverse Dutch communities.

The Theory of Change of NAP-WPS-III represents a solid and broadly applicable analytical framework for a very diverse community of stakeholders.

Coordinated evaluation of the programs should yield interesting knowledge about specific country strategies but can also generate more generic lessons across the portfolio about the relevance of the ToC, monitoring practices and some cross cutting issues.

Small grants for work of diaspora organisations in the South seemingly continue to be a good investment. The establishment of the PS4All Initiative acknowledges this and shows the willingness of MoFA and WO=MEN overcome challenges faced by these organisations. Further reflection on the management of such grants is required.

Chapter 4 - Added value of collaborative action and obstacles

By undertaking the implementation of UNSCR1325 in a collaborative way as a partnership between civil society organisations, knowledge institutions and four ministries, the Netherlands is said to have set an example for other countries. In chapter 2 several examples were shared of collaborative achievements of NAP-WPS-III signatories. The ToR explicitly asked for the MTR to look into the added value of collaboration and challenges and obstacles to it. In assessing the added value of collaborative action around the WPS agenda and its challenges, the following questions are relevant.

- How many organisations are signatory to NAP-WPS-III?
- What is the level of engagement (high/low intensity and specific activities) with UNSCR1325 and NAP-WPS-III? Which actors within signatory organisations engage with NAP-WPS-III and which actors do not?
- What do actors perceive to be the advantages and disadvantages, what alternatives do they see and pursue? What parameters of the collaboration influence their perceptions?

Below some findings are presented as inputs for a constructive reflection on how NAP-WPS-III works for Dutch signatories and their partners and how collaboration can be enhanced in the (near) future.

Organisations – number of (new) signatories

The number of organisations that are signatory to NAP-WPS-III is larger than any of its predecessors and continues to grow to date. Compared to NAP-WPS-II, some organisations dropped out but the decrease was compensated by new organisations signing-up. Currently, several others are also considering to join. Seemingly, more than ever organisations (particularly NGO's and CSO's) want to further the agenda of Women Peace and Security and want to do so through some form of collaboration. In addition, new knowledge institutions are showing interest and plan on joining, the latest example being Saxion University of Applied Sciences.

The signatories are a very diverse group. Other than being based in The Netherlands and making a pledge to contribute somehow to the realisations of the goals of NAP-WPS-III, there are no requirements for being a NAP-WPS-III signatory. The mandates of some signatory organisations have strong connections with the WPS agenda (for example Burundian Women for Peace and Development, WILPF, UNOY Peacebuilders, PAX but also MoFA, MoD) while for other signatories that agenda is more in the periphery of their work (University Utrecht, Nederlandse Vrouwenraad, ICCO, SNV, Hague Academy for Local Governance and MoECS).

Most often interviewees point out that being a signatory to NAP-WPS-III they can access information, knowledge and expertise that makes their work more effective; interviewees of smaller organisations also indicate that being a signatory gives them external legitimacy and access to connections in larger organisations and policy makers. Vice-versa such advantages are rarely flagged, many large organisations for example indicate they do have their own connections with MoFA for example, although these often stem from earlier NAPs. Also, for some the fact that being a NAP signatory was a pre-condition to access program resources appears to be an important incentive to join.

The diversity of signatories enriches the collaboration, but also complicates it as the organisational priorities, ways of working, influencing-strategies and expectations may be very different. According to one interviewee involved in developing NAP-WPS-III, it was exactly this diversity that made it so time-consuming to agree on the final action plan.

Pledging to NAP-WPS-III in itself does not entail a major commitment, so maybe the number of signatories is not a good indicator for the commitment because it mixes apples and oranges. The actual commitment would be reflected in the time and energy individual representatives dedicate to work in the context of NAP-WPS-III. Unfortunately, this indicator is influenced by diversity. Some signatories are represented by individuals that are full-time, dedicated women/gender and peace specialists; other individuals involved are professionals in the field of development and/or conflict; and yet others are not employed, retired, or professionals in a completely different field and/or work on women, peace and security on a voluntary basis.

Organisations and individuals – varied levels of collaborative engagement

Governmental signatories to NAP-WPS-III are committed to implementing UNSCR1325. However only one has actually an implementation plan, the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Without a clear organisational plan that defines how the organisation engages with the WPS agenda or UNSCR1325, within organisations departments and individuals can and have to make their own decisions regarding their (individual) levels of engagement. This is also applicable to broad development NGOs where some individuals may be highly committed to WPS and UNSCR1325 while others that have humanitarian, (post)conflict or peacebuilding related tasks continue to operate in a gender neutral or -blind way.

For the analysis of engagement with NAP-WPS-III it is also important to observe that a certain level of engagement with promoting the WPS agenda or with furthering implementation UNSC 1325, does not automatically imply that an individual actor engages in collaborative action using NAP-WPS-III as a framework of platform. All signatory organisations are formally committed to UNSCR1325 and NAP-WPS-III. However, among individual actors in the different organisations that are signatory to NAP-WPS-III, a variety of patterns of individual engagement can be observed. At the risk of missing nuances, three distinct patterns can be observed:

- A. High individual engagement with UNSCR1325 and high engagement with the broader NAP-WPS-III community;
- B. High individual engagement with UNSCR1325 but little collaborative engagement with NAP-WPS-III community;
- C. Formal organisational engagement, occasional individual engagement with UNSCR1325 and no engagement with NAP-WPS-III.

It is important to flag that signatory organisations are not homogeneous. Several individual patterns of engagement co-exist in some of the larger signatories.

High individual engagement with UNSCR1325 and high engagement with the broader NAP-WPS-III community

For WO=MEN, WPS is one of their key areas of action and it has systematically dedicated a significant part of their staff capacity to work on it, even in times when external funding was

limited. In 2016, together with MoFA, WO=MEN harnessed the experience of earlier iterations and in an intense process of dialogue and negotiation, translated the diverse views and interests of Dutch civil society actors into the NAP-WPS-III. As co-coordinator, WO=MEN keeps signatories abreast of activities around WPS through newsletters. Together with MoFA they organise regular signatory events and worked with signatories and MoFA to organise events in New York around the Dutch membership of the UNSC. In addition, WO=MEN compiles and share (confidential) briefs on relevant issues, drawing on intelligence from the civil society community, maintains contact with Country Group chairs and participates in international fora relevant to WPS.

During the period 2016-2018 initially two staff, now 4 (3,5 fte) in the MoFA Task Force Gender Equality and Women's Rights (TFVG) have been highly engaged in implementing UNSCR1325 and collaborating in the context of NAP-WPS-III with all signatories. Unfortunately, MoFA staff changed on multiple occasions, and for considerable time positions were vacant, or filled temporarily. Sometimes staff with other tasks assumed work related to NAP-WPS-III on top of other tasks. Capacity of these dedicated TFVG-staff has been applied to the collaboration with NGO/CSO NAP-WPS-III signatories. First they engaged with the broader community to define NAP-WPS-III and to elaborate a funding framework. Later they mostly engaged with the signatories involved in program consortia funded by MoFA working on M&E frameworks for the programs. Those directly involved in these processes indicate the high level of engagement has been very time consuming. They stress the importance of carefully clarifying and managing mutual expectations as a possibility to reduce time consuming tensions and friction.

Beyond the TFVG several other MoFA staff also actively engages with UNSCR1325 and NAP-WPS-III: for example, the MoFA Colombia desk actively participates in the NAP-WPS-III Colombia Country Group.²⁶ Another good example is the MoFA taskforce for the Dutch membership of the UN Security Council and the UNSC-TaskForce in MoFA who actively engaged around UNSCR1325. Together with WO=MEN, preparatory meetings were organised with the NAP-WPS-III signatories. There was active (and perceived positive) collaboration with WO=MEN and various NAP-WPS-III signatories to jointly influence UN Security Council decisions and make the voice and concerns of women in (post)conflict situations heard at the highest levels. Similar to their colleagues from the TaskForce, these MoFA staff mention it is important to manage mutual expectations.

In the Dutch National Police, the person managing international police missions is very much committed to the WPS agenda. She highly values NAP-WPS-III as a network of NGO expertise and regularly uses it as such. She regularly attends signatory events and works with contacts she develops on such events to work together in specific countries around specific problems. Many gender and conflict professionals in NGO/CSO signatories actively collaborate in the context of MoFA funded consortium programs and Country Groups, and all highly value collaboration with MoFA within the framework of NAP-WPS-III. Several do not benefit from funding, they value the information- and knowledge sharing. For example, representatives from knowledge institutions working in conflict countries with resources obtained through NUFFIC indicated that information sharing with members of Country Groups was useful to them.

²⁶ Feedback from consortium members also indicates HMA-staff is very open to exchange information in for example in South Sudan and Colombia but no HMA interviewees have been interviewed for this MTR

NGO/CSO signatories are most active in country groups. WO=MEN had raised concerns early on about the potential negative influence of consortia development and application for funding on the collaborative dynamic in Country Groups. After the consortia emerged from Country Groups not all transformed into inspiring platforms for information exchange or collective action. The DRC group developed a roadmap for collaborative action but collaboration in the group is limited to exchanging information on the situation in Congo. In the Colombia and Yemen groups active information exchange takes place, but engaged interviewees feel that much can be improved in the way that signatories work together in these groups, particularly in terms of more (pro-)active (policy)influencing.

From the learning event, which mainly involved gender and conflict professionals from funded consortia, it did emerge that there are many shared issues around which collaborative learning and action can happen at country level and across countries. Recent follow-up with country groups by WO=MEN also indicates there is currently more room for collaborative action and the support provide by WO=MEN to the country groups may give a yield in 2019.

Highly engaged NGO/CSO interviewees report very little engagement with MoD and the Dutch Police and none with MoJS or MoECS. Interviewees that did report on collaboration with MoD and/or the Dutch Police were quite positive in terms of the value added. The perceived value added had to do with learning from; with sharing concrete, practical information; and with support provided for example in access to authorities in focus countries. Information exchange and collaboration between some NGO/CSO signatories and MoD and the Dutch Police takes place at country level in particular in relation with Syria and Iraq. Since there are no active NAP-WPS-III Country Groups for these countries, this exchange does not take place within that framework.

The continued engagement of small, volunteer-based CSO's illustrates that NAP-WPS-III adds value for them and there are concrete examples of positive and constructive collaborative action, including outside the scope of the P&S4All funded activities. A recent event organised by Multicultural Women Peacemakers Network (MWPN) on Saturday (sic!) 3 November 2018 suggests that these bridgebuilders very much value learning from each other. Interviewees from this group also systematically indicate that they learn from the support they receive(d) from WO=MEN and from being part of consortia with larger (development) organisations.

Some interviewees of CSO's that actively engage with NAP-WPS-III and that participate in specific Country Groups but are not part of program consortia, feel that they sometimes miss-out on crucial information, in their perception possibly because they are not part of the MoFA funded consortium. The fact that the Country Groups meet during regular working hours and involve travel is mentioned by some individuals from volunteer-based CSO signatories as an additional barrier²⁷. In their view this limits the potential for collective action. Others similarly engaged suggest that such collective action does not emerge from the country groups because the interests represented in the group are too heterogenous and observe that the groups lack a shared influencing or political agenda.

²⁷ Despite the fact that there are some financial resources available to facilitate (participation in) meetings

High individual engagement with UNSCR1325 but little collaborative engagement with NAP-WPS-III community;

Some interviewees expressed high engagement with the implementation of UNSCR1325 but did not perceive collaborative action in the context of NAP-WPS-III to have high value added for a variety of reasons.

MoFA's Directorate of Humanitarian Aid and Stability (MoFA/DSH) has a focal point for gender who is a member of the TFGV (0,5 fte). It's leadership has been very outspoken about the relevance of gender for the work of the department. MoFA/DSH also has an action plan on gender, elaborated in 2016 which is being updated. The departmental plan refers to UNSCR1325 but not to NAP-WPS-III; also at an individual level NAP-WPS-III seems to have little relevance. Other individuals in other departments of MoFA closely collaborate and coordinate with MoD, MoJS and Dutch Police around (post)conflict and peacebuilding in decisions regarding specific foreign missions and secondment of military and civil personnel. Fielding gender experts is a priority for such secondments. While public sector actors actively collaborate around this topic, collaboration with the broader civil society stakeholders of the NAP-WPS community – envisaged in the NAP-WPS-III document - is not being mentioned by relevant interviewees.

The MoD Gender Advisor who is fully dedicated to implementing UNSCR1325, indicated that her key priority was to develop and implement an organisation-wide training program to increase gender awareness and gender-related skills in a broad sense. For this training MoD plans to draw on work done by NATO and peers. The knowledge institutions MoD plans to work with according to the Defence Action Plan 1325, are not NAP-WPS-III signatories²⁸ and no NAP signatories are mentioned.

There are also NGO/CSO signatories that have a high engagement with UNSCR1325 but less collaborative engagement with the NAP-WPS-III community for other reasons. An example is Dutch Moluccan Women for Peace, an organisation that brings together Christian and Muslim women of Moluccan descent that live in the Netherlands. They engaged in conflict prevention and mediation activities in peacebuilding in The Netherlands around 2000, trying to counter replication and amplification of tensions in Indonesia in Moluccan communities in The Netherlands. Later, with technical and financial support from another NAP signatory and others²⁹, they engaged in peacebuilding work with women in Indonesia itself. For them, NAP-WPS-III with its strict focus on eight countries offers them less value added than its predecessors. The same applies to women peace activist working on Palestine and some other geographies. Another example could be the gender specialist of a larger NGO: they are a signatory working in conflict and reconstruction and she sometimes attends signatory events but is not otherwise active in NAP-WPS-III because she has not enough time to commit to other ways of participating.

²⁸ Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations and the Roméo Dallaire Institute that works on child soldiers

²⁹ Among them the Municipality of Ridderkerk

Formal organisational engagement, occasional individual engagement with UNSCR1325 and no engagement with NAP-WPS-III.

MoFA's overall policy document for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (BHOS Policy Note) explicitly mentions UNSCR1325, as does the policy document on security (Geïntegreerde Buitenland- en Veiligheidsstrategie 2018-2022). Internal reports suggest in all relevant MoFA departments activities are undertaken related to UNSCR1325. However, MoFA has no organisational action plan to implement UNSCR1325.

The Directorate of Humanitarian Aid and Stability (DSH) has an action plan on gender, elaborated in 2016 but the plan does not make any reference to NAP-WPS-III and it has not been actively monitored. Possibly gender mainstreaming or UNSCR1325 action plans exist for other departments but they were not mentioned or reviewed in the context of this MTR. An interviewee suggested mainstreaming is the standard on MoFA and "everyone knows that gender needed to be mainstreamed in all work". However, others disagreed and said gender was not at all systematically addressed ("no priority, not relevant to my responsibilities, no time"). A few years ago IOB concluded that a lot of work remained to be done to actually systematically mainstream gender in all work related to (post)conflict and peacebuilding. This may very well still be the case.

The majority of the MoFA professionals working in the field of (post) conflict and peacebuilding in MoFA that were interviewed and/or responded to the survey indicated that NAP-WPS-III or collaboration in the context of NAP-WPS-III had no immediate relevance to their work. This includes those who were official gender focal points for their field³⁰. MoFA staff following this pattern of engagement do not attend signatory events or otherwise engage in collaboration in the context of NAP-III-WPS.

MoD has a formal plan for implementing UNSCR1325 but little capacity is dedicated to actually doing so and while there are champions, there is also still resistance to diversity and WPS related issues. Interviewees in MoD that are engaged with implementing UNSCR1325, suggest that on an individual basis there are several connections with individual members of the NAP-WPS community and that expertise is occasionally shared. MoD representatives did not participate in more recent signatory events. It was mentioned by someone in MoD directly involved that MoD had not yet progressed in such a way with the implementation of UNSCR1325 that they were in position to share anything substantive experience or leaning relevant to the rest of the NAP-WPS-III community.

The Ministry of Justice and Security (MoJS) is also a formal signatory to NAP-WPS-III and shares responsibilities for implementation of UNSCR1325. Respondents from this ministry mentioned that "gender/women is only one of many topics we deal with" also saying "there is simply no time for participating in NAP activities". They see the relevance of NAP-WPS-III and collaboration when it comes to contributing to peacekeeping but other elements of UNSCR1325 and NAP-WPS-III are not perceived to be a priority or relevant.

³⁰ A situation that could change over time as out of the three focal points interviewed, two had less than 2 months in this role.

Similarly, the Ministry of Culture, Education and Science (MoECS) is also a signatory. Like MoJS, staff of MoECS participates in signatory events but usually does not engage in more concrete collaboration because they find it difficult to translate what happens in the context of NAP-WPS-III to their challenges, priorities and responsibilities.

MoECS has traditionally a strong engagement with the non-discrimination and gender equality policy agenda in the Netherlands and coordinates the Dutch efforts related to CEDAW which includes a paragraph on women, peace and security. In the Emancipatie Monitor 2018 a chapter is dedicated to differences between women and girls in the Netherlands with different ethnic backgrounds and data on education and labour market participation over time are presented³¹. MoECS feels it has not extensively engaged with UNSCR1325 and NAP-WPS-III because the international focus of the NAP and the activities in conflict contexts in the eight focus countries do not easily connect with or translate into action or learning that is relevant to its mandate in The Netherlands. Several signatories have flagged that the fact that MoFA funding is limited to the work in the eight countries³², does not mean that the overall geographic scope of NAP-WPS-III is strictly limited to these countries. They state they actively work on UNSCR1325 in the Netherlands and/or link work on WPS in other countries in the global south with their work in the Netherlands. In doing so they see various opportunities for translation of UNSCR1325 into a variety of Dutch policies, for example when it comes to protection of refugees where the NVR has drafted a manifest that links CEDAW, The Istanbul Convention and UNSCR1325. This suggests that there is potential to translate UNSCR1325 and NAP-WPS-III more directly to the mandates of MoECS and MoJS.

Formal, organisational engagement combined with little individual engagement with UNSCR1325 and NAP-WPS-III can also be found in larger development and peacebuilding NGO's. One interviewee of a signatory organisation (as such formally committed to NAP-WPS-III) literally said that "it would be very hard to engage with my humanitarian colleagues around UNSCR1325" and a peacebuilding generalist in another NGO was completely unaware (and did not believe) the NGO actually was a signatory to NAP-WPS-III as an organisation.

All knowledge institutions among the signatories are mostly formally committed to NAP-WPS-III but show low levels of actual engagement. Very few individuals from this group participate in Country Groups or attend signatory events, not perceiving any value added. Again for many individuals WPS and gender is one of many issues and dimensions their work deals with.

Conclusions

Numerical participation NAP-WPS-III has increased in terms of signatories. While all signatory organisations commit to UNSCR1325 and NAP-WPS-III, actual engagement may vary among signatories but also within organisations at department and individual levels. Differences among signatories can be explained by the diversity of the signatory community. Different levels of engagement within signatory organisations require additional analysis.

³¹ Emancipatiemonitor 2018 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) en Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP) Den Haag 2018

³² And the four countries added under the P4All funding

The highest level of individual collaborative engagement with NAP-WPS-III can be found among NGO/CSO consortium members and MoFA staff with a specific assignment in the field of gender. Here, collaborative action seems to generate important value added for all involved.

Individuals in some organisations signatory to NAP-WPS-III have a high level of commitment to the WPS agenda but do not perceive value added by engaging in collaborative work with other signatories, or only on very specific topics with few signatories. Individuals may also turn to others outside the NAP-WPS-III community for collaborative relationships.

Even when their organisation is signatory to NAP-WPS-III and in some cases mandated to implement UNSCR1325, at individual levels many staff of larger signatories working on conflict-related issues may show limited engagement with the WPS agenda and NAP-WPS-III. Lack of relevance for immediate priorities and time and capacity constraints are most often mentioned as reasons not to engage in (collaboration around) UNSCR1325 and NAP-WPS-III. Specifically for some volunteer-based organisations, timing and travel costs are an issue.

An obstacle for implementation of UNSCR1325 and collaboration to that effect could be that MoFA, MoJS and MoECS do not have their own organisational action plan to implement and put UNSCR1325 into practice. General references are made in current MoFA policy documents, but these require translation in concrete departmental plans as part of an overall MoFA organisational implementation plan for UNSCR1325. Implementation plans for UNSCR1325 in each ministry would not only strengthen the organisational engagement of and the individual accountability within these signatories, but it would also make it easier for others, including civil society organisations to forge collaborative relationships with them.

For MoECS and MoJS there is scope to more actively engage with NAP-WPS-III by translating the WPS agenda, UNSCR1325 and related resolution into goals and activities relevant to their mandates. Several signatories identified relevant topics that connect the realities of (post)conflict countries in the south with The Netherlands and that provide scope for a much stronger link between UNSCR1325 and the WPS agenda and the mandates of MoJS and MoECS. Examples are – including some already mentioned in NAP-WPS-III – gender and radicalisation and extremism, specific gender-based violence, harmful gender norms and practices that affect men and women in refugee and immigrant communities in The Netherlands, but also women's involvement in the mediation of conflicts and tensions within and among different ethnic groups.

Chapter 5 Conclusions and recommendations

The purpose of this Mid Term Review of the *National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security* (NAP-WPS-III) is to assess progress and make recommendations for the last year of NAP-WPS-III and feed into policy discussions for the future of WPS policies

On 8 March 2016 signatories presented a *Third National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security – A partnership to contribute to the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda*. Among the signatories were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Ministry of Justice and Security (MoJS) and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (MoECS), WO=MEN and a group of over 50 Dutch NGOs, CSOs and knowledge institutions. NAP-WPS-III covers the period 2016-2019.

The Netherlands has been ahead and inclusive in promoting implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 through a broad partnership of civil society organisations and the government combined with an allocation of resources. This allocation of a substantial amount financial resources for WPS-programming illustrates the Dutch commitment goes beyond words.

Compared to its predecessors, NAP-WPS-III is innovative, incorporating a strong Theory of Change for sustainable peace and security for everyone, a ToC that is supported by a broad range of stakeholders. A strong emphasis is put on a gendered analysis of conflict and on learning and (information) exchange in country-specific groups.

Unlike other national action plans to implement UNSCR1325, the Dutch plan strictly focusses on fostering collaborative spaces and - action among public and private actors towards the plan's goals. Other plans usually include a comprehensive set of actions covering governmental responsibilities for the implementation of UNSCR1325. While innovative in its collaborative nature, this focus on collaborative action implies that the "National Action Plan", de facto only covers a part of Dutch governmental action towards implementation of UNSCR1325. Using it as a strategic umbrella, NAP-WPS-III, the Dutch Ministry of Defence developed a public, institutional action a plan for implementing UNSCR1325, but other governmental signatories (MoFA, MoECS and MoJS) do not have such plans.

NAP-WPS-III is broadly supported by signatories and significant achievements have been realised. It also has features that limit its effectiveness. Perspectives of signatories on its identity vary: is it an plan for collaborative action, a strategic umbrella, a community, a funding framework or a combination of (some of) these? These different perceptions generate different expectations. Also, the dynamics related to different identities may collide. As a funding framework NAP-WPS-III generates at times (competitive) dynamics that interfere with the collaboration, learning and exchange that takes place in the community.

NAP-WPS-III has no progress indicators that are systematically monitored and there is no overall M&E system. Also, while signatories pledge to a partnership and an action plan, the pledge does not include a responsibility to report to co-signatories on relevant action undertaken. This limits accountability within and among signatories. Country programmes funded by MoFA under the plan do each have their indicators and M&E systems, and recipients of grants are accountable to MoFA.

Important achievements can be highlighted in the context of WPS-NAP-III. Because there are no indicators and base line data agreed in the NAP-WPS-III and no consolidated reports, it is difficult to draw conclusions on progress towards objectives. However, it is clear from the (qualitative) data collected for this MTR that NAP-WPS-III has added value by triggering and funding collaborative programming that is relevant, that draws on lessons learned in the past and potentially adds value. Programs funded not only promise to yield interesting results but can also be expected to generate important knowledge around women, peace and security.

In terms of relevance, the country groups and consortia are diverse group of organisations that currently work together would probably not have done so without NAP. Also, many signatories praise NAP as a community, a valuable network that allows one to access relevant gender expertise. Several examples show how such connections lead to effective action. Indeed, NAP-WPS-III has triggered effective collaborative action at the level of the UN and in focus countries. Many activities involve collaboration between NGO/CSO signatories, their programme partners and MoFA. Other ministries and knowledge institutions that are signatory, seem to be less involved in collaborative initiatives under NAP-WPS-III. At the same time MoFA and other ministries develop also collaborative action on WPS outside the framework of NAP-WPS-III.

Numerical participation of NAP-WPS-III has increased in terms of signatories. While all signatory organisations commit to UNSCR1325 and NAP-WPS-III, actual engagement may vary among signatories but also within organisations at department and individual levels.

Working in consortia has a cost but seems to add value. Small Dutch grassroots and volunteer-based organisations are included in only two of the NAP program consortia, where they seem to complement and challenge the work on the WPS agenda of large development NGO's and public actors and connect it with diverse Dutch communities. Both MoFA WO=MEN and the NGO/CSO consortia have invested considerable time and (human)resources into an effective start-up of operations given the wide range of partners, and working on sensitive issues like SGBV, gender in a context of (post)conflict.

Small grants for activities of diaspora organisations in the South seemingly continue to be a good investment. The establishment of the P&S4All Initiative acknowledges this and shows the willingness of MoFA and WO=MEN to overcome challenges faced by these organisations. Further reflection on the management of such grants is required.

Coordinated evaluation of all the consortia programs should yield interesting knowledge about specific country strategies but can also generate more generic lessons across the portfolio about the relevance of the ToC, monitoring practices and some cross cutting issues.

To date, only the Ministry of Defence has drawn on NAP-WPS-III to translate it in an organisational level action plan. An obstacle for implementation of UNSCR1325 and collaboration to that effect could be that MoFA, MoJS and MoECS do not have their own organisational action plan to implement and put UNSCR1325 into practice. Implementation plans for UNSCR1325 in each ministry would not only strengthen the concrete organisational engagement of and the individual accountability within these signatories, but it would also make it easier for others, including civil society organisations, to forge collaborative relationships with them and/or hold them accountable to implementing UNSCR1325.

For MoECS and MoJ&V there is potential for more active engagement with NAP-WPS-III by translating the WPS agenda, UNSCR1325 and related resolution into goals and activities relevant to their mandates. Several signatories identified relevant topics that connect the realities of (post)conflict countries in the south with The Netherlands and that provide scope for a much stronger link between UNSCR1325 and the WPS agenda and the mandates of MoJS and MoECS.

Recommendations

Drawing on the findings, this MTR makes recommendations to signatories in five areas:

1. Extension of NAP-WPS-III until 2022, untangling and reinforcing its roles
2. Funding NAP-WPS
3. Collaboration and learning around WPS
4. Implementing UNSCR1325
5. Monitoring and accountability
6. Preparations for NAP-WPS-IV

1. Extension of NAP-WPS-III until 2022 untangling and reinforcing its roles

The ToC underlying NAP-WPS-III is relevant and broadly supported. It is comprehensive and can be expected to have continued relevance beyond 2019, the formal end date of NAP-WPS-III.

The different perceptions about what NAP-WPS-III does and does not represent, and what roles it has, require clarification. NAP can have three connected but different roles:

- I. A community, a space for exchange, learning and collaborative action on WPS among all stakeholders
- II. A framework for funding work on WPS by Dutch NGO/CSOs
- III. A collective, strategic umbrella for collaborative action between all stakeholders and for Governmental organizational level action plans to implement UNSCR1325.

As a framework for funding NAP has worked well. As a community and collaborative space, NAP-WPS-III can further develop, particularly if the interference of the dynamics of a funding call with the dynamics of collaborative learning and -action is minimised. As a strategic umbrella for governmental action plans, NAP-WPS-III is under-utilised. In addition to a solid portfolio of MoFA funded and NGO/CSO implemented programs, planned and monitored implementation of UNSCR1325 from the part of government entities responsible is needed. This includes mainstreaming of WPS in all relevant policies and operations, as well as coordinated and documented collective learning and collaboration in the Dutch WPS community.

The current MoFA funding frameworks based on NAP-WPS-III expires at the end of 2019. For the programs, continuity is important. A new call that allows activities to start early 2020 is recommended. The ToC of NAP-WPS-III can serve as a basis for such a call.

Given the continued relevance of the ToC, NAP-WPS-III it is recommended to extend it until 2022 and serve as a strategic umbrella for funding, collaborative action and – learning, and organization-level action planning.

If the new funding framework were to cover 2020 – 2024, NAP-WPS-III would formally expire half way. This leaves time to develop a new “umbrella” NAP-WPS-IV while the programs are ongoing

All signatories: Extend NAP-WPS-III and continue to work with the vision, objective, goals and generic outputs embodied in NAP-WPS-III at least until 2022. As an umbrella, this extended NAP-WPS-III can:

- serve as a basis for a new 2020-2024 MoFA funding calls to be issued in 2019 and 2020 (PS4All) for future WPS programming by NGO/CSOs;
- guide continued collaborative learning and action involving all NAP-WPS-III signatories;
- be used by government entities as a shared, strategic framework that guides the development of organisation level UNSCR1325 implementation plans.

All signatories: support the NAP-WPS-III coordinators in tracking progress in implementation in of NAP-WPS-III by sharing on an annual basis information on activities and outcomes specified in NAP-WPS-III, particularly activities undertaken in collaboration with one or more other signatories.

MoFA and WO=MEN: based on information provided by signatories compile public annual reports on progress in the collaborative implementation of UNSCR1325 from 2019 onwards. Outcomes listed in the current plan would be the reference. A report (and a public discussion) would enhance accountability within, and among signatories regarding the pledges their organisations have made to work towards UNSCR1325 in the context of NAP-WPS-III.

MoFA, MoECS and MoJS: develop organization-wide action plans to implement UNSCR1325

2. Funding NAP-WPS

The three roles or identities of NAP require different types of funding. It is important to differentiate between (a) funding for WPS related NGO/CSO program implementation in conflict countries and (b) funding for coordinated, WPS related collaborative learning and exchange among a broad community of Dutch stakeholders.

Currently MoFA funds WPS related NGO/CSO programs under the NAP-WPS-III funding framework. Also, gender and women are a consideration in other MoFA funding frameworks. Several signatories also receive funding for WPS-work from other (private) sources.

Looking forward throughout the remainder of NAP-WPS-III and the following period, specific recommendations on funding can be made:

(a) MoFA funding for WPS related NGO/CSO program implementation in focus/conflict countries

MoFA: Where required to achieve goals, extend in a budget neutral way all NAP-WPS-III funded programs (8 countries and the small diaspora consortia) until mid-2020 as the start of many programs was delayed.

MoFA: In consultation with the NGO/CSO community, MoFA should draw a new framework and issue a call for medium size programs in 2019 and one for small scale actions in the countries of origin of Dutch diaspora women's organisations in 2020. The most important difference would be extending the duration of these medium size programs that can be submitted to 5 years. Small programs should be min. 2 years. Collective learning and collaboration in the WPS community will benefit if the resource allocation process is transparent and swift.

The continuity this creates is important. If MoFA were to wait with a new call for the focus countries until all current programs are evaluated, or radically change the framework, there will be ruptures that may endanger results of the current phase. To build-in flexibility and accountability, NGO/CSO consortia can be invited to submit programs for 5 year grants starting 1 January 2020 with a clause that after 24 months programs can be required to adapt or phase out if independent evaluations of previous and ongoing activities show that program strategies lack relevance or do not yield results. Incentives to promote collaboration between large development organisations and smaller Dutch and southern partners should remain incorporated in the framework. In their proposals, consortia should build in work they will do in the NL with a wider group of NAP-WPS-III signatories working in their country that supports and widens their implementation on the ground.

A new call for small grants (cf PS4All) can be issued in 2020. Drawing lessons of the experience with PS4All, reflection on more nimble management of that call is required. This would generate efficiencies for the grant maker as well as for the grant recipient. Also, it should be considered to outsource grant-making to an independent external grant manager (i.e. an actor not involved in the NAP-WPS-III) with experience in making small grants to Dutch (volunteer-based) CSO's. Mandatory consortia (particularly consortia involving activities in multiple countries) are not recommended and would not be needed if procedures are more nimble and grant management is outsourced.

MoFA: Ensure that the (renewed) availability of funding for WPS under NAP-WPS, does not preclude such work is supported and encouraged under new iterations of FLOW or Strategic Partnership Funding.

(b) Funding for coordinated, WPS related collaborative learning and exchange among a broad group of Dutch stakeholders

Collaborative learning and exchange requires resources: staff resources to organise and document events, financial resources to develop and publish documents capturing lessons learned, and – when foreign partners are involved – travel. Face-to-face events often prompt spontaneous learning, at the same time the amount of resources invested in bringing people together needs to be in balance with the resources invested in documenting and disseminating the lessons shared.

MoFA: continue to fund collaborative learning and exchange as well as documentation and dissemination of lessons learned through WO=MEN who seem well positioned to coordinate and accompany the WPS community in this (see also recommendations on collaboration, learning and exchange below)

WO=MEN: beyond public resources, explore possibilities for additional (private) resources to support collaborative learning and exchange around NAP-WPS

3. Collaboration, learning, and exchange

MoFA and WO=MEN: Coordinators should continue to support the existing eight Country Groups. MoFA could internally promote participation of relevant staff (where that is lacking) while WO=MEN to continues the work with chairs.

It seems there is no standard recipe for a well-functioning group other than that a terms of reference or formally agreed arrangements, plans and priorities for action among the main stakeholders help structure the work of the Country Groups. All chairs should be encouraged to develop such terms of reference with their group. MoFA and WO=MEN should clarify if financial resources can be made available to support initiatives of groups³³ and how these resources can be accessed. If there is interest, coordinators could help group members to use virtual tools for learning and exchange (which can be as basic as web-conferencing, an e-survey, recorded webinars, a Linked-In group etc.).

Besides groups focussing on specific countries, MoFA and WO=MEN should investigate if there is interest in specific thematic groups

Consortia partners: generously share information without dominating discussions in discussion groups.

All signatories: Part of pledging to NAP is helping the coordinators plan relevant collaborative activities. As a token of their commitment, signatories should specify (in a one-pager) how they intend to contribute to forward the WPS agenda for the remainder of the extended duration of NAP-WPS-III (2019-2022) and indicate what kind of collaborative action they want to invest time and resources in during that period.

All signatories: Pledging towards an action plan is a commitment to act. Pledging towards a partnership is a commitment to inform your partners about your action. All signatories should annually submit to the coordinators a succinct report on relevant (collaborative) action they have developed and what learning they have participated in. MoFA could for example share its report to the UNSG with the NAP community. NGO/CSO's and other stakeholders can draw on information they compile for annual reports. This information would serve as a basis for the coordinators publish and annual report (see above).

WO=MEN and MoFA: For the period 2019-2022, map learning and exchange interests and needs and plan ahead for a mix of small thematic and larger networking events in 2019 and 2020. Ensure adequate funds and capacities are allocated to organise the events

³³ If no resources are available, some should be allocated.

WO=MEN and MoFA and relevant signatories: explore collaboration with the Knowledge platform for Security and Rule of Law (KPSRL) for example through a joint event or publication.

MoFA, Knowledge Institutes and NGO/CSO signatories: invest time and resources in systematically synthesizing and publishing lessons-learned on WPS-issues: not only from past NAP portfolios but also from other gender and conflict related portfolios (Addressing Root Causes-ARC, Stabiliteitsfonds, Strategic Partnerships, FLOW, DRA-funding etc.)

4. Implementing UNSCR1325

This is the MTR of NAP-WPS-III, which only covers a part of the effort by the Dutch government to implement UNSCR1325. MoD used NAP-WPS-III to guide the development of its own, organisational plan. At the same time this NAP-WPS-III has often been presented as the national action plan for UNSCR1325. This ambiguity is not helpful to further implementation of UNSCR1325.

MoFA and MoD: To avoid confusion and promote accountability and transparency, MoFA and MoD should both have their own organisational plan to implement UNSCR1325. Based on the ToC of NAP-WPS the entities can analyse what capacities, resources, attitudes, beliefs, laws and (internal) policies are required to move ahead the WPS agenda within their organisations and how they, individually or through collaborative action, wish to influence other actors. For **MoFA** this plan would entail systematic mainstreaming of gender in conflict prevention, resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery (CPRPRR) in all work of departments involved.

NGO/CSO signatories that have a mission broader than WPS: it enhances credibility and effectiveness of the work of these organisations if, using the NAP-WPS-III ToC, they plan for systematic mainstreaming of gender and the WPS agenda in conflict prevention, resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery (CPRPRR) in all work of departments involved.

MoJS, MoECS, WO=MEN and relevant NGO/CSOs: discuss connections between (post)conflicts situations in the South and The Netherlands and analyse how the commitments of UNSCR1325 affect realities of women and girls in the Netherlands for example those with a refugee/migration background. Ideally this would lead to concrete, comprehensive plans outlining how each ministry will strive to implement UNSCR1325 and the WPS agenda in collaboration with civil society.

5. Monitoring, accountability and governance

Accountability and monitoring arrangements are different in a funding relationship, compared to those that govern a space for collaborative learning, exchange and action. But irrespective of the differences, in all its roles NAP-WPS-III runs the risk of becoming irrelevant, ineffective and inefficient if it is not monitored and governed based on information regarding progress. Synergies in monitoring and governance can be achieved if the differences are made explicit.

MoFA, MoD, MoECS, WO=MEN and other signatories: Establish a High Level Steering Committee with an equal number of statutory public and civil society representatives to meet twice per year to:

- Reflect, consolidate learning and adapt the overall strategic framework and ToC for promoting WPS; and
- Govern NAP-WPS as a space for collaboration, learning and exchange, deciding on activity plans and budgets for this role.

In addition **Government signatories** are to commit to present in the Steering Committee (updates on) their organisational priorities and action plans, enabling civil society – in an advisory role - to give feedback, allow for potential linking and alignment, and collaborate.

The Steering Committee could delegate WO=MEN clearly defined tasks (and corresponding resources) to actually manage the space for collaboration, learning and exchange between signatories. As part of their pledge to NAP-WPS, signatories commit to provide to WO=MEN relevant information to be able undertake this role.

MoFA, MoD and WO=MEN: drawing on indicators used by the UN Secretary General, in the context of the EU and NATO, the indicators used in MoFA funded NGO/CSO programmes and the work of UNWOMEN, compile as a common reference set of sample indicators for the ten outcomes and the three goals of the NAP-WPS-III ToC.

6. Preparing for NAP-WPS- IV (2022-2027)

In 2021, the experience gained with organisational implementation plans of UNSCR1325 of **MoFA, MoECS, MoD, MoJS**, and the documented and synthesised learnings from the NAP-WPS-II and III activities and program portfolios can inform the development of a new strategic framework for WPS together with **WO=MEN** and all interested signatories. It would be innovative if – through ICTs or otherwise, southern actors particularly women's organisations could provide inputs towards the strategizing process

Meanwhile **all signatories**, after MoFA resources are again allocated by the end of 2019, use the following years for continued learning and planning of strategic collaboration, influencing, exchange and learning activities with aim of informing enhanced inputs for NAP-WPS-IV.

In preparing for NAP-WPS-IV, **all signatories and knowledge institutions that were engaged in WPS-NAP-I to III:** In the course of 2019 reflect and dialogue on how reengage with knowledge institutions; consider investing in a coordinated virtual resource platform (involving WOTRO, NUFFIC, Clingendael, IDLO and other members of KPSRL).

Annex 1 – List of NAP-WPS-III signatories

African Sky
Atria - Kennisinstituut voor emancipatie en vrouwengeschiedenis
Burundian Women for Peace and Development (BWPD)
CARE Nederland
CENDDOW
Center for Civil Society and Democracy - CCSD
Cordaid
Defensie Vrouwen Netwerk
Denis Mukwege Foundation
Dorcas
Eirene
EP Nuffic
FADHAF
Fem4All
Gender Concerns International
GPPAC Foundation
Health Works (voorheen HealthNet TPO)
Hivos
Human Security Collective
ICCO Cooperation
Impact
Karama Europe
Karin Verbaken Consultora (WILPF)
Kompass
Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen (KIT)
Mensen met een Missie
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken
Ministerie van Defensie
Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap
Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie
MUCOP
Muslims for Progressive Values
MWPN
Nederlandse Vereniging voor vrouwenbelangen, Vrouwenarbeid en Gelijk Staatsburgerschap
Nederlandse Vrouwenraad
NIMD
Oudere Vrouwen Netwerk Nederland (OVN-NL)
Oxfam Novib
Palestine Link
PAX
Peace Brigades International
Plan Nederland
Platform Vrouwen Duurzame Vrede

Politie
Rights4 change
Save the Children
Sawa
Saxion University Applied Sciences
SNV
SSWAN
STAD
Stichting Cleopatra
Stichting DR Congo à la Carte
Stichting Kefeya
Stichting Misa
Stichting Mukomeze
Stichting Somba Manyu
Stichting Sundjata
Stichting VOND
Stichting wadi
Syrian Female Journalists Network
Syrische Vrouwen in Nederland SVNL
The Hague Academy for Local Governance
TIYE INTERNATIONAL
Unie van de Soroptimistclubs in Nederland, Suriname en Curacao
Universiteit Utrecht - Centre for Conflict Studies
UNOY peacebuilders
Vluchtelingen Organisaties Nederland
Voice of Afghan Women
Vrouwen voor Vrede op de Molukken
War Child
WECF
WO=MEN
Women's Initiatives Network
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Dutch Section (WILPF NL)
Yemen organization for women's policy
YWCA-NL
ZAAD - Syrische Jeugd Forum
ZOA

Annex 2 – NAP-WPS-III goals, outcomes and planned activities

<i>I. Better protect women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations against violence and violations of their rights</i>	
<i>II.</i>	
I-1	Increased capacities, skills, knowledge and resources for meaningful participation of women in security and justice sector development
I-1.1	Inform government actors in the Netherlands and the focus countries about context-specific best practices and barriers to women's meaningful participation
I-1.2	Connect justice and defence actors in the focus countries with Dutch defence actors to exchange context-specific best practices and knowledge on the barriers to women's meaningful participation
I-1.3	Support training courses on protecting women for police and other security sector actors in the focus countries
I-1.4	Include women's CSOs in the implementation of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Rule of Law (RoL) programmes in the focus countries
I-1.5	Advocate gender-sensitive SSR and women's participation in it
I-1.6	Encourage the inclusion of gender expertise in Dutch civilian and military contributions to international missions
I-2	Increased understanding of gender-based violence and ways of protecting women from it
I-2.1	Conduct context-specific research on gender-based violence
I-2.2	Share knowledge on gender-based violence with policymakers
I-2.3	Exchange knowledge on context-specific gender-based violence and ways of protecting women from it
I-2.4	Support women human rights defenders (WHRD)
I-2.5	Organise and facilitate public events in the Netherlands and focus countries on conflict-related and context-specific genderbased violence and ways of protecting women from it
I-2.6	Conduct online campaigns in the focus countries on genderbased violence and ways of protecting women from it
I-3	Improved (implementation of) policies and regulations on gender-based violence and ways of protecting women from it
I-3.1	Exchange knowledge on policies and regulations on genderbased violence and ways of protecting women from it with local CSO partners in the focus countries
I-3.2	Encourage (the implementation of) legislation in the focus countries on gender-based violence and ways of protecting women from it
I-3.3	Coordinate signatories' interventions on gender-based violence and ways of protecting women from it through a country strategy

<i>II. Subvert harmful underlying gender norms, which are obstacles to sustainable peace</i>	
II-1	Increased capacity, skills, knowledge and resources for gender equity
II-1.1	Exchange best practices and knowledge on subverting harmful gender norms
II-1.2	Gather data, promote and disseminate research on the impact of harmful gender norms on peace and security
II-1.3	Conduct gender-specific conflict analysis in the focus countries
II-2	Increased understanding of gender equality and gender norms
II-2.1	Facilitate knowledge sharing between signatories from civil society, their local CSO partners and policymakers on gender equality and gender norms
II-2.2	Facilitate knowledge sharing on the variety of gender roles and ways of avoiding gender stereotyping
II-2.3	Redesign the Action Plan website to enable exchange of knowledge and best practices on gender equality and gender norms
II-2.4	Develop and facilitate pre-deployment training courses on gender equality and context-specific gender norms
II-2.5	Share knowledge and expertise on gender equality and gender norms with civilian experts (civilian capacity)
II-2.6	Integrate a thorough analysis of gender equality, gender norms and masculinities into all programmes
II-2.7	Plan and facilitate public events in the focus countries to showcase local expertise on gender equality and gender norms
II-3	Increased involvement of men and boys in implementing legislation that contributes to gender equality
II-3.1	Encourage the use of a masculinity perspective in the implementation of legislation in the focus countries
II-3.2	Include men and boys in developing and implementing legislative programmes
II-3.3	Support male role models who contribute to gender equality and subvert harmful gender norms
<i>III. Ensure that women have equal leverage in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery at all levels, and that their efforts are acknowledged and supported</i>	
III-1	Increased capacity, skills, knowledge and resources for women's meaningful participation as agents of change in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery
III-1.1	Exchange knowledge and experience on women's participation in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery
III-1.2	Include the voices and perspectives of women's organisations and women human rights defenders in pre-deployment training courses

III-1.3	Establish and/or contribute to a common database of Women, Peace and Security experts
III-1.4	Use capacity building programmes to introduce local CSO partners, such as women's organisations and women human rights defenders, to political decision-making processes
III-1.5	Coordinate diplomatic and advocacy efforts for women's meaningful participation in the country strategies
III-1.6	Contribute to the visibility of role models working on the local implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda
III-2	Increase political will, awareness, knowledge and skills for inclusive and non-violent conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery
III-2.1	Gather information on local inclusive and non-violent conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery
III-2.2	Exchange knowledge and best practices on non-violent conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery
III-2.3	Raise awareness in focus country governments of the importance (and cost-effectiveness) of non-violent conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery
III-3.1	Stronger local non-violent strategies for and approaches to conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery, which are incorporated into policies and legislation
III-3.1.1	Share examples and good practices with governments on including non-violent local strategies in laws and policies
III-3.1.2	Raise awareness of the usefulness for laws and policies of local non-violent strategies for and approaches to conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery
III-3.1.3	Monitor and address CVE and counterterrorist policies to avoid undermining gender equality and women's organisations in the focus countries
III-3.1.4	Encourage the integration of local non-violent strategies for and approaches to conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery into peace agreements and new laws and policies
III-3.1.5	Contribute to the visibility of role models working on the local implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda
III-3.2	Improved (implementation of) policies and legislation promoting women's participation in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery
III-3.2.1	Exchange information and best practices on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and follow-up resolutions
III-3.2.2	Exchange experiences and views on (the implementation of) policies and legislation that will increase women's participation in the focus countries
III-3.2.3	Press for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and follow-up resolutions through diplomacy and advocacy in the focus countries and multilateral organisations like the EU and UN

Annex 3 – Documents consulted³⁴

Author	Title	Subtitle	Editor	Year
Hanke Nube	Mid-term review of the Dutch National Action Plan on UNSC Resolution 1325 (2012-2015)		1325 Dutch NAP Partnership	2014
	Sparks of Change	Inspirational stories from men and women working on Women, Peace and Security	1325 Dutch NAP Partnership	2015
	National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security 2016-2019	A Partnership to contribute to the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda	1325 Dutch NAP Partnership	2016
WO=MEN, Cordaid & VON	NAP1325 Pilot Fund 2014 'Small Seeds for Big Baobabs	Inhoudelijke Project rapportage Pilotfonds 2014-2016	1325 Dutch NAP Partnership	2016
	Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of the Netherlands	CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/6	CEDAW	2016
Wil Portegijs en Marion van den Brakel	Emancipatiemonitor 2018		CBS and SCP	2018
Lau Schulpen	The NGO Funding Game	The case of The Netherlands	CIDIN	2016
Mariska van Beijnum	Between a Rock and a Hard Place	Monitoring and evaluation in situations of conflict	Clingendael	2018
	Revised indicators for the Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security	12525/16 - DEVGEN 205	Council of European Union	2016
	Third Report on the EU Indicators for the Comprehensive Approach to the EU Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security	14692/17	Council of European Union	2017
	Council Conclusions on Women, Peace and Security	3662nd Meeting 10 December 2018	Council of European Union	2018
	Council Conclusions - Women, Peace and Security - 2018	15086/18 - Adoption EU Strategic Approach to WPS	Council of European Union	2018
	UK NATIONAL ACTION PLAN on WPS		DFID, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, MoD of UK	2016

³⁴ This table only lists public document. In addition confidential documents and project reports for MoFA funded projects were consulted

Lydia Stone and Anna Parke	Midline Report - UK Action Plan On Women Peace and Security		DFID and SDD	2016
	Joining Forces to Break the Cycle of Violence Against Women	Dutch NGO Shadow Report on the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combatting violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention)	Dutch CEDAW Network	2018
various authors	UNSCR 1325 IN EUROPE	20 case studies of implementation	EPLO	2013
	Refreshing Indicators for the EU's Women, Peace and Security Policy Brussels	Civil Society Dialogue Network Meeting Report Expert Policy Workshop:	EPLO	2015
Laura Davies	Kissing the frog: Gender equality in EU conflict prevention and other fairy tales		EPLO	2018
	Informing the new UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security	written submission	Gender Action for Peace and Security	2017
	Canada's National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security 2017-2022	The implementation plans	Government of Canada	
Bronagh Hinds and Debbie Donnelly	Mid Term Review of Ireland's second National Action plan on Women Peace and Security 2015-2018		Government of Ireland	2017
	Evaluation the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism		Inspectorate for Security and Justice	2017
Barbara Miller, Milad Pournik, and Aisling Swaine	WPS through UNSCR 1325:	Literature Review, Content Analysis of National Action Plans, and Implementation	Institute for Global International Studies	2014
Marie O'Reilly, Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, and Thania Paffenholz,	Reimagining Peacemaking:	Women's Roles in Peace Processes	International Peace Insitute	2015
Rosan Smits and Paul G. de Nooijer	Gender, peace and security	Evaluation of the Netherlands and UN Security Council resolution 1325	IOB	2015
Paul G. de Nooijer and Kirsten Mastwijk	Gender sense & sensitivity	Policy evaluation on women's rights and gender equality (2007-2014)	IOB	2015
	Summary Report Workshop on UNSCR 1325 National Action Plans		M0FA The Netherlands, EEAS, EPLO, WO=MEN, IIS	2016
	Final Report Future Force Conference 2017	From partnerships to ecosystems: combining our efforts for a more secure world	MoD	2017

	Brief aan Tweede Kamer betr. IOB Beleidsdoorlichting "Gender Sense and Sensitivity"	TFVG-183/2015	MoFA Netherlands	2015
	Brief aan Tweede Kamer betr. Vrouwen, Vrede en Veiligheid	MinBuiza-2016.41270 van 8 Maart 2016	MoFA Netherlands	2016
	Order of the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of 3 May 2016, no. MINBUZA-2016.242245, laying down administrative rules and a ceiling for grants awarded under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Grant Regulations 2006 (Women, Peace and Security 2016-2019)		MoFA Netherlands	2016
	Order of the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of 8 January, no. DHS_2016.18114, laying down administrative rules and a ceiling for grants awarded under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Grant Regulations 2006 (Addressing Root Causes Fund 2016-2021)		MoFA Netherlands	2016
	Dutch National Action Plan on Resolution 1325	Taking a stand for women, peace and security	MoFA Netherlands	2017
	Wereldwijd voor een Veilig Nederland	Geïntegreerde Buitenland- en Veiligheidsstrategie 2018-2021	MoFA Netherlands	2018
	Investing in Global Prospects	For The World - For The Netherlands	MoFA Netherlands	2018
	Denmark's National Action Plan for Implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1325 on Women Peace and Security 2014-2019		MoFA, MoD and MoJ Denmark	2014
	Brief aan de Tweede Kamer betreffende Nederlandse bijdrage aan MINUSMA in 2019 en veiligheidsinzet in de Sahel 2019 tot en met 2021	BZDOC-1730042396-47	MoFA, MoD and MoSJ The Netherlands	2018
	NATO/EAPC Women, Peace and Security	Policy and Action Plan 2018	NATO	2018
Maggi Poppe	Resolutie 1325 van de VN Veiligheidsraad uitvoeren in Vlaanderen		Nederlandstalige Vrouwenraad vzw	2012
	Manifest Vrouwen Vluchtelingen Veiligheid		NVR en anderen	2018

Dorothea Hilhorst, Holly Porter and Rachel Gordon	Gender, sexuality, and violence in humanitarian crises	in: Disasters, Vol 42, Issue S1	ODI	2018
	Masculinities, conflict and peacebuilding,	Perspectives on men through a gender lens	Saferworld	2014
UNSG	Golas and targets (from the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development)	A/RES/71/313 - E/CN.3/2018/2	UN	2018
UNSG	Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security	Role of Indicators in monitoring implementation of UNSCR 1325 - S/2010/173	UNSC	2010
UNSG	Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security	Overview of Progress - S/2016/822	UNSC	2016
	Women's Meaningful Participation in Negotiating Peace and the Implementation of Peace Agreements	Report of the Expert Group Meeting May 2018	UNWomen	2018
Colleen Bromberger	Report on Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security, October 2018		WILPF	2018
	18TH Anniversary of UNSC Resolution 1325: Women Peace and Security Week	Highlights from the UNSCR1325+18 week: Dismantling Patriarchy and Ensuring Women's Meaningful Participation	WILPF	2018
	Meerjarenplan 2018-2021	WO=MEN Dutch Gender Platform	WO=MEN	2018